{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2025,4,21]],"date-time":"2025-04-21T11:41:59Z","timestamp":1745235719584},"publisher-location":"Berlin, Heidelberg","reference-count":24,"publisher":"Springer Berlin Heidelberg","isbn-type":[{"type":"print","value":"9783642339950"},{"type":"electronic","value":"9783642339967"}],"content-domain":{"domain":[],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":[],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2012]]},"DOI":"10.1007\/978-3-642-33996-7_20","type":"book-chapter","created":{"date-parts":[[2012,10,6]],"date-time":"2012-10-06T07:27:01Z","timestamp":1349508421000},"page":"227-238","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":11,"title":["Uniform Price Auctions: Equilibria and Efficiency"],"prefix":"10.1007","author":[{"given":"Evangelos","family":"Markakis","sequence":"first","affiliation":[],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]},{"given":"Orestis","family":"Telelis","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]}],"member":"297","reference":[{"key":"20_CR1","unstructured":"Ausubel, L., Cramton, P.: Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions. Tech. rep., University of Maryland (2002)"},{"key":"20_CR2","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Bhawalkar, K., Roughgarden, T.: Welfare Guarantees for Combinatorial Auctions with Item Bidding. In: Proceedings of the ACM-SIAM Symposium on Disctrete Algorithms, SODA, pp. 700\u2013709 (2011)","DOI":"10.1137\/1.9781611973082.55"},{"key":"20_CR3","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Bresky, M.: Pure Equilibrium Strategies in Multi-unit Auctions with Private Value Bidders. Tech. Rep. 376, Center for Economic Research & Graduate Education - Economics Institute (CERGE-EI), Czech Republic (2008)","DOI":"10.2139\/ssrn.1483179"},{"key":"20_CR4","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Caragiannis, I., Kaklamanis, K., Kanellopoulos, P., Kyropoulou, M., Lucier, B., Paes Leme, R., Tardos, E.: On the efficiency of equilibria in generalized second price auctions. arxiv:1201.6429 (2012)","DOI":"10.1145\/1993574.1993588"},{"key":"20_CR5","series-title":"Lecture Notes in Computer Science","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"820","DOI":"10.1007\/978-3-540-70575-8_67","volume-title":"Automata, Languages and Programming","author":"G. Christodoulou","year":"2008","unstructured":"Christodoulou, G., Kov\u00e1cs, A., Schapira, M.: Bayesian Combinatorial Auctions. In: Aceto, L., Damg\u00e5rd, I., Goldberg, L.A., Halld\u00f3rsson, M.M., Ing\u00f3lfsd\u00f3ttir, A., Walukiewicz, I. (eds.) ICALP 2008, Part I. LNCS, vol.\u00a05125, pp. 820\u2013832. Springer, Heidelberg (2008)"},{"key":"20_CR6","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"17","DOI":"10.1007\/BF01726210","volume":"11","author":"E.H. Clarke","year":"1971","unstructured":"Clarke, E.H.: Multipart pricing of public goods. Public Choice\u00a011, 17\u201333 (1971)","journal-title":"Public Choice"},{"key":"20_CR7","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"85","DOI":"10.1613\/jair.2950","volume":"37","author":"S. Dobzinski","year":"2010","unstructured":"Dobzinski, S., Nisan, N.: Mechanisms for Multi-Unit Auctions. Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research\u00a037, 85\u201398 (2010)","journal-title":"Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research"},{"issue":"1","key":"20_CR8","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"242","DOI":"10.1257\/aer.97.1.242","volume":"97","author":"B. Edelman","year":"2007","unstructured":"Edelman, B., Ostrovsky, M., Schwartz, M.: Internet Advertising and the Generalized Second-Price Auction: Selling Billions of Dollars Worth of Keywords. The American Economic Review\u00a097(1), 242\u2013259 (2007)","journal-title":"The American Economic Review"},{"issue":"2","key":"20_CR9","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"227","DOI":"10.1007\/s001990050220","volume":"12","author":"R. Engelbrecht-Wiggans","year":"1998","unstructured":"Engelbrecht-Wiggans, R., Kahn, C.M.: Multi-unit auctions with uniform prices. Economic Theory\u00a012(2), 227\u2013258 (1998)","journal-title":"Economic Theory"},{"key":"20_CR10","volume-title":"A Program for Monetary Stability","author":"M. Friedman","year":"1960","unstructured":"Friedman, M.: A Program for Monetary Stability. Fordham University Press, New York (1960)"},{"key":"20_CR11","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Hassidim, A., Kaplan, H., Mansour, Y., Nisan, N.: Non-price equilibria in markets of discrete goods. In: Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, EC, pp. 295\u2013296 (2011)","DOI":"10.1145\/1993574.1993619"},{"key":"20_CR12","series-title":"Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings","volume-title":"Negotiation and Market Engineering","author":"T. Kittsteiner","year":"2007","unstructured":"Kittsteiner, T., Ockenfels, A.: On the Design of Simple Multi-unit Online Auctions. In: Jennings, N., Kersten, G., Ockenfels, A., Weinhardt, C. (eds.) Negotiation and Market Engineering. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, vol.\u00a006461. Internationales Begegnungs- und Forschungszentrum f\u00fcr Informatik (IBFI), Schloss Dagstuhl, Germany (2007), \n                  \n                    http:\/\/drops.dagstuhl.de\/opus\/volltexte\/2007\/1005"},{"key":"20_CR13","unstructured":"Krishna, V.: Auction Theory. Academic Press (April 2002)"},{"issue":"2","key":"20_CR14","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"270","DOI":"10.1016\/j.geb.2005.02.006","volume":"55","author":"B. Lehmann","year":"2006","unstructured":"Lehmann, B., Lehmann, D.J., Nisan, N.: Combinatorial auctions with decreasing marginal utilities. Games and Economic Behavior\u00a055(2), 270\u2013296 (2006)","journal-title":"Games and Economic Behavior"},{"key":"20_CR15","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Leme, R.P., Syrgkanis, V., Tardos, E.: Sequential auctions and externalities. In: Proceedings of the ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, SODA, pp. 869\u2013886 (2012)","DOI":"10.1137\/1.9781611973099.70"},{"key":"20_CR16","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Lucier, B., Borodin, A.: Price of Anarchy for Greedy Auctions. In: Proceedings of the ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, SODA, pp. 537\u2013553 (2010)","DOI":"10.1137\/1.9781611973075.46"},{"key":"20_CR17","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Milgrom, P.: Putting Auction Theory to Work, Cambridge (2004)","DOI":"10.1017\/CBO9780511813825"},{"issue":"2","key":"20_CR18","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"612","DOI":"10.1016\/j.geb.2007.12.009","volume":"64","author":"A. Mu\u2019alem","year":"2008","unstructured":"Mu\u2019alem, A., Nisan, N.: Truthful approximation mechanisms for restricted combinatorial auctions. Games and Economic Behavior\u00a064(2), 612\u2013631 (2008)","journal-title":"Games and Economic Behavior"},{"key":"20_CR19","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"337","DOI":"10.1007\/BF01215207","volume":"5","author":"C. Noussair","year":"1995","unstructured":"Noussair, C.: Equilibria in a multi-object uniform price sealed bid auction with multi-unit demands. Economic Theory\u00a05, 337\u2013351 (1995)","journal-title":"Economic Theory"},{"key":"20_CR20","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Ockenfels, A., Reiley, D.H., Sadrieh, A.: Economics and Information Systems. In: Handbooks in Information Systems, Online Actions, vol.\u00a01, ch. 12, pp. 571\u2013628. Elsevier Science (December 2006)","DOI":"10.1016\/S1574-0145(06)01012-9"},{"key":"20_CR21","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"1029","DOI":"10.1111\/1468-0262.00069","volume":"67","author":"P.J. Reny","year":"1999","unstructured":"Reny, P.J.: On the existence of Pure and Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibria in Discontinuous Games. Econometrica\u00a067, 1029\u20131056 (1999)","journal-title":"Econometrica"},{"key":"20_CR22","unstructured":"U.S. Dept. of Treasury: Uniform-price auctions: Update of the treasury experience, office of market finance (1998), \n                  \n                    http:\/\/www.treasury.gov\/domfin"},{"issue":"1","key":"20_CR23","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"8","DOI":"10.1111\/j.1540-6261.1961.tb02789.x","volume":"16","author":"W. Vickrey","year":"1961","unstructured":"Vickrey, W.: Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed tenders. Journal of Finance\u00a016(1), 8\u201337 (1961)","journal-title":"Journal of Finance"},{"key":"20_CR24","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"V\u00f6cking, B.: A universally-truthful approximation scheme for multi-unit auctions. In: Proceedings of the ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, SODA, pp. 846\u2013855 (2012)","DOI":"10.1137\/1.9781611973099.68"}],"container-title":["Lecture Notes in Computer Science","Algorithmic Game Theory"],"original-title":[],"link":[{"URL":"http:\/\/link.springer.com\/content\/pdf\/10.1007\/978-3-642-33996-7_20","content-type":"unspecified","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"similarity-checking"}],"deposited":{"date-parts":[[2019,5,8]],"date-time":"2019-05-08T03:58:10Z","timestamp":1557287890000},"score":1,"resource":{"primary":{"URL":"http:\/\/link.springer.com\/10.1007\/978-3-642-33996-7_20"}},"subtitle":[],"short-title":[],"issued":{"date-parts":[[2012]]},"ISBN":["9783642339950","9783642339967"],"references-count":24,"URL":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/978-3-642-33996-7_20","relation":{},"ISSN":["0302-9743","1611-3349"],"issn-type":[{"type":"print","value":"0302-9743"},{"type":"electronic","value":"1611-3349"}],"subject":[],"published":{"date-parts":[[2012]]}}}