{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2025,3,26]],"date-time":"2025-03-26T13:25:06Z","timestamp":1742995506768,"version":"3.40.3"},"publisher-location":"Cham","reference-count":41,"publisher":"Springer Nature Switzerland","isbn-type":[{"type":"print","value":"9783031710322"},{"type":"electronic","value":"9783031710339"}],"license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2024,1,1]],"date-time":"2024-01-01T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1704067200000},"content-version":"tdm","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/www.springernature.com\/gp\/researchers\/text-and-data-mining"},{"start":{"date-parts":[[2024,1,1]],"date-time":"2024-01-01T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1704067200000},"content-version":"vor","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/www.springernature.com\/gp\/researchers\/text-and-data-mining"}],"content-domain":{"domain":["link.springer.com"],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":[],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2024]]},"DOI":"10.1007\/978-3-031-71033-9_5","type":"book-chapter","created":{"date-parts":[[2024,9,3]],"date-time":"2024-09-03T00:02:17Z","timestamp":1725321737000},"page":"72-88","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/springer_crossmark_policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":0,"title":["Fair Division with\u00a0Interdependent Values"],"prefix":"10.1007","author":[{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0003-4733-7885","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Georgios","family":"Birmpas","sequence":"first","affiliation":[],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]},{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0003-0626-4851","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Tomer","family":"Ezra","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]},{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0002-9809-7191","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Stefano","family":"Leonardi","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]},{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0003-2047-4089","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Matteo","family":"Russo","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]}],"member":"297","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2024,8,31]]},"reference":[{"key":"5_CR1","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Amanatidis, G., Birmpas, G., Christodoulou, G., Markakis, E.: Truthful allocation mechanisms without payments: characterization and implications on fairness. In: Proceedings of the 2017 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, EC 2017, pp. 545\u2013562. ACM (2017)","DOI":"10.1145\/3033274.3085147"},{"key":"5_CR2","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Amanatidis, G., Birmpas, G., Filos-Ratsikas, A., Voudouris, A.A.: Fair division of indivisible goods: a survey. In: IJCAI, pp. 5385\u20135393. ijcai.org (2022)","DOI":"10.24963\/ijcai.2022\/756"},{"key":"5_CR3","series-title":"Lecture Notes in Computer Science","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"149","DOI":"10.1007\/978-3-030-94676-0_9","volume-title":"Web and Internet Economics","author":"G Amanatidis","year":"2022","unstructured":"Amanatidis, G., Birmpas, G., Fusco, F., Lazos, P., Leonardi, S., Reiffenh\u00e4user, R.: Allocating indivisible goods to strategic agents: pure Nash equilibria and fairness. In: Feldman, M., Fu, H., Talgam-Cohen, I. (eds.) WINE 2021. LNCS, vol. 13112, pp. 149\u2013166. Springer, Cham (2022). https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/978-3-030-94676-0_9"},{"key":"5_CR4","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Amanatidis, G., Birmpas, G., Lazos, P., Leonardi, S., Reiffenh\u00e4user, R.: Round-robin beyond additive agents: existence and fairness of approximate equilibria. In: EC, pp. 67\u201387. ACM (2023)","DOI":"10.1145\/3580507.3597796"},{"key":"5_CR5","unstructured":"Amanatidis, G., Birmpas, G., Markakis, E.: On truthful mechanisms for maximin share allocations. In: Proceedings of the 25th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2016, pp. 31\u201337. IJCAI\/AAAI Press (2016)"},{"key":"5_CR6","series-title":"Lecture Notes in Computer Science","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"341","DOI":"10.1007\/978-3-030-64946-3_24","volume-title":"Web and Internet Economics","author":"H Aziz","year":"2020","unstructured":"Aziz, H.: Simultaneously achieving ex-ante and ex-post fairness. In: Chen, X., Gravin, N., Hoefer, M., Mehta, R. (eds.) WINE 2020. LNCS, vol. 12495, pp. 341\u2013355. Springer, Cham (2020). https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/978-3-030-64946-3_24"},{"key":"5_CR7","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Babaioff, M., Ezra, T., Feige, U.: Fair and truthful mechanisms for dichotomous valuations. In: Proceedings of the 35th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2021, pp. 5119\u20135126. AAAI Press (2021)","DOI":"10.1609\/aaai.v35i6.16647"},{"key":"5_CR8","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Babaioff, M., Ezra, T., Feige, U.: Fair-share allocations for agents with arbitrary entitlements. In: EC, p.