{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2025,9,11]],"date-time":"2025-09-11T21:37:45Z","timestamp":1757626665883,"version":"3.44.0"},"publisher-location":"Cham","reference-count":40,"publisher":"Springer Nature Switzerland","isbn-type":[{"type":"print","value":"9783032036384"},{"type":"electronic","value":"9783032036391"}],"license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2025,9,1]],"date-time":"2025-09-01T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1756684800000},"content-version":"tdm","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/www.springernature.com\/gp\/researchers\/text-and-data-mining"},{"start":{"date-parts":[[2025,9,1]],"date-time":"2025-09-01T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1756684800000},"content-version":"vor","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/www.springernature.com\/gp\/researchers\/text-and-data-mining"}],"content-domain":{"domain":["link.springer.com"],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":[],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2026]]},"DOI":"10.1007\/978-3-032-03639-1_20","type":"book-chapter","created":{"date-parts":[[2025,8,31]],"date-time":"2025-08-31T13:23:54Z","timestamp":1756646634000},"page":"363-380","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/springer_crossmark_policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":0,"title":["Deterministic Refund Mechanisms"],"prefix":"10.1007","author":[{"given":"Saeed","family":"Alaei","sequence":"first","affiliation":[]},{"given":"Shuchi","family":"Chawla","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[]},{"given":"Zhiyi","family":"Huang","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[]},{"given":"Ali","family":"Makhdoumi","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[]},{"given":"Azarakhsh","family":"Malekian","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[]}],"member":"297","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2025,9,1]]},"reference":[{"issue":"4","key":"20_CR1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"1601","DOI":"10.1257\/aer.100.4.1601","volume":"100","author":"I Aguirre","year":"2010","unstructured":"Aguirre, I., Cowan, S., Vickers, J.: Monopoly price discrimination and demand curvature. Am. Econ. Rev. 100(4), 1601\u201315 (2010)","journal-title":"Am. Econ. Rev."},{"key":"20_CR2","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"728","DOI":"10.1016\/j.jet.2015.07.016","volume":"159","author":"M Akan","year":"2015","unstructured":"Akan, M., Ata, B., Dana, J.D., Jr.: Revenue management by sequential screening. J. Econ. Theory 159, 728\u2013774 (2015)","journal-title":"J. Econ. Theory"},{"key":"20_CR3","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Alaei, S., Makhdoumi, A., Malekian, A.: Revenue maximization under unknown private values with non-obligatory inspection. In: Proceedings of the 22nd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, pp. 27\u201328 (2021)","DOI":"10.1145\/3465456.3467547"},{"issue":"1","key":"20_CR4","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"26","DOI":"10.1093\/restud\/rdv036","volume":"83","author":"M Armstrong","year":"2016","unstructured":"Armstrong, M., Zhou, J.: Search deterrence. Rev. Econ. Stud. 83(1), 26\u201357 (2016)","journal-title":"Rev. Econ. Stud."},{"key":"20_CR5","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Babaioff, M., Gonczarowski, Y.A., Nisan, N.: The menu-size complexity of revenue approximation. In: Proceedings of the 49th Annual ACM SIGACT Symposium on Theory of Computing, pp. 869\u2013877 (2017)","DOI":"10.1145\/3055399.3055426"},{"issue":"12","key":"20_CR6","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"3779","DOI":"10.1257\/aer.104.12.3779","volume":"104","author":"E Ben-Porath","year":"2014","unstructured":"Ben-Porath, E., Dekel, E., Lipman, B.L.: Optimal allocation with costly verification. Am. Econ. Rev. 104(12), 3779\u20133813 (2014)","journal-title":"Am. Econ. Rev."},{"issue":"3","key":"20_CR7","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"921","DOI":"10.1257\/aer.20130848","volume":"105","author":"D Bergemann","year":"2015","unstructured":"Bergemann, D., Brooks, B., Morris, S.: The limits of price discrimination. Am. Econ. Rev. 105(3), 921\u201357 (2015)","journal-title":"Am. Econ. Rev."