{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2026,6,2]],"date-time":"2026-06-02T17:49:33Z","timestamp":1780422573068,"version":"3.54.1"},"publisher-location":"Cham","reference-count":34,"publisher":"Springer International Publishing","isbn-type":[{"value":"9783030649456","type":"print"},{"value":"9783030649463","type":"electronic"}],"license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2020,1,1]],"date-time":"2020-01-01T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1577836800000},"content-version":"tdm","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"http:\/\/www.springer.com\/tdm"},{"start":{"date-parts":[[2020,1,1]],"date-time":"2020-01-01T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1577836800000},"content-version":"vor","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"http:\/\/www.springer.com\/tdm"}],"content-domain":{"domain":["link.springer.com"],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":[],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2020]]},"DOI":"10.1007\/978-3-030-64946-3_26","type":"book-chapter","created":{"date-parts":[[2020,12,5]],"date-time":"2020-12-05T09:03:39Z","timestamp":1607159019000},"page":"370-383","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/springer_crossmark_policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":35,"title":["Fair Division with Binary Valuations: One Rule to Rule Them All"],"prefix":"10.1007","author":[{"given":"Daniel","family":"Halpern","sequence":"first","affiliation":[],"role":[{"vocabulary":"crossref","role":"author"}]},{"given":"Ariel D.","family":"Procaccia","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[],"role":[{"vocabulary":"crossref","role":"author"}]},{"given":"Alexandros","family":"Psomas","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[],"role":[{"vocabulary":"crossref","role":"author"}]},{"given":"Nisarg","family":"Shah","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[],"role":[{"vocabulary":"crossref","role":"author"}]}],"member":"297","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2020,12,6]]},"reference":[{"key":"26_CR1","unstructured":"Aleksandrov, M., Aziz, H., Gaspers, S., Walsh, T.: Online fair division: analysing a food bank problem. In: Proceedings of the 24th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI), pp. 2540\u20132546 (2015)"},{"key":"26_CR2","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Amanatidis, G., Birmpas, G., Christodoulou, G., Markakis, E.: Truthful allocation mechanisms without payments: characterization and implications on fairness. In: Proceedings of the 18th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC), pp. 545\u2013562 (2017)","DOI":"10.1145\/3033274.3085147"},{"key":"26_CR3","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Amanatidis, G., Birmpas, G., Filos-Ratsikas, A., Hollender, A., Voudouris, A.A.: Maximum Nash welfare and other stories about EFX. In: Proceedings of the 29th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI) (2020, forthcoming)","DOI":"10.24963\/ijcai.2020\/4"},{"key":"26_CR4","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Aziz, H., Rey, S.: Almost group envy-free allocation of indivisible goods and chores. In: Proceedings of the 29th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI) (2020)","DOI":"10.24963\/ijcai.2020\/6"},{"key":"26_CR5","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Babaioff, M., Ezra, T., Feige, U.: Fair and truthful mechanisms for dichotomous valuations. arXiv preprint arXiv:2002.10704 (2020)","DOI":"10.1609\/aaai.v35i6.16647"},{"key":"26_CR6","unstructured":"Barman, S., Krishnamurthy, S.K., Vaish, R.: Greedy algorithms for maximizing Nash social welfare. In: Proceedings of the 17th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems (AAMAS), pp. 7\u201313 (2018)"},{"key":"26_CR7","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Benabbou, N., Chakraborty, M., Igarashi, A., Zick, Y.: Finding fair and efficient allocations when valuations don\u2019t add up. arXiv preprint arXiv:2003.07060 (2020)","DOI":"10.1007\/978-3-030-57980-7_3"},{"key":"26_CR8","first-page":"147","volume":"5","author":"G Birkhoff","year":"1946","unstructured":"Birkhoff, G.: Three observations on linear algebra. Universidad Nacional de Tucum\u00e1n, Revista A 5, 147\u2013151 (1946)","journal-title":"Universidad Nacional de Tucum\u00e1n, Revista