\u00a0127. ACM (2021)","DOI":"10.1145\/3465456.3467559"},{"issue":"1","key":"5_CR9","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"382","DOI":"10.1287\/moor.2020.1062","volume":"46","author":"M Babaioff","year":"2021","unstructured":"Babaioff, M., Nisan, N., Talgam-Cohen, I.: Competitive equilibrium with indivisible goods and generic budgets. Math. Oper. Res. 46(1), 382\u2013403 (2021)","journal-title":"Math. Oper. Res."},{"key":"5_CR10","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Barman, S., Verma, P.: Truthful and fair mechanisms for matroid-rank valuations. In: AAAI, pp. 4801\u20134808. AAAI Press (2022)","DOI":"10.1609\/aaai.v36i5.20407"},{"key":"5_CR11","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Birmpas, G., Ezra, T., Leonardi, S., Russo, M.: Fair division with interdependent values. arXiv preprint arXiv:2305.14096 (2023)","DOI":"10.1007\/978-3-031-71033-9_5"},{"issue":"6","key":"5_CR12","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"1061","DOI":"10.1086\/664613","volume":"119","author":"E Budish","year":"2011","unstructured":"Budish, E.: The combinatorial assignment problem: approximate competitive equilibrium from equal incomes. J. Polit. Econ. 119(6), 1061\u20131103 (2011)","journal-title":"J. Polit. Econ."},{"key":"5_CR13","series-title":"Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence)","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"111","DOI":"10.1007\/978-3-642-04428-1_10","volume-title":"Algorithmic Decision Theory","author":"I Caragiannis","year":"2009","unstructured":"Caragiannis, I., Kaklamanis, C., Kanellopoulos, P., Kyropoulou, M.: On low-envy truthful allocations. In: Rossi, F., Tsoukias, A. (eds.) ADT 2009. LNCS (LNAI), vol. 5783, pp. 111\u2013119. Springer, Heidelberg (2009). https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/978-3-642-04428-1_10"},{"key":"5_CR14","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Caragiannis, I., Kurokawa, D., Moulin, H., Procaccia, A.D., Shah, N., Wang, J.: The unreasonable fairness of maximum Nash welfare. ACM Trans. Econ. Comput. 7(3), 12:1\u201312:32 (2019)","DOI":"10.1145\/3355902"},{"key":"5_CR15","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Chakraborty, M., Igarashi, A., Suksompong, W., Zick, Y.: Weighted envy-freeness in indivisible item allocation. ACM Trans. Econ. Comput. 9(3), 18:1\u201318:39 (2021)","DOI":"10.1145\/3457166"},{"issue":"1","key":"5_CR16","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"17","DOI":"10.1007\/BF01726210","volume":"11","author":"EH Clarke","year":"1971","unstructured":"Clarke, E.H.: Multipart pricing of public goods. Public Choice 11(1), 17\u201333 (1971)","journal-title":"Public Choice"},{"key":"5_CR17","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Cohen, A., Feldman, M., Mohan, D., Talgam-Cohen, I.: Interdependent public projects. In: SODA, pp. 416\u2013443. SIAM (2023)","DOI":"10.1137\/1.9781611977554.ch18"},{"key":"5_CR18","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Eden, A., Feldman, M., Fiat, A., Goldner, K.: Interdependent values without single-crossing. In: EC, p.\u00a0369. ACM (2018)","DOI":"10.1145\/3219166.3219173"},{"key":"5_CR19","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Eden, A., Feldman, M., Fiat, A., Goldner, K., Karlin, A.R.: Combinatorial auctions with interdependent valuations: SOS to the rescue. In: EC, pp. 19\u201320. ACM (2019)","DOI":"10.1145\/3328526.3329759"},{"key":"5_CR20","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Eden, A., Feldman, M., Talgam-Cohen, I., Zviran, O.: PoA of simple auctions with interdependent values. In: AAAI, pp. 5321\u20135329. AAAI Press (2021)","DOI":"10.1609\/aaai.v35i6.16671"},{"key":"5_CR21","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Eden, A., Goldner, K., Zheng, S.: Private interdependent valuations. In: SODA, pp. 2920\u20132939. SIAM (2022)","DOI":"10.1137\/1.9781611977073.113"},{"key":"5_CR22","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"1","DOI":"10.1613\/jair.1.11291","volume":"64","author":"A Farhadi","year":"2019","unstructured":"Farhadi, A., et al.: Fair allocation of indivisible goods to asymmetric agents. J. Artif. Intell. Res. 64, 1\u201320 (2019)","journal-title":"J. Artif. Intell. Res."