{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2025,9,11]],"date-time":"2025-09-11T21:38:55Z","timestamp":1757626735113,"version":"3.44.0"},"publisher-location":"Cham","reference-count":40,"publisher":"Springer Nature Switzerland","isbn-type":[{"type":"print","value":"9783032036384"},{"type":"electronic","value":"9783032036391"}],"license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2025,9,1]],"date-time":"2025-09-01T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1756684800000},"content-version":"tdm","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/www.springernature.com\/gp\/researchers\/text-and-data-mining"},{"start":{"date-parts":[[2025,9,1]],"date-time":"2025-09-01T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1756684800000},"content-version":"vor","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/www.springernature.com\/gp\/researchers\/text-and-data-mining"}],"content-domain":{"domain":["link.springer.com"],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":[],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2026]]},"DOI":"10.1007\/978-3-032-03639-1_22","type":"book-chapter","created":{"date-parts":[[2025,8,31]],"date-time":"2025-08-31T13:24:08Z","timestamp":1756646648000},"page":"402-421","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/springer_crossmark_policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":1,"title":["Online Budget-Feasible Mechanism Design with\u00a0Predictions"],"prefix":"10.1007","author":[{"given":"Georgios","family":"Amanatidis","sequence":"first","affiliation":[]},{"given":"Evangelos","family":"Markakis","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[]},{"given":"Christodoulos","family":"Santorinaios","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[]},{"given":"Guido","family":"Sch\u00e4fer","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[]},{"given":"Panagiotis","family":"Tsamopoulos","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[]},{"given":"Artem","family":"Tsikiridis","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[]}],"member":"297","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2025,9,1]]},"reference":[{"issue":"4","key":"22_CR1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"2626","DOI":"10.1287\/moor.2022.0225","volume":"49","author":"P Agrawal","year":"2024","unstructured":"Agrawal, P., Balkanski, E., Gkatzelis, V., Ou, T., Tan, X.: Learning-augmented mechanism design: leveraging predictions for facility location. Math. Oper. Res. 49(4), 2626\u20132651 (2024)","journal-title":"Math. Oper. Res."},{"issue":"3","key":"22_CR2","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"2286","DOI":"10.1287\/moor.2021.1208","volume":"47","author":"G Amanatidis","year":"2022","unstructured":"Amanatidis, G., Kleer, P., Sch\u00e4fer, G.: Budget-feasible mechanism design for non-monotone submodular objectives: offline and online. Math. Oper. Res. 47(3), 2286\u20132309 (2022)","journal-title":"Math. Oper. Res."},{"key":"22_CR3","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Amanatidis, G., Markakis, E., Santorinaios, C., Sch\u00e4fer, G., Tsamopoulos, P., Tsikiridis, A.: Online budget-feasible mechanism design with predictions (2025). https:\/\/arxiv.org\/abs\/2505.24624","DOI":"10.1007\/978-3-032-03639-1_22"},{"key":"22_CR4","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1016\/j.disopt.2023.100778","volume":"48","author":"A Antoniadis","year":"2023","unstructured":"Antoniadis, A., Gouleakis, T., Kleer, P., Kolev, P.: Secretary and online matching problems with machine learned advice. Disc. Optim. 48, 100778 (2023)","journal-title":"Disc. Optim."},{"key":"22_CR5","series-title":"Lecture Notes in Computer Science","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"16","DOI":"10.1007\/978-3-540-74208-1_2","volume-title":"Approximation, Randomization, and Combinatorial Optimization. Algorithms and Techniques","author":"M Babaioff","year":"2007","unstructured":"Babaioff, M., Immorlica, N., Kempe, D., Kleinberg, R.: A knapsack secretary problem with applications. In: Charikar, M., Jansen, K., Reingold, O., Rolim, J.D.P. (eds.) APPROX\/RANDOM -2007. LNCS, vol. 4627, pp. 16\u201328. Springer, Heidelberg (2007). https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/978-3-540-74208-1_2"},{"key":"22_CR6","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Badanidiyuru, A., Kleinberg, R., Singer, Y.: Learning on a budget: posted