{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2025,3,25]],"date-time":"2025-03-25T14:29:42Z","timestamp":1742912982961,"version":"3.40.3"},"publisher-location":"Cham","reference-count":27,"publisher":"Springer Nature Switzerland","isbn-type":[{"type":"print","value":"9783031489730"},{"type":"electronic","value":"9783031489747"}],"license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2023,12,31]],"date-time":"2023-12-31T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1703980800000},"content-version":"tdm","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/www.springernature.com\/gp\/researchers\/text-and-data-mining"},{"start":{"date-parts":[[2023,12,31]],"date-time":"2023-12-31T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1703980800000},"content-version":"vor","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/www.springernature.com\/gp\/researchers\/text-and-data-mining"}],"content-domain":{"domain":["link.springer.com"],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":[],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2024]]},"DOI":"10.1007\/978-3-031-48974-7_37","type":"book-chapter","created":{"date-parts":[[2023,12,30]],"date-time":"2023-12-30T18:01:32Z","timestamp":1703959292000},"page":"654-671","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/springer_crossmark_policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":0,"title":["Reallocation Mechanisms Under Distributional Constraints in the Full Preference Domain"],"prefix":"10.1007","author":[{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0003-3427-9014","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Jinshan","family":"Zhang","sequence":"first","affiliation":[],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]},{"given":"Bo","family":"Tang","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]},{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0002-8632-1539","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Xiaoye","family":"Miao","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]},{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0003-4703-7348","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Jianwei","family":"Yin","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]}],"member":"297","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2023,12,31]]},"reference":[{"doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Abdulkadiro\u011flu, A., Che, Y.K., Pathak, P.A., Roth, A.E., Tercieux, O.: Minimizing justified envy in school choice: the design of new orleans\u2019 oneapp. Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Research (2017)","key":"37_CR1","DOI":"10.3386\/w23265"},{"issue":"2","key":"37_CR2","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"233","DOI":"10.1006\/jeth.1999.2553","volume":"88","author":"A Abdulkadiro\u011flu","year":"1999","unstructured":"Abdulkadiro\u011flu, A., S\u00f6nmez, T.: House allocation with existing tenants. J. Econ. Theory 88(2), 233\u2013260 (1999)","journal-title":"J. Econ. Theory"},{"issue":"3","key":"37_CR3","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"729","DOI":"10.1257\/000282803322157061","volume":"93","author":"A Abdulkadiro\u011flu","year":"2003","unstructured":"Abdulkadiro\u011flu, A., S\u00f6nmez, T.: School choice: a mechanism design approach. Am. Econ. Rev. 93(3), 729\u2013747 (2003)","journal-title":"Am. Econ. Rev."},{"issue":"3","key":"37_CR4","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"481","DOI":"10.1007\/s00182-010-0251-9","volume":"40","author":"S Athanassoglou","year":"2011","unstructured":"Athanassoglou, S., Sethuraman, J.: House allocation with fractional endowments. Int. J. Game Theory 40(3), 481\u2013513 (2011)","journal-title":"Int. J. Game Theory"},{"doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Aziz, H., Bir\u00f3, P., Yokoo, M.: Matching market design with constraints. In: Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (2022)","key":"37_CR5","DOI":"10.1609\/aaai.v36i11.21495"},{"issue":"2","key":"37_CR6","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"161","DOI":"10.1016\/j.jet.2004.05.004","volume":"123","author":"A Bogomolnaia","year":"2005","unstructured":"Bogomolnaia, A., Deb, R., Ehlers, L.: Strategy-proof assignment on the full preference domain. J. Econ. Theory 123(2), 161\u2013186 (2005)","journal-title":"J. Econ. Theory"},{"issue":"6","key":"37_CR7","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"3154","DOI":"10.1093\/restud\/rdac002","volume":"89","author":"J Combe","year":"2022","unstructured":"Combe, J., Tercieux, O., Terrier, C.: The design of teacher assignment: theory and evidence. Rev. Econ. Stud. 89(6), 3154\u20133222 (2022)","journal-title":"Rev. Econ. Stud."},{"issue":"2","key":"37_CR8","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"734","DOI":"10.1287\/moor.2015.0751","volume":"41","author":"T Fleiner","year":"2016","unstructured":"Fleiner, T., Kamiyama, N.: A matroid approach to stable matchings with lower quotas. Math. Oper. Res. 41(2), 734\u2013744 (2016)","journal-title":"Math. Oper. Res."},{"key":"37_CR9","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"47","DOI":"10.1016\/j.artint.2017.04.006","volume":"249","author":"N Hamada","year":"2017","unstructured":"Hamada, N., Hsu, C.L., Kurata, R., Suzuki, T., Ueda, S., Yokoo, M.: Strategy-proof school choice mechanisms with minimum quotas and initial endowments. Artif. Intell. 