},{"key":"5_CR23","first-page":"45","volume":"7","author":"DK Foley","year":"1967","unstructured":"Foley, D.K.: Resource allocation and the public sector. Yale Econ. Essays 7, 45\u201398 (1967)","journal-title":"Yale Econ. Essays"},{"key":"5_CR24","unstructured":"Gamow, G., Stern, M.: Puzzle-Math. Viking Press (1958)"},{"issue":"4","key":"5_CR25","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"617","DOI":"10.2307\/1914085","volume":"41","author":"T Groves","year":"1973","unstructured":"Groves, T.: Incentives in teams. Econometrica 41(4), 617\u2013631 (1973)","journal-title":"Econometrica"},{"key":"5_CR26","series-title":"Lecture Notes in Computer Science","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"370","DOI":"10.1007\/978-3-030-64946-3_26","volume-title":"Web and Internet Economics","author":"D Halpern","year":"2020","unstructured":"Halpern, D., Procaccia, A.D., Psomas, A., Shah, N.: Fair division with binary valuations: one rule to rule them all. In: Chen, X., Gravin, N., Hoefer, M., Mehta, R. (eds.) WINE 2020. LNCS, vol. 12495, pp. 370\u2013383. Springer, Cham (2020). https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/978-3-030-64946-3_26"},{"issue":"5","key":"5_CR27","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"1237","DOI":"10.1111\/1468-0262.00240","volume":"69","author":"P Jehiel","year":"2001","unstructured":"Jehiel, P., Moldovanu, B.: Efficient design with interdependent valuations. Econometrica 69(5), 1237\u20131259 (2001)","journal-title":"Econometrica"},{"key":"5_CR28","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Lipton, R.J., Markakis, E., Mossel, E., Saberi, A.: On approximately fair allocations of indivisible goods. In: Proceedings of the 5th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, EC 2004, pp. 125\u2013131. ACM (2004)","DOI":"10.1145\/988772.988792"},{"key":"5_CR29","series-title":"Lecture Notes in Computer Science","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"219","DOI":"10.1007\/978-3-031-22832-2_13","volume-title":"WINE 2022","author":"P Lu","year":"2022","unstructured":"Lu, P., Sun, E., Zhou, C.: Better approximation for interdependent SOS valuations. In: Hansen, K.A., Liu, T.X., Malekian, A. (eds.) WINE 2022. LNCS, vol. 13778, pp. 219\u2013234. Springer, Cham (2022). https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/978-3-031-22832-2_13"},{"key":"5_CR30","series-title":"Lecture Notes in Computer Science","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"278","DOI":"10.1007\/978-3-642-25510-6_24","volume-title":"Internet and Network Economics","author":"E Markakis","year":"2011","unstructured":"Markakis, E., Psomas, C.-A.: On worst-case allocations in the presence of indivisible goods. In: Chen, N., Elkind, E., Koutsoupias, E. (eds.) WINE 2011. LNCS, vol. 7090, pp. 278\u2013289. Springer, Heidelberg (2011). https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/978-3-642-25510-6_24"},{"issue":"5","key":"5_CR31","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"1089","DOI":"10.2307\/1911865","volume":"50","author":"PR Milgrom","year":"1982","unstructured":"Milgrom, P.R., Weber, R.J.: A theory of auctions and competitive bidding. Econometrica 50(5), 1089\u20131122 (1982)","journal-title":"Econometrica"},{"issue":"2","key":"5_CR32","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"1039","DOI":"10.1137\/19M124397X","volume":"34","author":"B Plaut","year":"2020","unstructured":"Plaut, B., Roughgarden, T.: Almost envy-freeness with general valuations. SIAM J. Discrete Math. 34(2), 1039\u20131068 (2020)","journal-title":"SIAM J. Discrete Math."},{"key":"5_CR33","unstructured":"Psomas, A., Verma, P.: Fair and efficient allocations without obvious manipulations. In: Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 35: Annual Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems 2022, NeurIPS 2022 (2022)"},{"key":"5_CR34","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Roughgarden, T., Talgam-Cohen, I.: Optimal and near-optimal mechanism design with interdependent values. In: EC, pp. 767\u2013784. ACM (2013)","DOI":"10.1145\/2482540.2482606"},{"issue":"Supplement","key":"5_CR35","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"315","DOI":"10.2307\/1907319","volume":"17","author":"H Steinhaus","year":"1949","unstructured":"Steinhaus, H.: Sur la division pragmatique. Econometrica 17(Supplement), 315\u2013319 (1949)","journal-title":"Econometrica"},{"key":"5_CR36","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"101","DOI":"10.1016\/j.mathsocsci.2022.03.004","volume":"117","author":"W Suksompong","year":"2022","unstructured":"Suksompong, W., Teh, N.: On maximum weighted Nash welfare for binary valuations. Math. Soc. Sci. 117, 101\u2013108 (2022)","journal-title":"Math. Soc. Sci."