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We show that a desirable type-coordination property is achieved at the unique fully revealing symmetric equilibrium (when it exists). Type-coordination is also obtained in a partially revealing equilibrium that exists when the fully revealing equilibrium does not. We further prove that truthfully revealed messages, followed by actions that depend meaningfully on these messages, are not equilibrium profiles with one-sided cheap talk. Finally, fully revealing equilibria do not exist under sequential communication either.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1007\/s00182-023-00857-0","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2023,5,26]],"date-time":"2023-05-26T09:04:05Z","timestamp":1685091845000},"page":"957-992","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/springer_crossmark_policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":1,"title":["Information revelation and coordination using cheap talk in a game with two-sided private information"],"prefix":"10.1007","volume":"52","author":[{"given":"Chirantan","family":"Ganguly","sequence":"first","affiliation":[]},{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0001-5254-3144","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Indrajit","family":"Ray","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[]}],"member":"297","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2023,5,26]]},"reference":[{"key":"857_CR1","first-page":"1","volume":"3","author":"A Ambrus","year":"2008","unstructured":"Ambrus A, Takahashi S (2008) Multi-sender cheap talk with restricted state spaces. 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