{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2025,12,2]],"date-time":"2025-12-02T06:16:50Z","timestamp":1764656210007,"version":"3.37.3"},"reference-count":46,"publisher":"Springer Science and Business Media LLC","issue":"2","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2023,1,5]],"date-time":"2023-01-05T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1672876800000},"content-version":"tdm","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/www.springernature.com\/gp\/researchers\/text-and-data-mining"},{"start":{"date-parts":[[2023,1,5]],"date-time":"2023-01-05T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1672876800000},"content-version":"vor","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/www.springernature.com\/gp\/researchers\/text-and-data-mining"}],"content-domain":{"domain":["link.springer.com"],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":["Int J Game Theory"],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2023,6]]},"DOI":"10.1007\/s00182-022-00828-x","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2023,1,5]],"date-time":"2023-01-05T16:03:09Z","timestamp":1672934589000},"page":"517-553","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/springer_crossmark_policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":4,"title":["Comparison of the voluntary contribution and Pareto-efficient mechanisms under voluntary participation"],"prefix":"10.1007","volume":"52","author":[{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0002-1351-3054","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Takuma","family":"Wakayama","sequence":"first","affiliation":[]},{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0001-7552-865X","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Takehiko","family":"Yamato","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[]}],"member":"297","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2023,1,5]]},"reference":[{"key":"828_CR1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"215","DOI":"10.1016\/j.econlet.2014.09.012","volume":"25","author":"PK Bag","year":"2014","unstructured":"Bag PK, Mondal D (2014) Group size paradox and public goods. Econ Lett 25:215\u2013218","journal-title":"Econ Lett"},{"key":"828_CR2","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"89","DOI":"10.1093\/rfs\/1.1.89","volume":"1","author":"M Bagnoli","year":"1988","unstructured":"Bagnoli M, Lipman B (1988) Successful takeovers without exclusion. Rev Financ Stud 1:89\u2013110","journal-title":"Rev Financ Stud"},{"key":"828_CR3","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"25","DOI":"10.1016\/0047-2727(86)90024-1","volume":"29","author":"T Bergstrom","year":"1986","unstructured":"Bergstrom T, Blume L, Varian H (1986) On the private provision of public goods. J Public Econ 29:25\u201349","journal-title":"J Public Econ"},{"key":"828_CR47","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"773","DOI":"10.1007\/s001990100174","volume":"19","author":"Y Chen","year":"2002","unstructured":"Chen Y (2002) A family of supermodular Nash mechanisms implementing Lindahl allocations. Econ Theory 19:773\u2013790","journal-title":"Econ Theory"},{"key":"828_CR4","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Chen Y (2008) Incentive-compatible mechanisms for pure public goods: a survey of experimental research. In: Smith V, Plott C (eds) Handbook of Experimental Economics Results, vol 1. North Holland, Amsterdam, pp 625\u2013643","DOI":"10.1016\/S1574-0722(07)00067-4"},{"key":"828_CR5","volume-title":"The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics","author":"R Croson","year":"2008","unstructured":"Croson R (2008) Public goods experiments. In: Durlauf SN, Blume LE (eds) The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd edn. Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke","edition":"2"},{"key":"828_CR6","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"83","DOI":"10.1007\/BF00182899","volume":"11","author":"P de Trenqualye","year":"1994","unstructured":"de Trenqualye P (1994) Nash implementation of Lindahl allocations. Soc Choice Welf 11:83\u201394","journal-title":"Soc Choice Welf"},{"key":"828_CR7","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"309","DOI":"10.1016\/S0047-2727(99)00089-4","volume":"76","author":"A Dixit","year":"2000","unstructured":"Dixit A, Olson M (2000) Does voluntary participation undermine the Coase theorem? J Public Econ 76:309\u2013335","journal-title":"J Public