},{"key":"5_CR37","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"48","DOI":"10.1016\/j.mathsocsci.2023.09.004","volume":"126","author":"W Suksompong","year":"2023","unstructured":"Suksompong, W., Teh, N.: Weighted fair division with matroid-rank valuations: monotonicity and strategyproofness. Math. Soc. Sci. 126, 48\u201359 (2023)","journal-title":"Math. Soc. Sci."},{"key":"5_CR38","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"63","DOI":"10.1016\/0022-0531(74)90075-1","volume":"9","author":"HR Varian","year":"1974","unstructured":"Varian, H.R.: Equity, envy and efficiency. J. Econ. Theory 9, 63\u201391 (1974)","journal-title":"J. Econ. Theory"},{"issue":"1","key":"5_CR39","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"8","DOI":"10.1111\/j.1540-6261.1961.tb02789.x","volume":"16","author":"W Vickrey","year":"1961","unstructured":"Vickrey, W.: Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed tenders. J. Finance 16(1), 8\u201337 (1961)","journal-title":"J. Finance"},{"key":"5_CR40","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Viswanathan, V., Zick, Y.: Yankee swap: a fast and simple fair allocation mechanism for matroid rank valuations. In: AAMAS, pp. 179\u2013187. ACM (2023)","DOI":"10.1145\/3580507.3597675"},{"issue":"7","key":"5_CR41","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"446","DOI":"10.1287\/mnsc.15.7.446","volume":"15","author":"R Wilson","year":"1969","unstructured":"Wilson, R.: Communications to the editor-competitive bidding with disparate information. Manag. Sci. 15(7), 446\u2013452 (1969)","journal-title":"Manag. Sci."}],"container-title":["Lecture Notes in Computer Science","Algorithmic Game Theory"],"original-title":[],"language":"en","link":[{"URL":"https:\/\/link.springer.com\/content\/pdf\/10.1007\/978-3-031-71033-9_5","content-type":"unspecified","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"similarity-checking"}],"deposited":{"date-parts":[[2024,11,27]],"date-time":"2024-11-27T17:53:44Z","timestamp":1732730024000},"score":1,"resource":{"primary":{"URL":"https:\/\/link.springer.com\/10.1007\/978-3-031-71033-9_5"}},"subtitle":[],"short-title":[],"issued":{"date-parts":[[2024]]},"ISBN":["9783031710322","9783031710339"],"references-count":41,"URL":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/978-3-031-71033-9_5","relation":{},"ISSN":["0302-9743","1611-3349"],"issn-type":[{"type":"print","value":"0302-9743"},{"type":"electronic","value":"1611-3349"}],"subject":[],"published":{"date-parts":[[2024]]},"assertion":[{"value":"31 August 2024","order":1,"name":"first_online","label":"First Online","group":{"name":"ChapterHistory","label":"Chapter History"}},{"value":"SAGT","order":1,"name":"conference_acronym","label":"Conference Acronym","group":{"name":"ConferenceInfo","label":"Conference Information"}},{"value":"International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory","order":2,"name":"conference_name","label":"Conference Name","group":{"name":"ConferenceInfo","label":"Conference Information"}},{"value":"Amsterdam","order":3,"name":"conference_city","label":"Conference City","group":{"name":"ConferenceInfo","label":"Conference Information"}},{"value":"The Netherlands","order":4,"name":"conference_country","label":"Conference Country","group":{"name":"ConferenceInfo","label":"Conference Information"}},{"value":"2024","order":5,"name":"conference_year","label":"Conference Year","group":{"name":"ConferenceInfo","label":"Conference Information"}},{"value":"3 September 2024","order":7,"name":"conference_start_date","label":"Conference Start Date","group":{"name":"ConferenceInfo","label":"Conference Information"}},{"value":"6 September 2024","order":8,"name":"conference_end_date","label":"Conference End Date","group":{"name":"ConferenceInfo","label":"Conference Information"}},{"value":"17","order":9,"name":"conference_number","label":"Conference Number","group":{"name":"ConferenceInfo","label":"Conference Information"}},{"value":"sagt2024","order":10,"name":"conference_id","label":"Conference ID","group":{"name":"ConferenceInfo","label":"Conference Information"}},{"value":"https:\/\/www.cwi.nl\/en\/groups\/networks-and-optimization\/events\/sagt-2024\/","order":11,"name":"conference_url","label":"Conference URL","group":{"name":"ConferenceInfo","label":"Conference Information"}}]}}