{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2025,12,8]],"date-time":"2025-12-08T07:11:02Z","timestamp":1765177862253,"version":"3.40.3"},"publisher-location":"Cham","reference-count":28,"publisher":"Springer International Publishing","isbn-type":[{"type":"print","value":"9783319996592"},{"type":"electronic","value":"9783319996608"}],"license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2018,1,1]],"date-time":"2018-01-01T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1514764800000},"content-version":"unspecified","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"http:\/\/www.springer.com\/tdm"}],"content-domain":{"domain":["link.springer.com"],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":[],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2018]]},"DOI":"10.1007\/978-3-319-99660-8_5","type":"book-chapter","created":{"date-parts":[[2018,8,26]],"date-time":"2018-08-26T18:19:21Z","timestamp":1535307561000},"page":"43-55","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/springer_crossmark_policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":3,"title":["Information Elicitation for Bayesian Auctions"],"prefix":"10.1007","author":[{"given":"Jing","family":"Chen","sequence":"first","affiliation":[],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]},{"given":"Bo","family":"Li","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]},{"given":"Yingkai","family":"Li","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]}],"member":"297","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2018,8,27]]},"reference":[{"key":"5_CR1","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Archer, A., Tardos, \u00c9.: Truthful mechanisms for one-parameter agents. In: 42nd Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS 2001), pp. 482\u2013491 (2001)","DOI":"10.1109\/SFCS.2001.959924"},{"key":"5_CR2","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Azar, P., Chen, J., Micali, S.: Crowdsourced Bayesian auctions. In: 3rd Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2012), pp. 236\u2013248 (2012)","DOI":"10.1145\/2090236.2090257"},{"key":"5_CR3","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1142\/8318","volume-title":"Robust Mechanism Design","author":"D Bergemann","year":"2012","unstructured":"Bergemann, D., Morris, S.: Robust Mechanism Design. World Scientific, Hackensack (2012)"},{"issue":"1","key":"5_CR4","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"1","DOI":"10.1175\/1520-0493(1950)078<0001:VOFEIT>2.0.CO;2","volume":"78","author":"GW Brier","year":"1950","unstructured":"Brier, G.W.: Verification of forecasts expressed in terms of probability. Mon. Weather Rev. 78(1), 1\u20133 (1950)","journal-title":"Mon. Weather Rev."},{"key":"5_CR5","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Cai, Y., Daskalakis, C., Weinberg, M.: Optimal multi-dimensional mechanism design: reducing revenue to welfare maximization. In: 53rd Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS 2012), pp. 130\u2013139 (2012)","DOI":"10.1109\/FOCS.2012.88"},{"key":"5_CR6","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Cai, Y., Devanur, N., Weinberg, M.: A duality based unified approach to Bayesian mechanism design. In: 48th Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC 2016), pp. 926\u2013939 (2016)","DOI":"10.1145\/2897518.2897645"},{"key":"5_CR7","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Chawla, S., Hartline, J., Kleinberg, R.: Algorithmic pricing via virtual valuations. In: 8th Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC 2007), pp. 243\u2013251 (2007)","DOI":"10.1145\/1250910.1250946"},{"key":"5_CR8","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Chawla, S., Hartline, J., Malec, D., Sivan, B.: Multi-parameter mechanism design and sequential posted pricing. In: 43th Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC 2010), pp. 311\u2013320 (2010)","DOI":"10.1145\/1806689.1806733"},{"key":"5_CR9","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Chen, J., Li, B., Li, Y.: Information elicitation for Bayesian auctions, full version. arXiv:1702.01416 (2017)","DOI":"10.1007\/978-3-319-99660-8_5"},{"key":"5_CR10","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"77","DOI":"10.1016\/j.jet.2013.07.021","volume":"156","author":"J Chen","year":"2013","unstructured":"Chen, J., Micali, S.: Mechanism design with possibilistic beliefs. J. Econ. Theory 156, 77\u2013102 (2013)","journal-title":"J. Econ. Theory"},{"issue":"4","key":"5_CR11","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"1619","DOI":"10.3982\/ECTA12563","volume":"83","author":"J Chen","year":"2015","unstructured":"Chen, J., Micali, S., Pass, R.: Tight revenue bounds with possibilistic beliefs and level-k rationality. Econometrica 83(4), 1619\u20131639 (2015)","journal-title":"Econometrica"},{"key":"5_CR12","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Cole, R., Roughgarden, T.: The sample complexity of revenue maximization. In: 46th Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC 2014), pp. 243\u2013252 (2014)","DOI":"10.1145\/2591796.2591867"},{"issue":"6","key":"5_CR13","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"1247","DOI":"10.2307\/1913096","volume":"56","author":"J Cremer","year":"1988","unstructured":"Cremer, J., McLean, R.: Full extraction of the surplus in Bayesian and dominant strategy auctions. Econometrica 56(6), 1247\u20131257 (1988)","journal-title":"Econometrica"},{"key":"5_CR14","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Devanur, N., Hartline, J.: Limited and online supply and the Bayesian foundations of prior-free mechanism design. In: 10th Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC 2009), pp. 41\u201350 (2009)","DOI":"10.1145\/1566374.1566381"},{"key":"5_CR15","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Devanur, N., Huang, Z., Psomas, C.A.: The sample complexity of auctions with side information. In: 48th Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC 2016), pp. 426\u2013439 (2016)","DOI":"10.1145\/2897518.2897553"},{"key":"5_CR16","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Hart, S., Nisan, N.: Approximate revenue maximization with multiple items. In: 13th Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC 2012), pp. 656\u2013656 (2012)","DOI":"10.1145\/2229012.2229061"},{"key":"5_CR17","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"331","DOI":"10.1017\/CBO9780511800481.015","volume-title":"Algorithmic Game Theory","author":"J Hartline","year":"2007","unstructured":"Hartline, J., Karlin, A.: Profit maximization in mechanism design. In: Nisan, N., Roughgarden, T., Tardos, \u00c9., Vazirani, V. (eds.) Algorithmic Game Theory, pp. 331\u2013361. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (2007)"},{"key":"5_CR18","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Hartline, J., Roughgarden, T.: Optimal mechanism design and money burning. In: 40th Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC 2008), pp. 75\u201384 (2008)","DOI":"10.1145\/1374376.1374390"},{"key":"5_CR19","volume-title":"Some Problems of Philosophy","author":"W James","year":"1979","unstructured":"James, W.: Some Problems of Philosophy. Harvard University Press, Cambridge (1979)"},{"key":"5_CR20","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Kleinberg, R., Weinberg, M.: Matroid prophet inequalities. In: 44th Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC 2012), pp. 123\u2013136 (2012)","DOI":"10.1145\/2213977.2213991"},{"issue":"28","key":"5_CR21","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"11232","DOI":"10.1073\/pnas.1309533110","volume":"110","author":"X Li","year":"2013","unstructured":"Li, X., Yao, A.C.C.: On revenue maximization for selling multiple independently distributed items. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. 110(28), 11232\u201311237 (2013)","journal-title":"Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci."},{"issue":"9","key":"5_CR22","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"1359","DOI":"10.1287\/mnsc.1050.0379","volume":"51","author":"N Miller","year":"2005","unstructured":"Miller, N., Resnick, P., Zeckhauser, R.: Eliciting informative feedback: the peer-prediction method. Manag. Sci. 51(9), 1359\u20131373 (2005)","journal-title":"Manag. Sci."