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First, we introduce new sufficient conditions, including interchangeability and weak quasiconcavity, for the existence of such equilibria. Second, we uncover relationships between these newly introduced conditions and existing ones. For instance, we demonstrate that the class of weakly quasiconcave games generalizes the class of quasiconcave games and ordinal potential games. Additionally, we show that exact potential games satisfy the interchangeability condition. 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