{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2026,8,1]],"date-time":"2026-08-01T17:07:09Z","timestamp":1785604029059,"version":"3.56.0"},"publisher-location":"Berlin, Heidelberg","reference-count":17,"publisher":"Springer Berlin Heidelberg","isbn-type":[{"value":"9783642046445","type":"print"},{"value":"9783642046452","type":"electronic"}],"content-domain":{"domain":[],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":[],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2009]]},"DOI":"10.1007\/978-3-642-04645-2_23","type":"book-chapter","created":{"date-parts":[[2009,10,7]],"date-time":"2009-10-07T11:14:23Z","timestamp":1254914063000},"page":"250-262","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":30,"title":["Learning and Approximating the Optimal Strategy to Commit To"],"prefix":"10.1007","author":[{"given":"Joshua","family":"Letchford","sequence":"first","affiliation":[],"role":[{"vocabulary":"crossref","role":"author"}]},{"given":"Vincent","family":"Conitzer","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[],"role":[{"vocabulary":"crossref","role":"author"}]},{"given":"Kamesh","family":"Munagala","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[],"role":[{"vocabulary":"crossref","role":"author"}]}],"member":"297","reference":[{"key":"23_CR1","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Chen, X., Deng, X.: Settling the complexity of two-player Nash equilibrium. In: FOCS, pp. 261\u2013272 (2006)","DOI":"10.1109\/FOCS.2006.69"},{"key":"23_CR2","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Conitzer, V., Sandholm, T.: Computing the optimal strategy to commit to. In: Proceedings of the ACM Conference of EC, Ann Arbor, MI, USA, pp. 82\u201390 (2006)","DOI":"10.1145\/1134707.1134717"},{"issue":"2","key":"23_CR3","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"621","DOI":"10.1016\/j.geb.2008.02.015","volume":"63","author":"V. Conitzer","year":"2008","unstructured":"Conitzer, V., Sandholm, T.: New complexity results about Nash equilibria. Games and Economic Behavior\u00a063(2), 621\u2013641 (2008)","journal-title":"Games and Economic Behavior"},{"key":"23_CR4","unstructured":"Cournot, A.A.: Recherches sur les principes math\u00e9matiques de la th\u00e9orie des richesses (Researches into the Mathematical Principles of the Theory of Wealth) (1838)"},{"key":"23_CR5","first-page":"330","volume-title":"Activity Analysis of Production and Allocation","author":"G. Dantzig","year":"1951","unstructured":"Dantzig, G.: A proof of the equivalence of the programming problem and the game problem. In: Koopmans, T. (ed.) Activity Analysis of Production and Allocation, pp. 330\u2013335. John Wiley & Sons, Chichester (1951)"},{"key":"23_CR6","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Daskalakis, C., Goldberg, P., Papadimitriou, C.H.: The complexity of computing a Nash equilibrium. In: STOC, pp. 71\u201378 (2006)","DOI":"10.1145\/1132516.1132527"},{"key":"23_CR7","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"80","DOI":"10.1016\/0899-8256(89)90006-7","volume":"1","author":"I. Gilboa","year":"1989","unstructured":"Gilboa, I., Zemel, E.: Nash and correlated equilibria: Some complexity considerations. Games and Economic Behavior\u00a01, 80\u201393 (1989)","journal-title":"Games and Economic Behavior"},{"key":"23_CR8","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Harrenstein, P., Brandt, F., Fischer, F.: Commitment and extortion. In: Proceedings of AAMAS, Honolulu, HI, USA (2007)","DOI":"10.1145\/1329125.1329157"},{"issue":"2","key":"23_CR9","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"1","DOI":"10.1145\/1399589.1399599","volume":"7","author":"M. Jain","year":"2008","unstructured":"Jain, M., Pita, J., Tambe, M., Ord\u00f3\u00f1ez, F.: Bayesian Stackelberg games and their application for security at Los Angeles international airport. SIGecom Exch.\u00a07(2), 1\u20133 (2008)","journal-title":"SIGecom Exch."},{"issue":"1","key":"23_CR10","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"11","DOI":"10.1002\/nav.3800130103","volume":"13","author":"M. Maschler","year":"1966","unstructured":"Maschler, M.: A price leadership method for solving the inspector\u2019s non-constant-sum game. Naval Research Logistics Quarterly\u00a013(1), 11\u201333 (1966)","journal-title":"Naval Research Logistics Quarterly"},{"key":"23_CR11","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"48","DOI":"10.1073\/pnas.36.1.48","volume":"36","author":"J. Nash","year":"1950","unstructured":"Nash, J.: Equilibrium points in n-person games. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences\u00a036, 48\u201349 (1950)","journal-title":"Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences"},{"key":"23_CR12","unstructured":"Paruchuri, P., Pearce, J.P., Marecki, J., Tambe, M., Ord\u00f3\u00f1ez, F.: Playing games for security: an efficient exact algorithm for solving Bayesian Stackelberg games. In: Proceedings of AAMAS, Estoril, Portugal, pp. 895\u2013902 (2008)"},{"issue":"1","key":"23_CR13","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"43","DOI":"10.1609\/aimag.v30i1.2173","volume":"30","author":"J. Pita","year":"2009","unstructured":"Pita, J., Jain, M., Ord\u00f3\u00f1ez, F., Portway, C., Tambe, M., Western, C.: Using game theory for Los Angeles airport security. AI Mag.\u00a030(1), 43\u201357 (2009)","journal-title":"AI Mag."},{"key":"23_CR14","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"104","DOI":"10.1145\/380752.380783","volume-title":"STOC","author":"T. Roughgarden","year":"2001","unstructured":"Roughgarden, T.: Stackelberg scheduling strategies. In: STOC, pp. 104\u2013113. ACM, New York (2001)"},{"key":"23_CR15","volume-title":"Marktform und Gleichgewicht","author":"H. Stackelberg von","year":"1934","unstructured":"von Stackelberg, H.: Marktform und Gleichgewicht. Springer, Vienna (1934)"},{"key":"23_CR16","unstructured":"von Stengel, B., Zamir, S.: Leadership with commitment to mixed strategies. Research Report LSE-CDAM-2004-01, London School of Economics (February 2004)"},{"issue":"1","key":"23_CR17","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"103","DOI":"10.4086\/toc.2007.v003a006","volume":"3","author":"D. Zuckerman","year":"2007","unstructured":"Zuckerman, D.: Linear degree extractors and the inapproximability of max clique and chromatic number. Theory of Computing\u00a03(1), 103\u2013128 (2007)","journal-title":"Theory of Computing"}],"container-title":["Lecture Notes in Computer Science","Algorithmic Game Theory"],"original-title":[],"link":[{"URL":"http:\/\/link.springer.com\/content\/pdf\/10.1007\/978-3-642-04645-2_23.pdf","content-type":"unspecified","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"similarity-checking"}],"deposited":{"date-parts":[[2023,5,27]],"date-time":"2023-05-27T02:27:00Z","timestamp":1685154420000},"score":1,"resource":{"primary":{"URL":"http:\/\/link.springer.com\/10.1007\/978-3-642-04645-2_23"}},"subtitle":[],"short-title":[],"issued":{"date-parts":[[2009]]},"ISBN":["9783642046445","9783642046452"],"references-count":17,"URL":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/978-3-642-04645-2_23","relation":{},"ISSN":["0302-9743","1611-3349"],"issn-type":[{"value":"0302-9743","type":"print"},{"value":"1611-3349","type":"electronic"}],"subject":[],"published":{"date-parts":[[2009]]}}}