},{"issue":"1","key":"5_CR23","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"58","DOI":"10.1287\/moor.6.1.58","volume":"6","author":"R Myerson","year":"1981","unstructured":"Myerson, R.: Optimal auction design. Math. Oper. Res. 6(1), 58\u201373 (1981)","journal-title":"Math. Oper. Res."},{"key":"5_CR24","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Radanovic, G., Faltings, B.: A robust Bayesian truth serum for non-binary signals. In: 27th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI 2013), pp. 833\u2013839 (2013)","DOI":"10.1609\/aaai.v27i1.8677"},{"key":"5_CR25","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Wilson, R.: Game-theoretic analysis of trading processes. In: Bewley, T. (ed.) Advances in Economic Theory: Fifth World Congress, pp. 33\u201377 (1987)","DOI":"10.1017\/CCOL0521340446.002"},{"key":"5_CR26","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Witkowski, J., Parkes, D.: Peer prediction without a common prior. In: 13th Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC 2012), pp. 964\u2013981 (2012)","DOI":"10.1145\/2229012.2229085"},{"key":"5_CR27","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Yao, A.: An n-to-1 bidder reduction for multi-item auctions and its applications. In: 26th Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA), pp. 92\u2013109 (2015)","DOI":"10.1137\/1.9781611973730.8"},{"key":"5_CR28","unstructured":"Zhang, P., Chen, Y.: Elicitability and knowledge-free elicitation with peer prediction. In: 13th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multigent Systems (AAMAS 2014), pp. 245\u2013252 (2014)"}],"container-title":["Lecture Notes in Computer Science","Algorithmic Game Theory"],"original-title":[],"language":"en","link":[{"URL":"https:\/\/link.springer.com\/content\/pdf\/10.1007\/978-3-319-99660-8_5","content-type":"unspecified","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"similarity-checking"}],"deposited":{"date-parts":[[2024,3,7]],"date-time":"2024-03-07T17:40:29Z","timestamp":1709833229000},"score":1,"resource":{"primary":{"URL":"https:\/\/link.springer.com\/10.1007\/978-3-319-99660-8_5"}},"subtitle":[],"short-title":[],"issued":{"date-parts":[[2018]]},"ISBN":["9783319996592","9783319996608"],"references-count":28,"URL":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/978-3-319-99660-8_5","relation":{},"ISSN":["0302-9743","1611-3349"],"issn-type":[{"type":"print","value":"0302-9743"},{"type":"electronic","value":"1611-3349"}],"subject":[],"published":{"date-parts":[[2018]]},"assertion":[{"value":"27 August 2018","order":1,"name":"first_online","label":"First Online","group":{"name":"ChapterHistory","label":"Chapter History"}},{"value":"SAGT","order":1,"name":"conference_acronym","label":"Conference Acronym","group":{"name":"ConferenceInfo","label":"Conference Information"}},{"value":"International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory","order":2,"name":"conference_name","label":"Conference Name","group":{"name":"ConferenceInfo","label":"Conference Information"}},{"value":"Beijing","order":3,"name":"conference_city","label":"Conference City","group":{"name":"ConferenceInfo","label":"Conference Information"}},{"value":"China","order":4,"name":"conference_country","label":"Conference Country","group":{"name":"ConferenceInfo","label":"Conference Information"}},{"value":"2018","order":5,"name":"conference_year","label":"Conference Year","group":{"name":"ConferenceInfo","label":"Conference Information"}},{"value":"11 September 2018","order":7,"name":"conference_start_date","label":"Conference Start Date","group":{"name":"ConferenceInfo","label":"Conference Information"}},{"value":"13 September 2018","order":8,"name":"conference_end_date","label":"Conference End Date","group":{"name":"ConferenceInfo","label":"Conference Information"}},{"value":"11","order":9,"name":"conference_number","label":"Conference Number","group":{"name":"ConferenceInfo","label":"Conference Information"}},{"value":"sagt2018","order":10,"name":"conference_id","label":"Conference ID","group":{"name":"ConferenceInfo","label":"Conference Information"}},{"value":"http:\/\/aims.sjtu.edu.cn\/SAGT_2018\/","order":11,"name":"conference_url","label":"Conference URL","group":{"name":"ConferenceInfo","label":"Conference Information"}}]}}