A"},{"key":"26_CR9","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"257","DOI":"10.1111\/j.1468-0262.2004.00483.x","volume":"72","author":"A Bogomolnaia","year":"2004","unstructured":"Bogomolnaia, A., Moulin, H.: Random matching under dichotomous preferences. Econometrica 72, 257\u2013279 (2004)","journal-title":"Econometrica"},{"issue":"2","key":"26_CR10","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"165","DOI":"10.1016\/j.jet.2004.05.005","volume":"122","author":"A Bogomolnaia","year":"2005","unstructured":"Bogomolnaia, A., Moulin, H., Stong, R.: Collective choice under dichotomous preferences. J. Econ. Theory 122(2), 165\u2013184 (2005)","journal-title":"J. Econ. Theory"},{"issue":"2","key":"26_CR11","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"259","DOI":"10.1007\/s10458-015-9287-3","volume":"30","author":"S Bouveret","year":"2016","unstructured":"Bouveret, S., Lema\u00eetre, M.: Characterizing conflicts in fair division of indivisible goods using a scale of criteria. Auton. Agents Multi-Agent Syst. 30(2), 259\u2013290 (2016)","journal-title":"Auton. Agents Multi-Agent Syst."},{"key":"26_CR12","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1007\/978-0-387-49896-6","volume-title":"Approval Voting","author":"SJ Brams","year":"2007","unstructured":"Brams, S.J., Fishburn, P.C.: Approval Voting, 2nd edn. Springer, New York (2007). https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/978-0-387-49896-6","edition":"2"},{"key":"26_CR13","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1017\/CBO9780511598975","volume-title":"Fair Division: From Cake-Cutting to Dispute Resolution","author":"SJ Brams","year":"1996","unstructured":"Brams, S.J., Taylor, A.D.: Fair Division: From Cake-Cutting to Dispute Resolution. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (1996)"},{"issue":"6","key":"26_CR14","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"1061","DOI":"10.1086\/664613","volume":"119","author":"E Budish","year":"2011","unstructured":"Budish, E.: The combinatorial assignment problem: approximate competitive equilibrium from equal incomes. J. Polit. Econ. 119(6), 1061\u20131103 (2011)","journal-title":"J. Polit. Econ."},{"issue":"2","key":"26_CR15","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"585","DOI":"10.1257\/aer.103.2.585","volume":"103","author":"E Budish","year":"2013","unstructured":"Budish, E., Che, Y.K., Kojima, F., Milgrom, P.: Designing random allocation mechanisms: theory and applications. Am. Econ. Rev. 103(2), 585\u2013623 (2013)","journal-title":"Am. Econ. Rev."},{"key":"26_CR16","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Caragiannis, I., Kurokawa, D., Moulin, H., Procaccia, A.D., Shah, N., Wang, J.: The unreasonable fairness of maximum Nash welfare. ACM Trans. Econ. Comput. 7(3), article 12 (2019)","DOI":"10.1145\/3355902"},{"key":"26_CR17","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Cheng, Y., Jiang, Z., Munagala, K., Wang, K.: Group fairness in committee selection. In: Proceedings of the 20th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC), pp. 263\u2013279 (2019)","DOI":"10.1145\/3328526.3329577"},{"issue":"3","key":"26_CR18","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"1211","DOI":"10.1137\/15M1053682","volume":"47","author":"R Cole","year":"2018","unstructured":"Cole, R., Gkatzelis, V.: Approximating the Nash social welfare with indivisible items. SIAM J. Comput. 47(3), 1211\u20131236 (2018)","journal-title":"SIAM J. Comput."},{"key":"26_CR19","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Cole, R., Gkatzelis, V., Goel, G.: Mechanism design for fair division: allocating divisible items without payments. In: Proceedings of the 14th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC), pp. 251\u2013268 (2013)","DOI":"10.1145\/2482540.2482582"},{"issue":"2","key":"26_CR20","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"548","DOI":"10.1016\/j.ejor.2015.05.071","volume":"247","author":"A Darmann","year":"2015","unstructured":"Darmann, A., Schauer, J.: Maximizing Nash product social welfare in allocating indivisible goods. Eur. J. Oper. Res. 247(2), 548\u2013559 (2015)","journal-title":"Eur. J. Oper. Res."