Econ"},{"key":"828_CR8","first-page":"173","volume":"1","author":"B Dutta","year":"1995","unstructured":"Dutta B, Sen A, Vohra R (1995) Nash implementation through elementary mechanisms in economic environments. Econ Des 1:173\u2013204","journal-title":"Econ Des"},{"key":"828_CR9","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"219","DOI":"10.3982\/TE567","volume":"6","author":"T Furusawa","year":"2011","unstructured":"Furusawa T, Konishi H (2011) Contributing or free-riding? Voluntary participation in a public good economy. Theor Econ 6:219\u2013256","journal-title":"Theor Econ"},{"key":"828_CR10","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"783","DOI":"10.2307\/1912672","volume":"45","author":"T Groves","year":"1977","unstructured":"Groves T, Ledyard J (1977) Optimal allocation of public goods: a solution to the \u2018free rider\u2019 problem. Econometrica 45:783\u2013809","journal-title":"Econometrica"},{"key":"828_CR11","unstructured":"Groves T, J. Ledyard (1987) Incentive compatibility since 1972. In: Groves T, Radner R, Reiter S (eds) Information, Incentives, and Economic Mechanisms: Essays in Honor of Leonid Hurwicz. University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, pp 48\u2013111"},{"key":"828_CR12","first-page":"27","volume":"14","author":"PJ Healy","year":"2010","unstructured":"Healy PJ (2010) Equilibrium participation in public goods allocations. Rev Econ Des 14:27\u201350","journal-title":"Rev Econ Des"},{"key":"828_CR48","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"493","DOI":"10.1007\/s00355-008-0337-5","volume":"32","author":"P Heijnen","year":"2009","unstructured":"Heijnen P (2009) On the probability of breakdown in participation games. Social Choice Welf 32:493\u2013511","journal-title":"Social Choice Welf"},{"key":"828_CR13","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"37","DOI":"10.1111\/j.1430-9134.1992.00037.x","volume":"1","author":"B Holmstr\u00f6m","year":"1992","unstructured":"Holmstr\u00f6m B, Nalebuff B (1992) To the raider goes the surplus? A reexamination of the free-rider problem. J Econ Manag Strategy 1:37\u201362","journal-title":"J Econ Manag Strategy"},{"key":"828_CR14","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"685","DOI":"10.1016\/j.jpubeco.2012.05.003","volume":"96","author":"F Hong","year":"2012","unstructured":"Hong F, Karp L (2012) International environmental agreements with mixed strategies and investment. J Public Econ 96:685\u2013697","journal-title":"J Public Econ"},{"key":"828_CR15","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"102","DOI":"10.1016\/j.jebo.2016.02.009","volume":"126","author":"F Hong","year":"2016","unstructured":"Hong F, Lim W (2016) Voluntary participation in public goods provision with Coasian bargaining. J Econ Behav Organiz 126:102\u2013119","journal-title":"J Econ Behav Organiz"},{"key":"828_CR16","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"217","DOI":"10.2307\/2297046","volume":"46","author":"L Hurwicz","year":"1979","unstructured":"Hurwicz L (1979) Outcome functions yielding Walrasian and Lindahl allocations at Nash equilibrium points. Rev Econ Stud 46:217\u2013224","journal-title":"Rev Econ Stud"},{"key":"828_CR18","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"359","DOI":"10.1016\/0304-4068(93)90023-E","volume":"22","author":"T Kim","year":"1993","unstructured":"Kim T (1993) A stable Nash mechanism implementing Lindahl allocations for quasi-linear environments. J Math Econ 22:359\u2013371","journal-title":"J Math Econ"},{"key":"828_CR19","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"144","DOI":"10.1111\/j.1468-5876.1996.tb00040.x","volume":"47","author":"T Kim","year":"1996","unstructured":"Kim T (1996) A stable Nash mechanism for quasi-additive public good environments. Jpn Econ Rev 47:144\u2013156","journal-title":"Jpn Econ Rev"},{"key":"828_CR20","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"173","DOI":"10.1111\/jpet.12054","volume":"16","author":"H Konishi","year":"2014","unstructured":"Konishi H, Shinohara R (2014) Voluntary participation and the provision of public goods in large finite economies. J Public Econ Theory 16:173\u2013195","journal-title":"J Public Econ Theory"},{"key":"828_CR21","unstructured":"Koriyama Y (2009) Freedom to not join: a voluntary participation game of a discrete public good. mimeo"},{"key":"828_CR22","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"816","DOI":"10.1086\/506337","volume":"114","author":"MJ Kotchen","year":"2006","unstructured":"Kotchen MJ (2006) Green markets and private provision of public goods. J Political Econ 114:816\u2013834","journal-title":"J Political Econ"},{"key":"828_CR24","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Matsushima N, Shinohara R (2012) Private provision of public goods that are complement to private goods: application to open source software developments, ISER Discussion Paper No.