{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2026,6,24]],"date-time":"2026-06-24T19:58:24Z","timestamp":1782331104134,"version":"3.54.5"},"reference-count":29,"publisher":"Springer Science and Business Media LLC","issue":"1","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2022,9,12]],"date-time":"2022-09-12T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1662940800000},"content-version":"tdm","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/www.springernature.com\/gp\/researchers\/text-and-data-mining"},{"start":{"date-parts":[[2022,9,12]],"date-time":"2022-09-12T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1662940800000},"content-version":"vor","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/www.springernature.com\/gp\/researchers\/text-and-data-mining"}],"content-domain":{"domain":["link.springer.com"],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":["Int J Game Theory"],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2023,3]]},"DOI":"10.1007\/s00182-022-00808-1","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2022,9,12]],"date-time":"2022-09-12T10:02:48Z","timestamp":1662976968000},"page":"1-31","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/springer_crossmark_policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":4,"title":["Prices as signals of product quality in a duopoly"],"prefix":"10.1007","volume":"52","author":[{"given":"Minghua","family":"Chen","sequence":"first","affiliation":[],"role":[{"vocabulary":"crossref","role":"author"}]},{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0002-0449-6774","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Konstantinos","family":"Serfes","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[],"role":[{"vocabulary":"crossref","role":"author"}]},{"given":"Eleftherios","family":"Zacharias","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[],"role":[{"vocabulary":"crossref","role":"author"}]}],"member":"297","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2022,9,12]]},"reference":[{"key":"808_CR1","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Bagwell K, Ramey G (1991) Oligopoly limit pricing. Rand J Econ 155\u2013172","DOI":"10.2307\/2601015"},{"key":"808_CR2","unstructured":"Bagwell K, Riordan MH (1991) High and declining prices signal product quality. Am Econ Rev 224\u2013239"},{"key":"808_CR3","first-page":"323","volume":"1","author":"MR Baye","year":"2006","unstructured":"Baye MR, Morgan J, Scholten P et al (2006) Information, search, and price dispersion. Handb Econ Inf Syst 1:323\u2013375","journal-title":"Handb Econ Inf Syst"},{"issue":"2","key":"808_CR4","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"135","DOI":"10.1007\/s10842-014-0178-0","volume":"15","author":"H Bester","year":"2015","unstructured":"Bester H, Demuth J (2015) Signalling rivalry and quality uncertainty in a duopoly. J Ind Compet Trade 15(2):135\u2013154","journal-title":"J Ind Compet Trade"},{"issue":"4","key":"808_CR5","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"681","DOI":"10.1111\/j.1756-2171.2011.00150.x","volume":"42","author":"A Chandra","year":"2011","unstructured":"Chandra A, Tappata M (2011) Consumer search and dynamic price dispersion: an application to gasoline markets. RAND J Econ 42(4):681\u2013704","journal-title":"RAND J Econ"},{"issue":"2","key":"808_CR6","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"179","DOI":"10.2307\/1885060","volume":"102","author":"I-K Cho","year":"1987","unstructured":"Cho I-K, Kreps DM (1987) Signaling games and stable equilibria. Q J Econ 102(2):179\u2013221","journal-title":"Q J Econ"},{"issue":"2","key":"808_CR7","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"418","DOI":"10.1086\/261380","volume":"94","author":"B Dahlby","year":"1986","unstructured":"Dahlby B, West DS (1986) Price dispersion in an automobile insurance market. J Polit Econ 94(2):418\u2013438","journal-title":"J Polit Econ"},{"issue":"1","key":"808_CR8","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"163","DOI":"10.1111\/j.1756-2171.2008.00008.x","volume":"39","author":"AF