},{"key":"26_CR21","unstructured":"Foley, D.K.: Resource allocation and the public sector. Yale Economics Essays, vol. 7, pp. 45\u201398 (1967)"},{"key":"26_CR22","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Freeman, R., Shah, N., Vaish, R.: Best of both worlds: ex-ante and ex-post fairness in resource allocation. In: Proceedings of the 21st ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC) (2020, forthcoming)","DOI":"10.1145\/3391403.3399537"},{"key":"26_CR23","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Freeman, R., Sikdar, S., Vaish, R., Xia, L.: Equitable allocations of indivisible goods. In: Proceedings of the 28th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI), pp. 280\u2013286 (2019)","DOI":"10.24963\/ijcai.2019\/40"},{"key":"26_CR24","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"421","DOI":"10.1007\/s001820100088","volume":"30","author":"B Klaus","year":"2001","unstructured":"Klaus, B., Miyagawa, E.: Strategy-proofness, solidarity, and consistency for multiple assignment problems. Int. J. Game Theory 30, 421\u2013435 (2001)","journal-title":"Int. J. Game Theory"},{"key":"26_CR25","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Kurokawa, D., Procaccia, A.D., Shah, N.: Leximin allocations in the real world. ACM Trans. Econ. Comput. 6(3\u20134), article 11 (2018)","DOI":"10.1145\/3274641"},{"key":"26_CR26","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Lackner, M., Skowron, P.: A quantitative analysis of multi-winner rules. In: Proceedings of the 28th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI), pp. 407\u2013413 (2019)","DOI":"10.24963\/ijcai.2019\/58"},{"key":"26_CR27","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Lipton, R.J., Markakis, E., Mossel, E., Saberi, A.: On approximately fair allocations of indivisible goods. In: Proceedings of the 6th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC), pp. 125\u2013131 (2004)","DOI":"10.1145\/988772.988792"},{"key":"26_CR28","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.7551\/mitpress\/2954.001.0001","volume-title":"Fair Division and Collective Welfare","author":"H Moulin","year":"2003","unstructured":"Moulin, H.: Fair Division and Collective Welfare. MIT Press, Cambridge (2003)"},{"key":"26_CR29","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"von Neumann, J.: A certain zero-sum two-person game equivalent to the optimal assignment problem. In: Kuhn, W., Tucker, A.W. (eds.) Contributions to the Theory of Games, vol. 2, pp. 5\u201312. Princeton University Press (1953)","DOI":"10.1515\/9781400881970-002"},{"key":"26_CR30","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Orlin, J.B.: Improved algorithms for computing fisher\u2019s market clearing prices: computing fisher\u2019s market clearing prices. In: Proceedings of the 42nd Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC), pp. 291\u2013300 (2010)","DOI":"10.1145\/1806689.1806731"},{"key":"26_CR31","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"15","DOI":"10.1016\/j.mathsocsci.2019.11.003","volume":"103","author":"J Ortega","year":"2020","unstructured":"Ortega, J.: Multi-unit assignment under dichotomous preferences. Math. Soc. Sci. 103, 15\u201324 (2020)","journal-title":"Math. Soc. Sci."},{"key":"26_CR32","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Plaut, B., Roughgarden, T.: Almost envy-freeness with general valuations. In: Proceedings of the 29th Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA), pp. 2584\u20132603 (2018)","DOI":"10.1137\/1.9781611975031.165"},{"key":"26_CR33","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"63","DOI":"10.1016\/0022-0531(74)90075-1","volume":"9","author":"H Varian","year":"1974","unstructured":"Varian, H.: Equity, envy and efficiency. J. Econ. Theory 9, 63\u201391 (1974)","journal-title":"J. Econ. Theory"},{"issue":"2","key":"26_CR34","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"573","DOI":"10.1287\/moor.2013.0623","volume":"39","author":"LA V\u00e9gh","year":"2013","unstructured":"V\u00e9gh, L.A.: Concave generalized flows with applications to market equilibria. Math. Oper. Res. 39(2), 573\u2013596 (2013)","journal-title":"Math. Oper. Res."