},{"key":"20_CR8","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Bergemann, D., Castro, F., Weintraub, G.: The scope of sequential screening with ex post participation constraints. In: Proceedings of the 2017 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, pp. 163\u2013164 (2017)","DOI":"10.1145\/3033274.3085102"},{"key":"20_CR9","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"275","DOI":"10.1016\/j.geb.2021.11.008","volume":"131","author":"D Bergemann","year":"2022","unstructured":"Bergemann, D., Castro, F., Weintraub, G.: Third-degree price discrimination versus uniform pricing. Games Econ. Behav. 131, 275\u2013291 (2022)","journal-title":"Games Econ. Behav."},{"key":"20_CR10","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1016\/j.jet.2020.105055","volume":"188","author":"D Bergemann","year":"2020","unstructured":"Bergemann, D., Castro, F., Weintraub, G.Y.: The scope of sequential screening with ex post participation constraints. J. Econ. Theory 188, 105055 (2020)","journal-title":"J. Econ. Theory"},{"key":"20_CR11","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Bergemann, D., Morris, S.: Robust mechanism design. In: Econometrica, pp. 1771\u20131813 (2005)","DOI":"10.1111\/j.1468-0262.2005.00638.x"},{"key":"20_CR12","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Bergemann, D., Valimaki, J.: Information in mechanism design (2005)","DOI":"10.1111\/j.1468-0262.2005.00638.x"},{"key":"20_CR13","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Briest, P., Chawla, S., Kleinberg, R., Weinberg, S.M.: Pricing randomized allocations. In: Proceedings of the Twenty-First Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, pp. 585\u2013597. SIAM (2010)","DOI":"10.1137\/1.9781611973075.49"},{"key":"20_CR14","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Chawla, S., Hartline, J.D., Malec, D.L., Sivan, B.: Multi-parameter mechanism design and sequential posted pricing. In: Proceedings of the Forty-Second ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, pp. 311\u2013320 (2010)","DOI":"10.1145\/1806689.1806733"},{"key":"20_CR15","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Chawla, S., Rezvan, R., Teng, Y., Tzamos, C.: Pricing ordered items. In: Proceedings of the 54th Annual ACM SIGACT Symposium on Theory of Computing, pp. 722\u2013735 (2022)","DOI":"10.1145\/3519935.3520065"},{"key":"20_CR16","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Che, Y.K.: Customer return policies for experience goods. J. Ind. Econ. 17\u201324 (1996)","DOI":"10.2307\/2950557"},{"issue":"4","key":"20_CR17","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"697","DOI":"10.1111\/1467-937X.00150","volume":"67","author":"P Courty","year":"2000","unstructured":"Courty, P., Hao, L.: Sequential screening. Rev. Econ. Stud. 67(4), 697\u2013717 (2000)","journal-title":"Rev. Econ. Stud."},{"issue":"1","key":"20_CR18","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"41","DOI":"10.1007\/s00199-007-0301-0","volume":"38","author":"J Cr\u00e9mer","year":"2009","unstructured":"Cr\u00e9mer, J., Spiegel, Y., Zheng, C.Z.: Auctions with costly information acquisition. Econ. Theor. 38(1), 41\u201372 (2009)","journal-title":"Econ. Theor."},{"key":"20_CR19","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Cummings, R., Devanur, N.R., Huang, Z., Wang, X.: Algorithmic price discrimination. In: Proceedings of the Fourteenth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, pp. 2432\u20132451. SIAM (2020)","DOI":"10.1137\/1.9781611975994.149"},{"key":"20_CR20","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Daskalakis, C., Deckelbaum, A., Tzamos, C.: Mechanism design via optimal transport. In: Proceedings of the Fourteenth ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, pp. 269\u2013286 (2013)","DOI":"10.1145\/2482540.2482593"},{"key":"20_CR21","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Daskalakis, C., Papadimitriou, C., Tzamos, C.: Does information revelation improve revenue? In: Proceedings of the 2016 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, pp. 233\u2013250 (2016)","DOI":"10.1145\/2940716.2940789"},{"key":"20_CR22","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Devanur, N.R., Goldner, K., Saxena, R.R., Schvartzman, A., Weinberg, S.M.: Optimal mechanism design for single-minded agents. In: Proceedings of the 21st ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, pp. 193\u2013256 (2020)","DOI":"10.1145\/3391403.3399454"},{"key":"20_CR23","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Devanur, N.R., Haghpanah, N., Psomas, C.A.: Optimal multi-unit mechanisms with private demands. In: Proceedings of the 2017 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, pp. 41\u201342 (2017)","DOI":"10.1145\/3033274.3085122"},{"key":"20_CR24","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Devanur, N.R., Weinberg, S.M.: The optimal mechanism for selling to a budget constrained buyer: the general case. In: Proceedings of the 2017 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, pp. 39\u201340 (2017)","DOI":"10.1145\/3033274.3085132"},{"key":"20_CR25","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"1","DOI":"10.1016\/j.ijindorg.2014.02.005","volume":"34","author":"D Escobari","year":"2014","unstructured":"Escobari, D., Jindapon, P.: Price discrimination through refund contracts in airlines. Int. J. Ind. Organ. 34, 1\u20138 (2014)","journal-title":"Int. J. Ind. Organ."},{"issue":"3","key":"20_CR26","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"705","DOI":"10.1111\/j.1467-937X.2007.00442.x","volume":"74","author":"P Es\u0151","year":"2007","unstructured":"Es\u0151, P., Szentes, B.: Optimal information disclosure in auctions and the handicap auction. Rev. Econ. Stud. 74(3), 705\u2013731 (2007)","journal-title":"Rev. Econ. Stud."},{"key":"20_CR27","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Fiat, A., Goldner, K., Karlin, A.R., Koutsoupias, E.: The fedex problem. In: Proceedings of the 2016 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, pp. 21\u201322 (2016)","DOI":"10.1145\/2940716.2940752"},{"key":"20_CR28","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Giannakopoulos, Y., Koutsoupias, E.: Duality and optimality of auctions for uniform distributions. In: Proceedings of the Fifteenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, pp. 259\u2013276 (2014)","DOI":"10.1145\/2600057.2602883"},{"issue":"1","key":"20_CR29","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"130","DOI":"10.1287\/opre.2016.1558","volume":"65","author":"N Golrezaei","year":"2017","unstructured":"Golrezaei, N., Nazerzadeh, H.: Auctions with dynamic costly information acquisition. Oper. Res. 65(1), 130\u2013144 (2017)","journal-title":"Oper. Res."},{"key":"20_CR30","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Haghpanah, N., Hartline, J.: Reverse mechanism design. In: Proceedings of the Sixteenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, pp. 757\u2013758 (2015)","DOI":"10.1145\/2764468.2764498"},{"issue":"4","key":"20_CR31","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"1014","DOI":"10.1111\/1756-2171.12348","volume":"51","author":"T Hinnosaar","year":"2020","unstructured":"Hinnosaar, T., Kawai, K.: Robust pricing with refunds. Rand J. Econ. 51(4), 1014\u20131036 (2020)","journal-title":"Rand J. Econ."},{"issue":"3","key":"20_CR32","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"1002","DOI":"10.1093\/restud\/rdt005","volume":"80","author":"R Inderst","year":"2013","unstructured":"Inderst, R., Ottaviani, M.: Sales talk, cancellation terms and the role of consumer protection. Rev. Econ. Stud. 80(3), 1002\u20131026 (2013)","journal-title":"Rev. Econ. Stud."},{"issue":"2","key":"20_CR33","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"762","DOI":"10.1093\/restud\/rdv003","volume":"82","author":"D Kr\u00e4hmer","year":"2015","unstructured":"Kr\u00e4hmer, D., Strausz, R.: Optimal sales contracts with withdrawal rights. Rev. Econ. Stud. 82(2), 762\u2013790 (2015)","journal-title":"Rev. Econ. Stud."},{"issue":"11","key":"20_CR34","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"3363","DOI":"10.1257\/aer.20151743","volume":"107","author":"H Li","year":"2017","unstructured":"Li, H., Shi, X.: Discriminatory information disclosure. Am. Econ. Rev. 107(11), 3363\u201385 (2017)","journal-title":"Am. Econ. Rev."