\u00a0830, Osaka University","DOI":"10.2139\/ssrn.1997772"},{"key":"828_CR25","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1017\/CBO9780511806292","volume-title":"Evolution and the Theory of Games","author":"J Maynard Smith","year":"1982","unstructured":"Maynard Smith J (1982) Evolution and the Theory of Games. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge"},{"key":"828_CR26","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"1191","DOI":"10.2307\/1911364","volume":"56","author":"J Moore","year":"1988","unstructured":"Moore J, Repullo R (1988) Subgame perfect implementation. Econometrica 56:1191\u20131220","journal-title":"Econometrica"},{"key":"828_CR27","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"629","DOI":"10.1007\/BF01047864","volume":"77","author":"A Okada","year":"1993","unstructured":"Okada A (1993) The possibility of cooperation in an $$n$$-person prisoners\u2019 dilemma with institutional arrangements. Public Choice 77:629\u2013656","journal-title":"Public Choice"},{"key":"828_CR28","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","DOI":"10.4159\/9780674041660","volume-title":"The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups","author":"M Olson","year":"1965","unstructured":"Olson M (1965) The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups. Harvard University Press, Cambridge"},{"key":"828_CR29","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"171","DOI":"10.1016\/0047-2727(84)90023-9","volume":"24","author":"T Palfrey","year":"1984","unstructured":"Palfrey T, Rosenthal H (1984) Participation and the provision of discrete public goods: a strategic analysis. J Public Econ 24:171\u2013193","journal-title":"J Public Econ"},{"key":"828_CR30","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"1179","DOI":"10.1007\/s00355-012-0662-6","volume":"40","author":"S Rouillon","year":"2013","unstructured":"Rouillon S (2013) Anonymous implementation of the Lindahl correspondence: possibility and impossibility results. Social Choice Welf 40:1179\u20131203","journal-title":"Social Choice Welf"},{"key":"828_CR31","unstructured":"Saijo\u00a0T (2020) Global stability of voluntary contribution mechanism with heterogeneous preferences, SDES-2020-6, Kochi University of Technology"},{"key":"828_CR32","first-page":"119","volume":"1","author":"T Saijo","year":"1994","unstructured":"Saijo T, Tatamitani Y (1994) Characterizing neutrality in the voluntary contribution mechanism. Econ Des 1:119\u2013140","journal-title":"Econ Des"},{"key":"828_CR35","unstructured":"Saijo T, Yamato T (1997) Fundamental difficulties in the provision of public goods: \u2018A solution to the free-rider problem\u2019 twenty years after, ISER discussion paper No.\u00a0445, Osaka University"},{"key":"828_CR33","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"227","DOI":"10.1006\/jeth.1998.2476","volume":"84","author":"T Saijo","year":"1999","unstructured":"Saijo T, Yamato T (1999) A voluntary participation game with a non-excludable public good. J Econ Theory 84:227\u2013242","journal-title":"J Econ Theory"},{"key":"828_CR34","first-page":"51","volume":"14","author":"T Saijo","year":"2010","unstructured":"Saijo T, Yamato T (2010) Fundamental impossibility theorems on voluntary participation in the provision of non-excludable public goods. Rev Econ Des 14:51\u201373","journal-title":"Rev Econ Des"},{"key":"828_CR36","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"387","DOI":"10.2307\/1925895","volume":"36","author":"PA Samuelson","year":"1954","unstructured":"Samuelson PA (1954) The pure theory of public expenditure. Rev Econ Stat 36:387\u2013389","journal-title":"Rev Econ Stat"},{"key":"828_CR37","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"367","DOI":"10.1007\/s00355-008-0329-5","volume":"32","author":"R Shinohara","year":"2009","unstructured":"Shinohara R (2009) The possibility of efficient provision of a public good in voluntary participation games. Social Choice Welf 32:367\u2013387","journal-title":"Social Choice