price mechanisms for online procurement. In: Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, EC 2012, pp. 128\u2013145. ACM (2012)","DOI":"10.1145\/2229012.2229026"},{"key":"22_CR7","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Balkanski, E., Garimidi, P., Gkatzelis, V., Schoepflin, D., Tan, X.: Deterministic budget-feasible clock auctions. Oper. Res. (2025)","DOI":"10.1287\/opre.2023.0526"},{"key":"22_CR8","unstructured":"Balkanski, E., Gkatzelis, V., Shahkarami, G.: Randomized strategic facility location with predictions. In: The Thirty-eighth Annual Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems (2024)"},{"key":"22_CR9","unstructured":"Balkanski, E., Gkatzelis, V., Tan, X.: Strategyproof scheduling with predictions. In: 14th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2023). Schloss Dagstuhl\u2013Leibniz-Zentrum f\u00fcr Informatik (2023)"},{"key":"22_CR10","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Balkanski, E., Gkatzelis, V., Tan, X., Zhu, C.: Online mechanism design with predictions. In: Proceedings of the 25th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, pp. 1184\u20131184 (2024)","DOI":"10.1145\/3670865.3673478"},{"key":"22_CR11","first-page":"3682","volume":"37","author":"E Balkanski","year":"2024","unstructured":"Balkanski, E., Ma, W., Maggiori, A.: Fair secretaries with unfair predictions. Adv. Neural. Inf. Process. Syst. 37, 3682\u20133716 (2024)","journal-title":"Adv. Neural. Inf. Process. Syst."},{"key":"22_CR12","unstructured":"Barak, Z., Gupta, A., Talgam-Cohen, I.: MAC advice for facility location mechanism design. In: The Thirty-Eighth Annual Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems (2024)"},{"issue":"4","key":"22_CR13","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"1","DOI":"10.1145\/2500121","volume":"9","author":"M Bateni","year":"2013","unstructured":"Bateni, M., Hajiaghayi, M., Zadimoghaddam, M.: Submodular secretary problem and extensions. ACM Trans. Algor. (TALG) 9(4), 1\u201323 (2013)","journal-title":"ACM Trans. Algor. (TALG)"},{"key":"22_CR14","unstructured":"Benomar, Z., Perchet, V.: Advice querying under budget constraint for online algorithms. In: Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 36: Annual Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems 2023. NeurIPS 2023 (2023)"},{"key":"22_CR15","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Caragiannis, I., Kalantzis, G.: Randomized learning-augmented auctions with revenue guarantees. In: Proceedings of the 33rd International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2024, pp. 2687\u20132694 (2024)","DOI":"10.24963\/ijcai.2024\/297"},{"key":"22_CR16","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Charalampopoulos, A., Fotakis, D., Patsilinakos, P., Tolias, T.: A competitive posted-price mechanism for online budget-feasible auctions. In: Proceedings of the 26th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, pp. 1046\u20131075 (2025)","DOI":"10.1145\/3736252.3742668"},{"key":"22_CR17","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Chen, N., Gravin, N., Lu, P.: On the approximability of budget feasible mechanisms. In: Proceedings of the 22nd Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, SODA 2011, pp. 685\u2013699. SIAM (2011)","DOI":"10.1137\/1.9781611973082.54"},{"key":"22_CR18","unstructured":"Christodoulou, G., Sgouritsa, A., Vlachos, I.: Mechanism design augmented with output advice. In: Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 38: Annual Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems 2024, NeurIPS 2024, Vancouver, BC, Canada, 10\u201315 December 2024 (2024)"},{"key":"22_CR19","first-page":"110057","volume":"37","author":"I Cohen","year":"2024","unstructured":"Cohen, I., Eden, A., Eden, T., Vasilyan, A.: Plant-and-steal: truthful fair allocations via predictions. Adv. Neural. Inf. Process. Syst. 37, 110057\u2013110096 (2024)","journal-title":"Adv. Neural. Inf. Process. Syst."