},{"key":"20_CR35","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1016\/j.jet.2020.105000","volume":"186","author":"Y Li","year":"2020","unstructured":"Li, Y.: Mechanism design with costly verification and limited punishments. J. Econ. Theory 186, 105000 (2020)","journal-title":"J. Econ. Theory"},{"key":"20_CR36","unstructured":"Lyu, Q.: Optimal refund mechanism (2021)"},{"issue":"1","key":"20_CR37","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"113","DOI":"10.1007\/s00199-007-0312-x","volume":"39","author":"A Malakhov","year":"2009","unstructured":"Malakhov, A., Vohra, R.V.: An optimal auction for capacity constrained bidders: a network perspective. Econ. Theor. 39(1), 113\u2013128 (2009)","journal-title":"Econ. Theor."},{"issue":"1","key":"20_CR38","first-page":"242","volume":"71","author":"R Schmalensee","year":"1981","unstructured":"Schmalensee, R.: Output and welfare implications of monopolistic third-degree price discrimination. Am. Econ. Rev. 71(1), 242\u2013247 (1981)","journal-title":"Am. Econ. Rev."},{"key":"20_CR39","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"von Wangenheim, J.: Optimal information design of online marketplaces with return rights. Forthcoming J. Polit. Econ. (2025)","DOI":"10.1086\/736214"},{"issue":"5","key":"20_CR40","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"452","DOI":"10.1016\/j.ijindorg.2013.08.001","volume":"31","author":"J Zhang","year":"2013","unstructured":"Zhang, J.: Revenue maximizing with return policy when buyers have uncertain valuations. Int. J. Ind. Organ. 31(5), 452\u2013461 (2013)","journal-title":"Int. J. Ind. Organ."}],"container-title":["Lecture Notes in Computer Science","Algorithmic Game Theory"],"original-title":[],"language":"en","link":[{"URL":"https:\/\/link.springer.com\/content\/pdf\/10.1007\/978-3-032-03639-1_20","content-type":"unspecified","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"similarity-checking"}],"deposited":{"date-parts":[[2025,9,9]],"date-time":"2025-09-09T23:11:08Z","timestamp":1757459468000},"score":1,"resource":{"primary":{"URL":"https:\/\/link.springer.com\/10.1007\/978-3-032-03639-1_20"}},"subtitle":[],"short-title":[],"issued":{"date-parts":[[2025,9,1]]},"ISBN":["9783032036384","9783032036391"],"references-count":40,"URL":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/978-3-032-03639-1_20","relation":{},"ISSN":["0302-9743","1611-3349"],"issn-type":[{"type":"print","value":"0302-9743"},{"type":"electronic","value":"1611-3349"}],"subject":[],"published":{"date-parts":[[2025,9,1]]},"assertion":[{"value":"1 September 2025","order":1,"name":"first_online","label":"First Online","group":{"name":"ChapterHistory","label":"Chapter History"}},{"value":"SAGT","order":1,"name":"conference_acronym","label":"Conference Acronym","group":{"name":"ConferenceInfo","label":"Conference Information"}},{"value":"International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory","order":2,"name":"conference_name","label":"Conference Name","group":{"name":"ConferenceInfo","label":"Conference Information"}},{"value":"Bath","order":3,"name":"conference_city","label":"Conference City","group":{"name":"ConferenceInfo","label":"Conference Information"}},{"value":"United Kingdom","order":4,"name":"conference_country","label":"Conference Country","group":{"name":"ConferenceInfo","label":"Conference Information"}},{"value":"2025","order":5,"name":"conference_year","label":"Conference Year","group":{"name":"ConferenceInfo","label":"Conference Information"}},{"value":"1 September 2025","order":7,"name":"conference_start_date","label":"Conference Start Date","group":{"name":"ConferenceInfo","label":"Conference Information"}},{"value":"4 September 2025","order":8,"name":"conference_end_date","label":"Conference End Date","group":{"name":"ConferenceInfo","label":"Conference Information"}},{"value":"18","order":9,"name":"conference_number","label":"Conference Number","group":{"name":"ConferenceInfo","label":"Conference Information"}},{"value":"sagt2025","order":10,"name":"conference_id","label":"Conference ID","group":{"name":"ConferenceInfo","label":"Conference Information"}}]}}