}],"container-title":["Lecture Notes in Computer Science","Web and Internet Economics"],"original-title":[],"language":"en","link":[{"URL":"http:\/\/link.springer.com\/content\/pdf\/10.1007\/978-3-030-64946-3_26","content-type":"unspecified","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"similarity-checking"}],"deposited":{"date-parts":[[2023,10,14]],"date-time":"2023-10-14T17:19:28Z","timestamp":1697303968000},"score":1,"resource":{"primary":{"URL":"http:\/\/link.springer.com\/10.1007\/978-3-030-64946-3_26"}},"subtitle":[],"short-title":[],"issued":{"date-parts":[[2020]]},"ISBN":["9783030649456","9783030649463"],"references-count":34,"URL":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/978-3-030-64946-3_26","relation":{},"ISSN":["0302-9743","1611-3349"],"issn-type":[{"value":"0302-9743","type":"print"},{"value":"1611-3349","type":"electronic"}],"subject":[],"published":{"date-parts":[[2020]]},"assertion":[{"value":"6 December 2020","order":1,"name":"first_online","label":"First Online","group":{"name":"ChapterHistory","label":"Chapter History"}},{"value":"WINE","order":1,"name":"conference_acronym","label":"Conference Acronym","group":{"name":"ConferenceInfo","label":"Conference Information"}},{"value":"International Conference on Web and Internet Economics","order":2,"name":"conference_name","label":"Conference Name","group":{"name":"ConferenceInfo","label":"Conference Information"}},{"value":"Beijing","order":3,"name":"conference_city","label":"Conference City","group":{"name":"ConferenceInfo","label":"Conference Information"}},{"value":"China","order":4,"name":"conference_country","label":"Conference Country","group":{"name":"ConferenceInfo","label":"Conference Information"}},{"value":"2020","order":5,"name":"conference_year","label":"Conference Year","group":{"name":"ConferenceInfo","label":"Conference Information"}},{"value":"7 December 2020","order":7,"name":"conference_start_date","label":"Conference Start Date","group":{"name":"ConferenceInfo","label":"Conference Information"}},{"value":"11 December 2020","order":8,"name":"conference_end_date","label":"Conference End Date","group":{"name":"ConferenceInfo","label":"Conference Information"}},{"value":"16","order":9,"name":"conference_number","label":"Conference Number","group":{"name":"ConferenceInfo","label":"Conference Information"}},{"value":"wine2020","order":10,"name":"conference_id","label":"Conference ID","group":{"name":"ConferenceInfo","label":"Conference Information"}},{"value":"https:\/\/econcs.pku.edu.cn\/wine2020\/","order":11,"name":"conference_url","label":"Conference URL","group":{"name":"ConferenceInfo","label":"Conference Information"}},{"value":"Single-blind","order":1,"name":"type","label":"Type","group":{"name":"ConfEventPeerReviewInformation","label":"Peer Review Information (provided by the conference organizers)"}},{"value":"EasyChair","order":2,"name":"conference_management_system","label":"Conference Management System","group":{"name":"ConfEventPeerReviewInformation","label":"Peer Review Information (provided by the conference organizers)"}},{"value":"136","order":3,"name":"number_of_submissions_sent_for_review","label":"Number of Submissions Sent for Review","group":{"name":"ConfEventPeerReviewInformation","label":"Peer Review Information (provided by the conference organizers)"}},{"value":"31","order":4,"name":"number_of_full_papers_accepted","label":"Number of Full Papers Accepted","group":{"name":"ConfEventPeerReviewInformation","label":"Peer Review Information (provided by the conference organizers)"}},{"value":"11","order":5,"name":"number_of_short_papers_accepted","label":"Number of Short Papers Accepted","group":{"name":"ConfEventPeerReviewInformation","label":"Peer Review Information (provided by the conference organizers)"}},{"value":"23% - The value is computed by the equation \"Number of Full Papers Accepted \/ Number of Submissions Sent for Review * 100\" and then rounded to a whole number.","order":6,"name":"acceptance_rate_of_full_papers","label":"Acceptance Rate of Full Papers","group":{"name":"ConfEventPeerReviewInformation","label":"Peer Review Information (provided by the conference organizers)"}},{"value":"3","order":7,"name":"average_number_of_reviews_per_paper","label":"Average Number of Reviews per Paper","group":{"name":"ConfEventPeerReviewInformation","label":"Peer Review Information (provided by the conference organizers)"}},{"value":"10","order":8,"name":"average_number_of_papers_per_reviewer","label":"Average Number of Papers per Reviewer","group":{"name":"ConfEventPeerReviewInformation","label":"Peer Review Information (provided by the conference organizers)"}},{"value":"Yes","order":9,"name":"external_reviewers_involved","label":"External Reviewers Involved","group":{"name":"ConfEventPeerReviewInformation","label":"Peer Review Information (provided by the conference organizers)"}}]}}