{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2026,3,4]],"date-time":"2026-03-04T20:29:43Z","timestamp":1772656183373,"version":"3.50.1"},"publisher-location":"Berlin, Heidelberg","reference-count":17,"publisher":"Springer Berlin Heidelberg","isbn-type":[{"value":"9783642413919","type":"print"},{"value":"9783642413926","type":"electronic"}],"content-domain":{"domain":[],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":[],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2013]]},"DOI":"10.1007\/978-3-642-41392-6_2","type":"book-chapter","created":{"date-parts":[[2013,10,9]],"date-time":"2013-10-09T03:30:26Z","timestamp":1381289426000},"page":"13-25","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":14,"title":["New Results on Equilibria in Strategic Candidacy"],"prefix":"10.1007","author":[{"given":"J\u00e9rome","family":"Lang","sequence":"first","affiliation":[],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]},{"given":"Nicolas","family":"Maudet","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]},{"given":"Maria","family":"Polukarov","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]}],"member":"297","reference":[{"key":"2_CR1","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Aumann, R.: Acceptable points in general cooperative n-person games. In: Contributions to the Theory of Games IV. Annals of Mathematics Study, vol.\u00a040, pp. 287\u2013324 (1959)","DOI":"10.1515\/9781400882168-018"},{"issue":"8-9","key":"2_CR2","first-page":"27","volume":"16","author":"J. Bartholdi","year":"1992","unstructured":"Bartholdi, J., Tovey, C., Trick, M.: How hard is it to control an election? Social Choice and Welfare\u00a016(8-9), 27\u201340 (1992)","journal-title":"Social Choice and Welfare"},{"issue":"1","key":"2_CR3","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"74","DOI":"10.1016\/j.mathsocsci.2011.12.003","volume":"64","author":"Y. Chevaleyre","year":"2012","unstructured":"Chevaleyre, Y., Lang, J., Maudet, N., Monnot, J., Xia, L.: New candidates welcome! possible winners with respect to the addition of new candidates. Mathematical Social Sciences\u00a064(1), 74\u201388 (2012)","journal-title":"Mathematical Social Sciences"},{"key":"2_CR4","first-page":"5","volume":"97","author":"B. Debord","year":"1987","unstructured":"Debord, B.: Caract\u00e9risation des matrices de pr\u00e9f\u00e9rences nettes et m\u00e9thodes d\u2019agr\u00e9gation associ\u00e9es. Mathematiques et Sciences Humaines\u00a097, 5\u201317 (1987)","journal-title":"Mathematiques et Sciences Humaines"},{"key":"2_CR5","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"1013","DOI":"10.1111\/1468-0262.00228","volume":"69","author":"B. Dutta","year":"2001","unstructured":"Dutta, B., Breton, M.L., Jackson, M.O.: Strategic candidacy and voting procedures. Econometrica\u00a069, 1013\u20131037 (2001)","journal-title":"Econometrica"},{"key":"2_CR6","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"190","DOI":"10.1006\/jeth.2001.2862","volume":"103","author":"B. Dutta","year":"2002","unstructured":"Dutta, B., Breton, M.L., Jackson, M.O.: Voting by successive elimination and strategic candidacy in committees. Journal of Economic Theory\u00a0103, 190\u2013218 (2002)","journal-title":"Journal of Economic Theory"},{"issue":"2","key":"2_CR7","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"233","DOI":"10.1007\/s00199-002-0279-6","volume":"22","author":"L. Ehlers","year":"2003","unstructured":"Ehlers, L., Weymark, J.A.: Candidate stability and nonbinary social choice. Economic Theory\u00a022(2), 233\u2013243 (2003)","journal-title":"Economic Theory"},{"key":"2_CR8","first-page":"529","volume":"42","author":"E. Elkind","year":"2011","unstructured":"Elkind, E., Faliszewski, P., Slinko, A.M.: Cloning in elections: Finding the possible winners. J. Artif. Intell. Res (JAIR)\u00a042, 529\u2013573 (2011)","journal-title":"J. Artif. Intell. Res. (JAIR)"},{"issue":"1","key":"2_CR9","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"29","DOI":"10.1016\/j.jet.2003.09.005","volume":"117","author":"H. Eraslan","year":"2004","unstructured":"Eraslan, H., McLennan, A.: Strategic candidacy for multivalued voting procedures. Journal of Economic Theory\u00a0117(1), 29\u201354 (2004)","journal-title":"Journal of Economic Theory"},{"key":"2_CR10","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"305","DOI":"10.1613\/jair.3136","volume":"40","author":"P. Faliszewski","year":"2011","unstructured":"Faliszewski, P., Hemaspaandra, E., Hemaspaandra, L.: Multimode control attacks on elections. JAIR\u00a040, 305\u2013351 (2011)","journal-title":"JAIR"},{"issue":"5-6","key":"2_CR11","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"255","DOI":"10.1016\/j.artint.2007.01.005","volume":"171","author":"E. Hemaspaandra","year":"2007","unstructured":"Hemaspaandra, E., Hemaspaandra, L., Rothe, J.: Anyone but him: The complexity of precluding an alternative. Artificial Intelligence\u00a0171(5-6), 255\u2013285 (2007)","journal-title":"Artificial Intelligence"},{"key":"2_CR12","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Lu, T., Boutilier, C.: The unavailable candidate model: a decision-theoretic view of social choice. In: ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2010, pp. 263\u2013274 (2010)","DOI":"10.1145\/1807342.1807385"},{"issue":"2","key":"2_CR13","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"286","DOI":"10.2307\/1969529","volume":"54","author":"J. Nash","year":"1951","unstructured":"Nash, J.: Non-cooperative games. Annals of Mathematics\u00a054(2), 286\u2013295 (1951)","journal-title":"Annals of Mathematics"},{"issue":"3","key":"2_CR14","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"657","DOI":"10.1007\/s00199-004-0564-7","volume":"27","author":"C. Rodriguez-Alvarez","year":"2006","unstructured":"Rodriguez-Alvarez, C.: Candidate stability and probabilistic voting procedures. Economic Theory\u00a027(3), 657\u2013677 (2006)","journal-title":"Economic Theory"},{"issue":"3","key":"2_CR15","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"545","DOI":"10.1007\/s00355-006-0126-y","volume":"27","author":"C. Rodriguez-Alvarez","year":"2006","unstructured":"Rodriguez-Alvarez, C.: Candidate stability and voting correspondences. Social Choice and Welfare\u00a027(3), 545\u2013570 (2006)","journal-title":"Social Choice and Welfare"},{"key":"2_CR16","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Saari, D.: A dictionary of voting paradoxes. Journal of Economic Theory\u00a048 (1989)","DOI":"10.1016\/0022-0531(89)90037-9"},{"key":"2_CR17","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Saari, D.: Election results and a partial ordering for positional ordering. In: Schofield, N.J. (ed.) Collective Decision-Making: Social Choice and Political Economy, pp. 93\u2013110. Kluwer (1996)","DOI":"10.1007\/978-94-015-8767-9_5"}],"container-title":["Lecture Notes in Computer Science","Algorithmic Game Theory"],"original-title":[],"link":[{"URL":"http:\/\/link.springer.com\/content\/pdf\/10.1007\/978-3-642-41392-6_2","content-type":"unspecified","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"similarity-checking"}],"deposited":{"date-parts":[[2019,5,17]],"date-time":"2019-05-17T19:37:10Z","timestamp":1558121830000},"score":1,"resource":{"primary":{"URL":"http:\/\/link.springer.com\/10.1007\/978-3-642-41392-6_2"}},"subtitle":[],"short-title":[],"issued":{"date-parts":[[2013]]},"ISBN":["9783642413919","9783642413926"],"references-count":17,"URL":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/978-3-642-41392-6_2","relation":{},"ISSN":["0302-9743","1611-3349"],"issn-type":[{"value":"0302-9743","type":"print"},{"value":"1611-3349","type":"electronic"}],"subject":[],"published":{"date-parts":[[2013]]}}}