},{"key":"22_CR20","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Colini-Baldeschi, R., Klumper, S., Sch\u00e4fer, G., Tsikiridis, A.: To trust or not to trust: assignment mechanisms with predictions in the private graph model. In: Proceedings of the 25th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, pp. 1134\u20131154 (2024)","DOI":"10.1145\/3670865.3673578"},{"key":"22_CR21","volume-title":"Combinatorial Auctions","author":"P Cramton","year":"2006","unstructured":"Cramton, P., Shoham, Y., Steinberg, R.: Combinatorial Auctions. The MIT Press, Cambridge (2006)"},{"key":"22_CR22","series-title":"Lecture Notes in Computer Science","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"218","DOI":"10.1007\/978-3-642-22935-0_19","volume-title":"Approximation, Randomization, and Combinatorial Optimization. Algorithms and Techniques","author":"M Feldman","year":"2011","unstructured":"Feldman, M., Naor, J.S., Schwartz, R.: Improved competitive ratios for submodular secretary problems (extended abstract). In: Goldberg, L.A., Jansen, K., Ravi, R., Rolim, J.D.P. (eds.) APPROX\/RANDOM -2011. LNCS, vol. 6845, pp. 218\u2013229. Springer, Heidelberg (2011). https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/978-3-642-22935-0_19"},{"key":"22_CR23","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Filos-Ratsikas, A., Kalantzis, G., Voudouris, A.A.: Utilitarian distortion with predictions. In: Proceedings of the 26th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, pp. 254\u2013271 (2025)","DOI":"10.1145\/3736252.3742526"},{"issue":"2","key":"22_CR24","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"1241","DOI":"10.1287\/moor.2022.0031","volume":"49","author":"K Fujii","year":"2024","unstructured":"Fujii, K., Yoshida, Y.: The secretary problem with predictions. Math. Oper. Res. 49(2), 1241\u20131262 (2024)","journal-title":"Math. Oper. Res."},{"key":"22_CR25","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Gkatzelis, V., Schoepflin, D., Tan, X.: Clock auctions augmented with unreliable advice. In: Proceedings of the 2025 Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, SODA 2025, pp. 2629\u20132655. SIAM (2025)","DOI":"10.1137\/1.9781611978322.86"},{"issue":"4","key":"22_CR26","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"1","DOI":"10.1145\/3417746","volume":"8","author":"N Gravin","year":"2020","unstructured":"Gravin, N., Jin, Y., Lu, P., Zhang, C.: Optimal budget-feasible mechanisms for additive valuations. ACM Trans. Econ. Comput. (TEAC) 8(4), 1\u201315 (2020)","journal-title":"ACM Trans. Econ. Comput. (TEAC)"},{"key":"22_CR27","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Han, K., Zhang, H., Cui, S.: Efficient and effective budget-feasible mechanisms for submodular valuations. Artif. Intell. 104348 (2025)","DOI":"10.1016\/j.artint.2025.104348"},{"key":"22_CR28","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Huang, H., Han, K., Cui, S., Tang, J.: Randomized pricing with deferred acceptance for revenue maximization with submodular objectives. In: Proceedings of the ACM Web Conference 2023, WWW 2023, pp. 3530\u20133540. ACM (2023)","DOI":"10.1145\/3543507.3583477"},{"issue":"1","key":"22_CR29","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"1","DOI":"10.1145\/3434421","volume":"9","author":"P Jalaly","year":"2021","unstructured":"Jalaly, P., Tardos, \u00c9.: Simple and efficient budget feasible mechanisms for monotone submodular valuations. ACM Trans. Econ. Comput. (TEAC) 9(1), 1\u201320 (2021)","journal-title":"ACM Trans. Econ. Comput. (TEAC)"},{"key":"22_CR30","unstructured":"Kesselheim, T., T\u00f6nnis, A.: Submodular secretary problems: cardinality, matching, and linear constraints. In: Approximation, Randomization, and Combinatorial Optimization. Algorithms and Techniques, APPROX\/RANDOM 2017. LIPIcs, vol.\u00a081, pp. 16:1\u201316:22 (2017)"},{"key":"22_CR31","unstructured":"Lindermayr, A., Megow, N.: Algorithms with predictions (2025). https:\/\/algorithms-with-predictions.github.io. Accessed 19 Jan 2025"},{"key":"22_CR32","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Liu, X., Chan, H., Li, M., Wu, W.: Budget feasible mechanisms: a survey. In: 33rd International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2024, pp. 8132\u20138141. International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence (2024)","DOI":"10.24963\/ijcai.2024\/899"},{"key":"22_CR33","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Lu, P., Wan, Z., Zhang, J.: Competitive auctions with imperfect predictions. In: Proceedings of the 25th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, EC 2024, pp. 1155\u20131183. ACM (2024)","DOI":"10.1145\/3670865.3673586"},{"issue":"4","key":"22_CR34","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"1","DOI":"10.1145\/3447579","volume":"68","author":"T Lykouris","year":"2021","unstructured":"Lykouris, T., Vassilvitskii, S.: Competitive caching with machine learned advice. J. ACM (JACM) 68(4), 1\u201325 (2021)","journal-title":"J. ACM (JACM)"},{"issue":"1","key":"22_CR35","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"265","DOI":"10.1007\/BF01588971","volume":"14","author":"GL Nemhauser","year":"1978","unstructured":"Nemhauser, G.L., Wolsey, L.A., Fisher, M.L.: An analysis of approximations for maximizing submodular set functions - I. Math. Program. 