{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2024,9,9]],"date-time":"2024-09-09T15:22:18Z","timestamp":1725895338654},"publisher-location":"Berlin, Heidelberg","reference-count":12,"publisher":"Springer Berlin Heidelberg","isbn-type":[{"type":"print","value":"9783642339950"},{"type":"electronic","value":"9783642339967"}],"content-domain":{"domain":[],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":[],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2012]]},"DOI":"10.1007\/978-3-642-33996-7_16","type":"book-chapter","created":{"date-parts":[[2012,10,6]],"date-time":"2012-10-06T03:27:01Z","timestamp":1349494021000},"page":"180-191","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":2,"title":["Commodity Auctions and Frugality Ratios"],"prefix":"10.1007","author":[{"given":"Paul W.","family":"Goldberg","sequence":"first","affiliation":[],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]},{"given":"Antony","family":"McCabe","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]}],"member":"297","reference":[{"key":"16_CR1","first-page":"991","volume-title":"Proceedings of the Thirteenth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, SODA 2002","author":"A. Archer","year":"2002","unstructured":"Archer, A., Tardos, E.: Frugal path mechanisms. In: Proceedings of the Thirteenth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, SODA 2002, pp. 991\u2013999. Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics, Philadelphia (2002)"},{"key":"16_CR2","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Chen, N., Elkind, E., Gravin, N., Petrov, F.: Frugal mechanism design via spectral techniques. In: IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, pp. 755\u2013764 (2010)","DOI":"10.1109\/FOCS.2010.77"},{"key":"16_CR3","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Clarke, E.H.: Multipart pricing of public goods. Public Choice 11(1) (September 1971)","DOI":"10.1007\/BF01726210"},{"key":"16_CR4","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Elkind, E., Goldberg, L., Goldberg, P.: Frugality ratios and improved truthful mechanisms for vertex cover. In: Proceedings of the 8th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, pp. 336\u2013345 (2007)","DOI":"10.1145\/1250910.1250959"},{"issue":"4","key":"16_CR5","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"587","DOI":"10.2307\/1914083","volume":"41","author":"A. Gibbard","year":"1973","unstructured":"Gibbard, A.: Manipulation of voting schemes: A general result. Econometrica\u00a041(4), 587\u2013601 (1973)","journal-title":"Econometrica"},{"issue":"4","key":"16_CR6","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"617","DOI":"10.2307\/1914085","volume":"41","author":"T. Groves","year":"1973","unstructured":"Groves, T.: Incentives in teams. Econometrica\u00a041(4), 617\u2013631 (1973)","journal-title":"Econometrica"},{"key":"16_CR7","first-page":"615","volume-title":"FOCS 2005: Proceedings of the 46th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science","author":"A.R. Karlin","year":"2005","unstructured":"Karlin, A.R., Kempe, D., Tamir, T.: Beyond VCG: Frugality of truthful mechanisms. In: FOCS 2005: Proceedings of the 46th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, pp. 615\u2013626. IEEE Computer Society, Washington, DC (2005)"},{"key":"16_CR8","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Kempe, D., Salek, M., Moore, C.: Frugal and truthful auctions for vertex covers, flows and cuts. In: IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, pp. 745\u2013754 (2010)","DOI":"10.1109\/FOCS.2010.76"},{"key":"16_CR9","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1017\/CBO9780511800481","volume-title":"Algorithmic Game Theory","author":"N. Nisan","year":"2007","unstructured":"Nisan, N., Roughgarden, T., Tardos, E., Vazirani, V.V.: Algorithmic Game Theory. Cambridge University Press, New York (2007)"},{"key":"16_CR10","series-title":"Lecture Notes in Computer Science","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"608","DOI":"10.1007\/3-540-36494-3_53","volume-title":"STACS 2003","author":"K. Talwar","year":"2003","unstructured":"Talwar, K.: The Price of Truth: Frugality in Truthful Mechanisms. In: Alt, H., Habib, M. (eds.) STACS 2003. LNCS, vol.\u00a02607, pp. 608\u2013619. Springer, Heidelberg (2003)"},{"issue":"1","key":"16_CR11","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"8","DOI":"10.1111\/j.1540-6261.1961.tb02789.x","volume":"16","author":"W. Vickrey","year":"1961","unstructured":"Vickrey, W.: Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Tenders. The Journal of Finance\u00a016(1), 8\u201337 (1961)","journal-title":"The Journal of Finance"},{"key":"16_CR12","series-title":"Lecture Notes in Computer Science","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"584","DOI":"10.1007\/978-3-540-77105-0_64","volume-title":"Internet and Network Economics","author":"Q. Yan","year":"2007","unstructured":"Yan, Q.: On the Price of Truthfulness in Path Auctions. In: Deng, X., Graham, F.C. (eds.) WINE 2007. LNCS, vol.\u00a04858, pp. 584\u2013589. Springer, Heidelberg (2007)"}],"container-title":["Lecture Notes in Computer Science","Algorithmic Game Theory"],"original-title":[],"link":[{"URL":"http:\/\/link.springer.com\/content\/pdf\/10.1007\/978-3-642-33996-7_16","content-type":"unspecified","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"similarity-checking"}],"deposited":{"date-parts":[[2019,5,8]],"date-time":"2019-05-08T00:07:41Z","timestamp":1557274061000},"score":1,"resource":{"primary":{"URL":"http:\/\/link.springer.com\/10.1007\/978-3-642-33996-7_16"}},"subtitle":[],"short-title":[],"issued":{"date-parts":[[2012]]},"ISBN":["9783642339950","9783642339967"],"references-count":12,"URL":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/978-3-642-33996-7_16","relation":{},"ISSN":["0302-9743","1611-3349"],"issn-type":[{"type":"print","value":"0302-9743"},{"type":"electronic","value":"1611-3349"}],"subject":[],"published":{"date-parts":[[2012]]}}}