249, 47\u201371 (2017)","journal-title":"Artif. Intell."},{"doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Huang, C.C.: Classified stable matching. In: Proceedings of the Twenty-First Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, pp. 1235\u20131253. SIAM (2010)","key":"37_CR10","DOI":"10.1137\/1.9781611973075.99"},{"issue":"5","key":"37_CR11","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"1913","DOI":"10.1016\/j.jet.2012.05.017","volume":"147","author":"P Jaramillo","year":"2012","unstructured":"Jaramillo, P., Manjunath, V.: The difference indifference makes in strategy-proof allocation of objects. J. Econ. Theory 147(5), 1913\u20131946 (2012)","journal-title":"J. Econ. Theory"},{"issue":"1","key":"37_CR12","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"67","DOI":"10.1257\/aer.20101552","volume":"105","author":"Y Kamada","year":"2015","unstructured":"Kamada, Y., Kojima, F.: Efficient matching under distributional constraints: theory and applications. Am. Econ. Rev. 105(1), 67\u201399 (2015)","journal-title":"Am. Econ. Rev."},{"issue":"2","key":"37_CR13","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"761","DOI":"10.3982\/TE2717","volume":"13","author":"Y Kamada","year":"2018","unstructured":"Kamada, Y., Kojima, F.: Stability and strategy-proofness for matching with constraints: a necessary and sufficient condition. Theor. Econ. 13(2), 761\u2013793 (2018)","journal-title":"Theor. Econ."},{"issue":"3","key":"37_CR14","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"1431","DOI":"10.1137\/17M1149717","volume":"33","author":"N Kamiyama","year":"2019","unstructured":"Kamiyama, N.: Pareto stable matchings under one-sided matroid constraints. SIAM J. Discret. Math. 33(3), 1431\u20131451 (2019)","journal-title":"SIAM J. Discret. Math."},{"unstructured":"Kamiyama, N.: On stable matchings with pairwise preferences and matroid constraints. In: Proceedings of the 19th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, pp. 584\u2013592 (2020)","key":"37_CR15"},{"key":"37_CR16","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"265","DOI":"10.1016\/j.tcs.2019.12.017","volume":"809","author":"N Kamiyama","year":"2020","unstructured":"Kamiyama, N.: Popular matchings with two-sided preference lists and matroid constraints. Theor. Comput. Sci. 809, 265\u2013276 (2020)","journal-title":"Theor. Comput. Sci."},{"doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Lesca, J., Fujita, E., Sonoda, A., Todo, T., Yokoo, M.: A complexity approach for core-selecting exchange with multiple indivisible goods under lexicographic preferences. In: Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (2015)","key":"37_CR17","DOI":"10.1609\/aaai.v29i1.9318"},{"issue":"6","key":"37_CR18","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"1403","DOI":"10.1111\/1468-0262.00166","volume":"68","author":"S P\u00e1pai","year":"2000","unstructured":"P\u00e1pai, S.: Strategyproof assignment by hierarchical exchange. Econometrica 68(6), 1403\u20131433 (2000)","journal-title":"Econometrica"},{"unstructured":"Plaxton, C.G.: A simple family of top trading cycles mechanisms for housing markets with indifferences. In: Proceedings of the 24th International Conference on Game Theory at Stony Brook (2013)","key":"37_CR19"},{"issue":"1","key":"37_CR20","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"287","DOI":"10.3982\/TE2201","volume":"12","author":"M Pycia","year":"2017","unstructured":"Pycia, M., \u00dcnver, M.U.: Incentive compatible allocation and exchange of discrete resources. Theor. Econ. 12(1), 287\u2013329 (2017)","journal-title":"Theor. Econ."},{"doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Saban, D., Sethuraman, J.: House allocation with indifferences: a generalization and a unified view. In: Proceedings of the EC \u201913, pp. 803\u2013820. ACM (2013)","key":"37_CR21","DOI":"10.1145\/2482540.2482574"},{"unstructured":"Schrijver, A.: Combinatorial Optimization: Polyhedra and Efficiency, vol. 24. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg (2003)","key":"37_CR22"},{"issue":"1","key":"37_CR23","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"23","DOI":"10.1016\/0304-4068(74)90033-0","volume":"1","author":"L Shapley","year":"1974","unstructured":"Shapley, L., Scarf, H.: On cores and indivisibility. J. Math. Econ. 1(1), 23\u201337 (1974)","journal-title":"J. Math. Econ."