Welf"},{"key":"828_CR38","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"925","DOI":"10.1007\/s00355-014-0806-y","volume":"43","author":"R Shinohara","year":"2014","unstructured":"Shinohara R (2014) Participation and demand levels for a joint project. Social Choice Welf 43:925\u2013952","journal-title":"Social Choice Welf"},{"key":"828_CR39","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"647","DOI":"10.1007\/s00355-009-0384-6","volume":"33","author":"T Suzuki","year":"2009","unstructured":"Suzuki T (2009) Natural implementation in public goods economies. Social Choice Welf 33:647\u2013664","journal-title":"Social Choice Welf"},{"key":"828_CR40","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"613","DOI":"10.2307\/2297504","volume":"56","author":"G Tian","year":"1989","unstructured":"Tian G (1989) Implementation of the Lindahl correspondence by a single-valued, feasible and continuous mechanism. Review of Economic Studies 56:613\u2013621","journal-title":"Review of Economic Studies"},{"key":"828_CR41","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"443","DOI":"10.1016\/0022-0531(90)90029-J","volume":"51","author":"G Tian","year":"1990","unstructured":"Tian G (1990) Completely feasible and continuous implementation of the Lindahl correspondence with a message space of minimal dimension. J Econ Theory 51:443\u2013452","journal-title":"J Econ Theory"},{"key":"828_CR42","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"363","DOI":"10.1111\/jpet.12028","volume":"15","author":"M Van Essen","year":"2013","unstructured":"Van Essen M (2013) A simple supermodular mechanism that implements Lindahl allocations. J Public Econ Theory 15:363\u2013377","journal-title":"J Public Econ Theory"},{"key":"828_CR43","first-page":"1278","volume":"84","author":"HR Varian","year":"1994","unstructured":"Varian HR (1994) A solution to the problem of externalities when agents are well-informed. Am Econ Rev 84:1278\u20131293","journal-title":"Am Econ Rev"},{"key":"828_CR44","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"65","DOI":"10.2307\/1911126","volume":"49","author":"M Walker","year":"1981","unstructured":"Walker M (1981) A simple incentive compatible scheme for attaining Lindahl allocations. Econometrica 49:65\u201371","journal-title":"Econometrica"},{"key":"828_CR45","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"131","DOI":"10.1016\/0047-2727(82)90056-1","volume":"19","author":"PG Warr","year":"1982","unstructured":"Warr PG (1982) Pareto optimal redistribution and private charity. J Public Econ 19:131\u2013138","journal-title":"J Public Econ"},{"key":"828_CR46","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"207","DOI":"10.1016\/0165-1765(83)90087-3","volume":"13","author":"PG Warr","year":"1983","unstructured":"Warr PG (1983) The private provision of a public good is independent of the distribution of income. Econ Lett 13:207\u2013211","journal-title":"Econ Lett"}],"container-title":["International Journal of Game Theory"],"original-title":[],"language":"en","link":[{"URL":"https:\/\/link.springer.com\/content\/pdf\/10.1007\/s00182-022-00828-x.pdf","content-type":"application\/pdf","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"text-mining"},{"URL":"https:\/\/link.springer.com\/article\/10.1007\/s00182-022-00828-x\/fulltext.html","content-type":"text\/html","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"text-mining"},{"URL":"https:\/\/link.springer.com\/content\/pdf\/10.1007\/s00182-022-00828-x.pdf","content-type":"application\/pdf","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"similarity-checking"}],"deposited":{"date-parts":[[2024,10,11]],"date-time":"2024-10-11T18:24:37Z","timestamp":1728671077000},"score":1,"resource":{"primary":{"URL":"https:\/\/link.springer.com\/10.1007\/s00182-022-00828-x"}},"subtitle":[],"short-title":[],"issued":{"date-parts":[[2023,1,5]]},"references-count":46,"journal-issue":{"issue":"2","published-print":{"date-parts":[[2023,6]]}},"alternative-id":["828"],"URL":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/s00182-022-00828-x","relation":{},"ISSN":["0020-7276","1432-1270"],"issn-type":[{"type":"print","value":"0020-7276"},{"type":"electronic","value":"1432-1270"}],"subject":[],"published":{"date-parts":[[2023,1,5]]},"assertion":[{"value":"17 October 2021","order":1,"name":"accepted","label":"Accepted","group":{"name":"ArticleHistory","label":"Article History"}},{"value":"5 January 2023","order":2,"name":"first_online","label":"First Online","group":{"name":"ArticleHistory","label":"Article History"}}]}}