{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2025,3,27]],"date-time":"2025-03-27T07:05:53Z","timestamp":1743059153263,"version":"3.40.3"},"publisher-location":"Berlin, Heidelberg","reference-count":16,"publisher":"Springer Berlin Heidelberg","isbn-type":[{"type":"print","value":"9783662541098"},{"type":"electronic","value":"9783662541104"}],"license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2016,1,1]],"date-time":"2016-01-01T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1451606400000},"content-version":"unspecified","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"http:\/\/www.springer.com\/tdm"}],"content-domain":{"domain":[],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":[],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2016]]},"DOI":"10.1007\/978-3-662-54110-4_14","type":"book-chapter","created":{"date-parts":[[2016,12,10]],"date-time":"2016-12-10T08:48:58Z","timestamp":1481359738000},"page":"188-206","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":0,"title":["Anonymous Auctions Maximizing Revenue"],"prefix":"10.1007","author":[{"given":"Christos","family":"Tzamos","sequence":"first","affiliation":[],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]},{"given":"Christopher A.","family":"Wilkens","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]}],"member":"297","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2016,12,11]]},"reference":[{"doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Alaei, S., Hartline, J.D., Niazadeh, R., Pountourakis, E., Yuan, Y.: Optimal auctions vs. anonymous pricing. In: Guruswami, V. (ed.) IEEE 56th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, FOCS 2015, Berkeley, CA, USA, 17\u201320 October 2015, pp. 1446\u20131463. IEEE Computer Society (2015)","key":"14_CR1","DOI":"10.1109\/FOCS.2015.92"},{"doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Archer, A., Tardos, \u00c9.: Truthful mechanisms for one-parameter agents. In: FOCS 2001: Proceedings of the 42nd IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, p. 482. IEEE Computer Society, Washington, DC (2001)","key":"14_CR2","DOI":"10.1109\/SFCS.2001.959924"},{"unstructured":"Ashlagi, I.: A characterization of anonymous truth-revealing position auctions. Harvard University, Discussion Paper, Harvard Business School (2008)","key":"14_CR3"},{"doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Azar, P.D., Daskalakis, C., Micali, S., Weinberg, S.M.: Optimal and efficient parametric auctions. In: SODA, pp. 596\u2013604 (2013)","key":"14_CR4","DOI":"10.1137\/1.9781611973105.43"},{"doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Balcan, M.-F., Blum, A., Mansour, Y.: Item pricing for revenue maximization. In: Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce, pp. 50\u201359. ACM (2008)","key":"14_CR5","DOI":"10.1145\/1386790.1386802"},{"issue":"2","key":"14_CR6","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"345","DOI":"10.2307\/1911240","volume":"53","author":"J Cremer","year":"1985","unstructured":"Cremer, J., McLean, R.P.: Optimal selling strategies under uncertainty for a discriminating monopolist when demands are interdependent. Econometrica 53(2), 345\u2013361 (1985)","journal-title":"Econometrica"},{"unstructured":"Deb, R., Pai, M.: Discrimination via symmetric auctions. Am. Econ. J. Microecon. (2015)","key":"14_CR7"},{"doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Dhangwatnotai, P., Roughgarden, T., Yan, Q.: Revenue maximization with a single sample. In: Proceedings of the 11th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, EC 2010, pp. 129\u2013138. ACM, New York (2010)","key":"14_CR8","DOI":"10.1145\/1807342.1807364"},{"doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Feldman, M., Fiat, A., Leonardi, S., Sankowski, P.: Revenue maximizing envy-free multi-unit auctions with budgets. In: Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, pp. 532\u2013549. ACM (2012)","key":"14_CR9","DOI":"10.1145\/2229012.2229052"},{"doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Goldberg, A.V., Hartline, J.D.: Envy-free auctions for digital goods. In: Proceedings of the 4th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, pp. 29\u201335. ACM (2003)","key":"14_CR10","DOI":"10.1145\/779928.779932"},{"unstructured":"Guruswami, V., Hartline, J.D., Karlin, A.R., Kempe, D., Kenyon, C., McSherry, F.: On profit-maximizing envy-free pricing. In: Proceedings of the Sixteenth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, pp. 1164\u20131173. Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics (2005)","key":"14_CR11"},{"issue":"1","key":"14_CR12","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"5:1","DOI":"10.1145\/1598780.1598785","volume":"8","author":"JD Hartline","year":"2009","unstructured":"Hartline, J.D., Roughgarden, T.: Simple versus optimal mechanisms. SIGecom Exch. 8(1), 5:1\u20135:3 (2009)","journal-title":"SIGecom Exch."},{"issue":"1","key":"14_CR13","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"58","DOI":"10.1287\/moor.6.1.58","volume":"6","author":"RB Myerson","year":"1981","unstructured":"Myerson, R.B.: Optimal auction design. Math. Oper. Res. 6(1), 58\u201373 (1981)","journal-title":"Math. Oper. Res."},{"doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Ronen, A.: On approximating optimal auctions. In: Proceedings of the 3rd ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, pp. 11\u201317. ACM (2001)","key":"14_CR14","DOI":"10.1145\/501158.501160"},{"doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Roughgarden, T., Talgam-Cohen, I.: Optimal and near-optimal mechanism design with interdependent values. In: Proceedings of the Fourteenth ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, EC 2013, pp. 767\u2013784. ACM, New York (2013)","key":"14_CR15","DOI":"10.1145\/2492002.2482606"},{"issue":"3","key":"14_CR16","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"509","DOI":"10.1257\/000282803322156963","volume":"93","author":"I Segal","year":"2003","unstructured":"Segal, I.: Optimal pricing mechanisms with unknown demand. Am. Econ. Rev. 93(3), 509\u2013529 (2003)","journal-title":"Am. Econ. Rev."}],"container-title":["Lecture Notes in Computer Science","Web and Internet Economics"],"original-title":[],"link":[{"URL":"http:\/\/link.springer.com\/content\/pdf\/10.1007\/978-3-662-54110-4_14","content-type":"unspecified","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"similarity-checking"}],"deposited":{"date-parts":[[2017,6,25]],"date-time":"2017-06-25T01:40:44Z","timestamp":1498354844000},"score":1,"resource":{"primary":{"URL":"http:\/\/link.springer.com\/10.1007\/978-3-662-54110-4_14"}},"subtitle":[],"short-title":[],"issued":{"date-parts":[[2016]]},"ISBN":["9783662541098","9783662541104"],"references-count":16,"URL":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/978-3-662-54110-4_14","relation":{},"ISSN":["0302-9743","1611-3349"],"issn-type":[{"type":"print","value":"0302-9743"},{"type":"electronic","value":"1611-3349"}],"subject":[],"published":{"date-parts":[[2016]]}}}