Daughety","year":"2008","unstructured":"Daughety AF, Reinganum JF (2008) Imperfect competition and quality signalling. RAND J Econ 39(1):163\u2013183","journal-title":"RAND J Econ"},{"key":"808_CR9","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"127","DOI":"10.1016\/j.jet.2018.01.005","volume":"175","author":"L Doval","year":"2018","unstructured":"Doval L (2018) Whether or not to open pandora\u2019s box. J Econ Theory 175:127\u2013158","journal-title":"J Econ Theory"},{"issue":"7","key":"808_CR10","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"907","DOI":"10.1016\/S0167-7187(01)00075-3","volume":"20","author":"C Fluet","year":"2002","unstructured":"Fluet C, Garella PG (2002) Advertising and prices as signals of quality in a regime of price rivalry. Int J Ind Organ 20(7):907\u2013930","journal-title":"Int J Ind Organ"},{"key":"808_CR11","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Harrington JE (1987) Oligopolistic entry deterrence under incomplete information. RAND J Econ 211\u2013231","DOI":"10.2307\/2555548"},{"key":"808_CR12","unstructured":"Hertzendorf MN, Overgaard PB (2000) Will the high-quality producer please stand up? A model of duopoly signaling. Department of Economics, University of Aarhus, draft"},{"issue":"4","key":"808_CR13","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"621","DOI":"10.1162\/105864001753356123","volume":"10","author":"MN Hertzendorf","year":"2001","unstructured":"Hertzendorf MN, Overgaard PB (2001) Price competition and advertising signals: signaling by competing senders. J Econ Manag Strat 10(4):621\u2013662","journal-title":"J Econ Manag Strat"},{"issue":"1","key":"808_CR14","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"192","DOI":"10.1016\/j.geb.2009.06.001","volume":"68","author":"MC Janssen","year":"2010","unstructured":"Janssen MC, Roy S (2010) Signaling quality through prices in an oligopoly. Games Econ Behav 68(1):192\u2013207","journal-title":"Games Econ Behav"},{"issue":"7","key":"808_CR15","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"931","DOI":"10.1016\/S0167-7187(01)00081-9","volume":"20","author":"L Linnemer","year":"2002","unstructured":"Linnemer L (2002) Price and advertising as signals of quality when some consumers are informed. Int J Ind Organ 20(7):931\u2013947","journal-title":"Int J Ind Organ"},{"key":"808_CR16","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Milgrom P, Roberts J (1982) Limit pricing and entry under incomplete information: an equilibrium analysis. Econometrica 443\u2013459","DOI":"10.2307\/1912637"},{"issue":"4","key":"808_CR17","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"796","DOI":"10.1086\/261408","volume":"94","author":"P Milgrom","year":"1986","unstructured":"Milgrom P, Roberts J (1986) Price and advertising signals of product quality. J Polit Econ 94(4):796\u2013821","journal-title":"J Polit Econ"},{"issue":"2","key":"808_CR18","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"606","DOI":"10.1111\/sjoe.12272","volume":"121","author":"LJ Mirman","year":"2019","unstructured":"Mirman LJ, Santugini M (2019) The informational role of prices. Scand J Econ 121(2):606\u2013629","journal-title":"Scand J Econ"},{"key":"808_CR19","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Orzach R, Overgaard PB, Tauman Y (2002) Modest advertising signals strength. RAND J Econ 340\u2013358","DOI":"10.2307\/3087437"},{"key":"808_CR20","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Orzach R, Tauman Y (1996) Signalling reversal. Int Econ Rev 453\u2013464","DOI":"10.2307\/2527332"},{"key":"808_CR21","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Petrikait V (2021) Escaping search when buying. Working paper","DOI":"10.1016\/j.ijindorg.2022.102828"},{"issue":"2","key":"808_CR22","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"403","DOI":"10.1007\/s00182-011-0279-5","volume":"40","author":"CP Pires","year":"2011","unstructured":"Pires CP, Catal\u00e3o-Lopes