},{"doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Sikdar, S., Adali, S., Xia, L.: Mechanism design for multi-type housing markets. In: Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, vol. 31 (2017)","key":"37_CR24","DOI":"10.1609\/aaai.v31i1.10601"},{"unstructured":"Sun, Z., Hata, H., Todo, T., Yokoo, M.: Exchange of indivisible objects with asymmetry. In: Twenty-Fourth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (2015)","key":"37_CR25"},{"unstructured":"Suzuki, T., Tamura, A., Yokoo, M.: Efficient allocation mechanism with endowments and distributional constraints. In: Proceedings of the 17th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems, pp. 50\u201358 (2018)","key":"37_CR26"},{"unstructured":"Terrier, C.: Matching practices for secondary public school teacher France, MiP country profile 20 (2014)","key":"37_CR27"}],"container-title":["Lecture Notes in Computer Science","Web and Internet Economics"],"original-title":[],"language":"en","link":[{"URL":"https:\/\/link.springer.com\/content\/pdf\/10.1007\/978-3-031-48974-7_37","content-type":"unspecified","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"similarity-checking"}],"deposited":{"date-parts":[[2023,12,31]],"date-time":"2023-12-31T02:07:08Z","timestamp":1703988428000},"score":1,"resource":{"primary":{"URL":"https:\/\/link.springer.com\/10.1007\/978-3-031-48974-7_37"}},"subtitle":[],"short-title":[],"issued":{"date-parts":[[2023,12,31]]},"ISBN":["9783031489730","9783031489747"],"references-count":27,"URL":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/978-3-031-48974-7_37","relation":{},"ISSN":["0302-9743","1611-3349"],"issn-type":[{"type":"print","value":"0302-9743"},{"type":"electronic","value":"1611-3349"}],"subject":[],"published":{"date-parts":[[2023,12,31]]},"assertion":[{"value":"31 December 2023","order":1,"name":"first_online","label":"First Online","group":{"name":"ChapterHistory","label":"Chapter History"}},{"value":"WINE","order":1,"name":"conference_acronym","label":"Conference Acronym","group":{"name":"ConferenceInfo","label":"Conference Information"}},{"value":"International Conference on Web and Internet Economics","order":2,"name":"conference_name","label":"Conference Name","group":{"name":"ConferenceInfo","label":"Conference Information"}},{"value":"Shanghai","order":3,"name":"conference_city","label":"Conference City","group":{"name":"ConferenceInfo","label":"Conference Information"}},{"value":"China","order":4,"name":"conference_country","label":"Conference Country","group":{"name":"ConferenceInfo","label":"Conference Information"}},{"value":"2023","order":5,"name":"conference_year","label":"Conference Year","group":{"name":"ConferenceInfo","label":"Conference Information"}},{"value":"4 December 2023","order":7,"name":"conference_start_date","label":"Conference Start Date","group":{"name":"ConferenceInfo","label":"Conference Information"}},{"value":"8 December 2023","order":8,"name":"conference_end_date","label":"Conference End Date","group":{"name":"ConferenceInfo","label":"Conference Information"}},{"value":"19","order":9,"name":"conference_number","label":"Conference Number","group":{"name":"ConferenceInfo","label":"Conference Information"}},{"value":"wine2023","order":10,"name":"conference_id","label":"Conference ID","group":{"name":"ConferenceInfo","label":"Conference Information"}},{"value":"https:\/\/wine2023.shanghaitech.edu.cn\/","order":11,"name":"conference_url","label":"Conference URL","group":{"name":"ConferenceInfo","label":"Conference Information"}},{"value":"Double-blind","order":1,"name":"type","label":"Type","group":{"name":"ConfEventPeerReviewInformation","label":"Peer Review Information (provided by the conference organizers)"}},{"value":"EasyChair","order":2,"name":"conference_management_system","label":"Conference Management System","group":{"name":"ConfEventPeerReviewInformation","label":"Peer Review Information (provided by the conference organizers)"}},{"value":"221","order":3,"name":"number_of_submissions_sent_for_review","label":"Number of Submissions Sent for Review","group":{"name":"ConfEventPeerReviewInformation","label":"Peer Review Information (provided by the conference organizers)"}},{"value":"37","order":4,"name":"number_of_full_papers_accepted","label":"Number of Full Papers Accepted","group":{"name":"ConfEventPeerReviewInformation","label":"Peer Review Information (provided by the conference organizers)"}},{"value":"0","order":5,"name":"number_of_short_papers_accepted","label":"Number of Short Papers Accepted","group":{"name":"ConfEventPeerReviewInformation","label":"Peer Review Information (provided by the conference organizers)"}},{"value":"17% - The value is computed by the equation \"Number of Full Papers Accepted \/ Number of Submissions Sent for Review * 100\" and then rounded to a whole number.","order":6,"name":"acceptance_rate_of_full_papers","label":"Acceptance Rate of Full Papers","group":{"name":"ConfEventPeerReviewInformation","label":"Peer Review Information (provided by the conference organizers)"}},{"value":"3","order":7,"name":"average_number_of_reviews_per_paper","label":"Average Number of Reviews per Paper","group":{"name":"ConfEventPeerReviewInformation","label":"Peer Review Information (provided by the conference organizers)"}},{"value":"8","order":8,"name":"average_number_of_papers_per_reviewer","label":"Average Number of Papers per Reviewer","group":{"name":"ConfEventPeerReviewInformation","label":"Peer Review Information (provided by the conference organizers)"}},{"value":"No","order":9,"name":"external_reviewers_involved","label":"External Reviewers Involved","group":{"name":"ConfEventPeerReviewInformation","label":"Peer Review Information (provided by the conference organizers)"}},{"value":"29 one-page abstracts accepted","order":10,"name":"additional_info_on_review_process","label":"Additional Info on Review Process","group":{"name":"ConfEventPeerReviewInformation","label":"Peer Review Information (provided by the conference organizers)"}}]}}