{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2025,11,18]],"date-time":"2025-11-18T12:17:42Z","timestamp":1763468262867},"publisher-location":"Berlin, Heidelberg","reference-count":17,"publisher":"Springer Berlin Heidelberg","isbn-type":[{"type":"print","value":"9783662476659"},{"type":"electronic","value":"9783662476666"}],"content-domain":{"domain":[],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":[],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2015]]},"DOI":"10.1007\/978-3-662-47666-6_52","type":"book-chapter","created":{"date-parts":[[2015,6,19]],"date-time":"2015-06-19T03:46:47Z","timestamp":1434685607000},"page":"650-662","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":11,"title":["Selling Two Goods Optimally"],"prefix":"10.1007","author":[{"given":"Yiannis","family":"Giannakopoulos","sequence":"first","affiliation":[]},{"given":"Elias","family":"Koutsoupias","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[]}],"member":"297","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2015,6,20]]},"reference":[{"key":"52_CR1","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Babaioff, M., Immorlica, N., Lucier, B., Weinberg, S.M.: A simple and approximately optimal mechanism for an additive buyer. In FOCS 2014 (2014)","DOI":"10.1109\/FOCS.2014.11"},{"key":"52_CR2","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Daskalakis, C., Deckelbaum, A., Tzamos, C.: The complexity of optimal mechanism design. In: SODA 2013, pp. 1302\u20131318 (2013)","DOI":"10.1137\/1.9781611973402.96"},{"key":"52_CR3","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Daskalakis, C., Deckelbaum, A., Tzamos, C.: Mechanism design via optimal transport. In: EC 2013, pp. 269\u2013286 (2013)","DOI":"10.1145\/2492002.2482593"},{"key":"52_CR4","unstructured":"Giannakopoulos, Y.: Bounding the optimal revenue of selling multiple goods. CoRR, abs\/1404.2832 (2014)"},{"key":"52_CR5","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Giannakopoulos, Y., Koutsoupias, E.: Duality and optimality of auctions for uniform distributions. In: EC 2014, pp. 259\u2013276 (2014)","DOI":"10.1145\/2600057.2602883"},{"key":"52_CR6","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Hart, S., Nisan, N.: Approximate revenue maximization with multiple items. In: EC 2012 (2012)","DOI":"10.1145\/2229012.2229061"},{"key":"52_CR7","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Hart, S., Nisan, N.: The menu-size complexity of auctions. In: EC 2013, pp. 565\u2013566 (2013)","DOI":"10.1145\/2492002.2482544"},{"key":"52_CR8","unstructured":"Hart, S., Reny, P.J.: Maximal revenue with multiple goods: nonmonotonicity and other observations. Technical report, The Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University, Jerusalem (2012)"},{"issue":"28","key":"52_CR9","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"11232","DOI":"10.1073\/pnas.1309533110","volume":"110","author":"X Li","year":"2013","unstructured":"Li, X., Yao, A.C.-C.: On revenue maximization for selling multiple independently distributed items. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. 110(28), 11232\u201311237 (2013)","journal-title":"Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci."},{"key":"52_CR10","unstructured":"Lov\u00e1sz, L., Plummer, M.D.: Matching theory, North-Holland (1986)"},{"issue":"1","key":"52_CR11","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"1","DOI":"10.1016\/j.jet.2005.08.007","volume":"127","author":"AM Manelli","year":"2006","unstructured":"Manelli, A.M., Vincent, D.R.: Bundling as an optimal selling mechanism for a multiple-good monopolist. J. Econ. Theory 127(1), 1\u201335 (2006)","journal-title":"J. Econ. Theory"},{"issue":"2","key":"52_CR12","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"335","DOI":"10.1016\/0022-0531(88)90135-4","volume":"46","author":"RP McAfee","year":"1988","unstructured":"McAfee, R.P., McMillan, J.: Multidimensional incentive compatibility and mechanism design. J. Econ. Theory 46(2), 335\u2013354 (1988)","journal-title":"J. Econ. Theory"},{"issue":"1","key":"52_CR13","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"58","DOI":"10.1287\/moor.6.1.58","volume":"6","author":"RB Myerson","year":"1981","unstructured":"Myerson, R.B.: Optimal auction design. Mathematics of Operations Research 6(1), 58\u201373 (1981)","journal-title":"Mathematics of Operations Research"},{"issue":"4","key":"52_CR14","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"625","DOI":"10.1215\/S0012-7094-55-02268-7","volume":"22","author":"O Ore","year":"1955","unstructured":"Ore, O.: Graphs and matching theorems. Duke Mathematical Journal 22(4), 625\u2013639 (1955)","journal-title":"Duke Mathematical Journal"},{"key":"52_CR15","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Pavlov, G.: Optimal mechanism for selling two goods. The BE Journal of Theoretical Economics 11(1) (2011)","DOI":"10.2202\/1935-1704.1664"},{"issue":"2","key":"52_CR16","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"113","DOI":"10.1016\/0304-4068(85)90015-1","volume":"14","author":"J-C Rochet","year":"1985","unstructured":"Rochet, J.-C.: The taxation principle and multi-time hamilton-jacobi equations. Journal of Mathematical Economics 14(2), 113\u2013128 (1985)","journal-title":"Journal of Mathematical Economics"},{"key":"52_CR17","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Wang, Z., Tang, P.: Optimal mechanisms with simple menus. In: EC 2014 (2014)","DOI":"10.1145\/2600057.2602863"}],"container-title":["Lecture Notes in Computer Science","Automata, Languages, and Programming"],"original-title":[],"link":[{"URL":"http:\/\/link.springer.com\/content\/pdf\/10.1007\/978-3-662-47666-6_52","content-type":"unspecified","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"similarity-checking"}],"deposited":{"date-parts":[[2019,5,30]],"date-time":"2019-05-30T03:08:17Z","timestamp":1559185697000},"score":1,"resource":{"primary":{"URL":"http:\/\/link.springer.com\/10.1007\/978-3-662-47666-6_52"}},"subtitle":[],"short-title":[],"issued":{"date-parts":[[2015]]},"ISBN":["9783662476659","9783662476666"],"references-count":17,"URL":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/978-3-662-47666-6_52","relation":{},"ISSN":["0302-9743","1611-3349"],"issn-type":[{"type":"print","value":"0302-9743"},{"type":"electronic","value":"1611-3349"}],"subject":[],"published":{"date-parts":[[2015]]}}}