M (2011) Signaling advertising by multiproduct firms. Int J Game Theory 40(2):403\u2013425","journal-title":"Int J Game Theory"},{"issue":"3","key":"808_CR23","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"487","DOI":"10.2307\/2297666","volume":"52","author":"R Rob","year":"1985","unstructured":"Rob R (1985) Equilibrium price distributions. Rev Econ Stud 52(3):487\u2013504","journal-title":"Rev Econ Stud"},{"issue":"6","key":"808_CR24","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"801","DOI":"10.1016\/S0167-7187(97)00067-2","volume":"17","author":"C Schultz","year":"1999","unstructured":"Schultz C (1999) Limit pricing when incumbents have conflicting interests. Int J Ind Organ 17(6):801\u2013825","journal-title":"Int J Ind Organ"},{"issue":"2","key":"808_CR25","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"217","DOI":"10.2307\/2297319","volume":"43","author":"M Spence","year":"1976","unstructured":"Spence M (1976) Product selection, fixed costs, and monopolistic competition. Rev Econ Stud 43(2):217\u2013235","journal-title":"Rev Econ Stud"},{"key":"808_CR26","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"102","DOI":"10.1016\/j.geb.2021.02.006","volume":"127","author":"P Vida","year":"2021","unstructured":"Vida P, Honryo T (2021) Strategic stability of equilibria in multi-sender signaling games. Games Econ Behav 127:102\u2013112","journal-title":"Games Econ Behav"},{"key":"808_CR27","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"108","DOI":"10.2307\/3003403","volume":"11","author":"CA Wilson","year":"1980","unstructured":"Wilson CA (1980) The nature of equilibrium in markets with asymmetric information. Bell J Econ 11:108\u2013130","journal-title":"Bell J Econ"},{"issue":"4","key":"808_CR28","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"647","DOI":"10.2307\/2297767","volume":"50","author":"A Wolinsky","year":"1983","unstructured":"Wolinsky A (1983) Prices as signals of product quality. Rev Econ Stud 50(4):647\u2013658","journal-title":"Rev Econ Stud"},{"issue":"4","key":"808_CR29","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"937","DOI":"10.1111\/j.1530-9134.2008.00201.x","volume":"17","author":"Y Yehezkel","year":"2008","unstructured":"Yehezkel Y (2008) Signaling quality in an oligopoly when some consumers are informed. J Econ Manag Strat 17(4):937\u2013972","journal-title":"J Econ Manag Strat"}],"container-title":["International Journal of Game Theory"],"original-title":[],"language":"en","link":[{"URL":"https:\/\/link.springer.com\/content\/pdf\/10.1007\/s00182-022-00808-1.pdf","content-type":"application\/pdf","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"text-mining"},{"URL":"https:\/\/link.springer.com\/article\/10.1007\/s00182-022-00808-1\/fulltext.html","content-type":"text\/html","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"text-mining"},{"URL":"https:\/\/link.springer.com\/content\/pdf\/10.1007\/s00182-022-00808-1.pdf","content-type":"application\/pdf","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"similarity-checking"}],"deposited":{"date-parts":[[2023,2,21]],"date-time":"2023-02-21T21:53:25Z","timestamp":1677016405000},"score":1,"resource":{"primary":{"URL":"https:\/\/link.springer.com\/10.1007\/s00182-022-00808-1"}},"subtitle":[],"short-title":[],"issued":{"date-parts":[[2022,9,12]]},"references-count":29,"journal-issue":{"issue":"1","published-print":{"date-parts":[[2023,3]]}},"alternative-id":["808"],"URL":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/s00182-022-00808-1","relation":{},"ISSN":["0020-7276","1432-1270"],"issn-type":[{"value":"0020-7276","type":"print"},{"value":"1432-1270","type":"electronic"}],"subject":[],"published":{"date-parts":[[2022,9,12]]},"assertion":[{"value":"12 August 2022","order":1,"name":"accepted","label":"Accepted","group":{"name":"ArticleHistory","label":"Article History"}},{"value":"12 September 2022","order":2,"name":"first_online","label":"First Online","group":{"name":"ArticleHistory","label":"Article History"}}]}}