14(1), 265\u2013294 (1978)","journal-title":"Math. Program."},{"key":"22_CR36","unstructured":"Prasad, S., Balcan, M., Sandholm, T.: Bicriteria multidimensional mechanism design with side information. In: Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 36: Annual Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems 2023, NeurIPS 2023 (2023)"},{"key":"22_CR37","volume-title":"Beyond the Worst-Case Analysis of Algorithms","author":"T Roughgarden","year":"2021","unstructured":"Roughgarden, T.: Beyond the Worst-Case Analysis of Algorithms. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (2021)"},{"key":"22_CR38","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Singer, Y.: Budget feasible mechanisms. In: 51th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, FOCS 2010, pp. 765\u2013774 (2010)","DOI":"10.1109\/FOCS.2010.78"},{"issue":"1","key":"22_CR39","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"41","DOI":"10.1016\/S0167-6377(03)00062-2","volume":"32","author":"M Sviridenko","year":"2004","unstructured":"Sviridenko, M.: A note on maximizing a submodular set function subject to a knapsack constraint. Oper. Res. Lett. 32(1), 41\u201343 (2004)","journal-title":"Oper. Res. Lett."},{"key":"22_CR40","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Xu, C., Lu, P.: Mechanism design with predictions. In: Proceedings of the 31st International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2022, pp. 571\u2013577 (2022)","DOI":"10.24963\/ijcai.2022\/81"}],"container-title":["Lecture Notes in Computer Science","Algorithmic Game Theory"],"original-title":[],"language":"en","link":[{"URL":"https:\/\/link.springer.com\/content\/pdf\/10.1007\/978-3-032-03639-1_22","content-type":"unspecified","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"similarity-checking"}],"deposited":{"date-parts":[[2025,9,9]],"date-time":"2025-09-09T23:12:55Z","timestamp":1757459575000},"score":1,"resource":{"primary":{"URL":"https:\/\/link.springer.com\/10.1007\/978-3-032-03639-1_22"}},"subtitle":[],"short-title":[],"issued":{"date-parts":[[2025,9,1]]},"ISBN":["9783032036384","9783032036391"],"references-count":40,"URL":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/978-3-032-03639-1_22","relation":{},"ISSN":["0302-9743","1611-3349"],"issn-type":[{"type":"print","value":"0302-9743"},{"type":"electronic","value":"1611-3349"}],"subject":[],"published":{"date-parts":[[2025,9,1]]},"assertion":[{"value":"1 September 2025","order":1,"name":"first_online","label":"First Online","group":{"name":"ChapterHistory","label":"Chapter History"}},{"value":"SAGT","order":1,"name":"conference_acronym","label":"Conference Acronym","group":{"name":"ConferenceInfo","label":"Conference Information"}},{"value":"International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory","order":2,"name":"conference_name","label":"Conference Name","group":{"name":"ConferenceInfo","label":"Conference Information"}},{"value":"Bath","order":3,"name":"conference_city","label":"Conference City","group":{"name":"ConferenceInfo","label":"Conference Information"}},{"value":"United Kingdom","order":4,"name":"conference_country","label":"Conference Country","group":{"name":"ConferenceInfo","label":"Conference Information"}},{"value":"2025","order":5,"name":"conference_year","label":"Conference Year","group":{"name":"ConferenceInfo","label":"Conference Information"}},{"value":"1 September 2025","order":7,"name":"conference_start_date","label":"Conference Start Date","group":{"name":"ConferenceInfo","label":"Conference Information"}},{"value":"4 September 2025","order":8,"name":"conference_end_date","label":"Conference End Date","group":{"name":"ConferenceInfo","label":"Conference Information"}},{"value":"18","order":9,"name":"conference_number","label":"Conference Number","group":{"name":"ConferenceInfo","label":"Conference Information"}},{"value":"sagt2025","order":10,"name":"conference_id","label":"Conference ID","group":{"name":"ConferenceInfo","label":"Conference Information"}}]}}