{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2024,6,11]],"date-time":"2024-06-11T02:49:18Z","timestamp":1718074158559},"reference-count":21,"publisher":"Springer Science and Business Media LLC","issue":"3","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2010,8,17]],"date-time":"2010-08-17T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1282003200000},"content-version":"tdm","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"http:\/\/www.springer.com\/tdm"}],"content-domain":{"domain":[],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":["Math Meth Oper Res"],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2010,12]]},"DOI":"10.1007\/s00186-010-0322-5","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2010,8,16]],"date-time":"2010-08-16T11:36:06Z","timestamp":1281958566000},"page":"347-378","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":4,"title":["Own-company stockholding and work effort preferences of an unconstrained executive"],"prefix":"10.1007","volume":"72","author":[{"given":"Sascha","family":"Desmettre","sequence":"first","affiliation":[],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]},{"given":"John","family":"Gould","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]},{"given":"Alexander","family":"Szimayer","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]}],"member":"297","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2010,8,17]]},"reference":[{"issue":"3","key":"322_CR1","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"345","DOI":"10.2307\/2676287","volume":"36","author":"J Aseff","year":"2001","unstructured":"Aseff J, Bizjak J, Lemmon M (2001) Managerial ownership, incentive contracting, and the use of zero-cost collars and equity swaps by corporate insiders. J Financ Quant Anal 36(3): 345\u2013370","journal-title":"J Financ Quant Anal"},{"issue":"1","key":"322_CR2","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"71","DOI":"10.1016\/j.jfineco.2003.06.003","volume":"73","author":"A Cadenillas","year":"2004","unstructured":"Cadenillas A, Cvitani\u0107 J, Zapatero F (2004) Leverage decision and manager compensation with choice of effort and volatility. J Financ Econ 73(1): 71\u201392","journal-title":"J Financ Econ"},{"issue":"5","key":"322_CR3","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"2311","DOI":"10.1111\/0022-1082.00288","volume":"55","author":"J Carpenter","year":"2000","unstructured":"Carpenter J (2000) Does option compensation increase managerial risk appetite? J Finance 55(5): 2311\u20132331","journal-title":"J Finance"},{"issue":"3","key":"322_CR4","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"317","DOI":"10.1016\/S0304-405X(02)00127-7","volume":"64","author":"J Core","year":"2002","unstructured":"Core J, Larcker D (2002) Performance consequences of mandatory increases in executive stock ownership. J Financ Econ 64(3): 317\u2013340","journal-title":"J Financ Econ"},{"key":"322_CR5","first-page":"27","volume":"9","author":"J Core","year":"2003","unstructured":"Core J, Guay W, Larcker D (2003) Executive equity compensation and incentives: a survey. Econ Pol Rev 9: 27\u201350","journal-title":"Econ Pol Rev"},{"key":"322_CR6","volume-title":"On managerial risk-taking incentives when compensation may be hedged against","author":"J Cvitani\u0107","year":"2008","unstructured":"Cvitani\u0107 J (2008) On managerial risk-taking incentives when compensation may be hedged against. Working Paper, Caltech, Pasadena"},{"issue":"1","key":"322_CR7","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"303","DOI":"10.1111\/j.1540-6261.2007.01208.x","volume":"62","author":"I Dittmann","year":"2007","unstructured":"Dittmann I, Maug E (2007) Lower salaries and no options? On the optimal structure of executive pay. J Finance 62(1): 303\u2013343","journal-title":"J Finance"},{"issue":"4","key":"322_CR8","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"1557","DOI":"10.1111\/1540-6261.00577","volume":"58","author":"G Garvey","year":"2003","unstructured":"Garvey G, Milbourn T (2003) Incentive compensation when executives can hedge the market: evidence of relative performance evaluation in the cross section. J Finance 58(4): 1557\u20131581","journal-title":"J Finance"},{"issue":"3","key":"322_CR9","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"653","DOI":"10.1162\/003355398555702","volume":"113","author":"B Hall","year":"1998","unstructured":"Hall B, Liebman J (1998) Are CEOs really paid like bureaucrats? Q J Econ 113(3): 653\u2013691","journal-title":"Q J Econ"},{"key":"322_CR10","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"74","DOI":"10.2307\/3003320","volume":"10","author":"B Holmstrom","year":"1979","unstructured":"Holmstrom B (1979) Moral hazard and observability. Bell J Econ 10: 74\u201391","journal-title":"Bell J Econ"},{"issue":"4","key":"322_CR11","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"305","DOI":"10.1016\/0304-405X(76)90026-X","volume":"3","author":"M Jensen","year":"1976","unstructured":"Jensen M, Meckling W (1976) Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. J Financ Econ 3(4): 305\u2013360","journal-title":"J Financ Econ"},{"issue":"2","key":"322_CR12","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"225","DOI":"10.1086\/261677","volume":"98","author":"M Jensen","year":"1990","unstructured":"Jensen M, Murphy K (1990) Performance pay and top-management incentives. J Polit Econ 98(2): 225\u2013264","journal-title":"J Polit Econ"},{"issue":"1","key":"322_CR13","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"29","DOI":"10.1016\/S0304-405X(02)00150-2","volume":"66","author":"L Jin","year":"2002","unstructured":"Jin L (2002) CEO compensation, diversification and incentives. J Financ Econ 66(1): 29\u201363","journal-title":"J Financ Econ"},{"key":"322_CR14","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Korn R, Korn E (2001) Option pricing and portfolio optimization. Graduate studies in mathematics, vol 31. American Mathematical Society","DOI":"10.1090\/gsm\/031"},{"issue":"1","key":"322_CR15","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"67","DOI":"10.1007\/s11408-007-0067-1","volume":"22","author":"R Korn","year":"2008","unstructured":"Korn R, Kraft H (2008) Continuous-time delegated portfolio management with homogeneous expectations: Can an agency conflict be avoided. Financ Markets Portf Manag 22(1): 67\u201390","journal-title":"Financ Markets Portf Manag"},{"issue":"1","key":"322_CR16","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"129","DOI":"10.2307\/2491032","volume":"29","author":"R Lambert","year":"1991","unstructured":"Lambert R, Larcker D, Verrecchia R (1991) Portfolio considerations in valuing executive compensation. J Account Res 29(1): 129\u2013148","journal-title":"J Account Res"},{"key":"322_CR17","volume-title":"Handbook of labor economics, vol 3","author":"K Murphy","year":"1999","unstructured":"Murphy K (1999) Executive compensation. In: Ashenfelter, Card D (eds) Handbook of labor economics, vol 3. North-Holland, Amsterdam"},{"issue":"3","key":"322_CR18","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"1367","DOI":"10.1111\/0022-1082.00250","volume":"55","author":"E Ofek","year":"2000","unstructured":"Ofek E, Yermack D (2000) Taking stock: equity-based compensation and the evolution of managerial ownership. J Finance 55(3): 1367\u20131384","journal-title":"J Finance"},{"issue":"1","key":"322_CR19","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"173","DOI":"10.1093\/rfs\/16.1.0173","volume":"16","author":"H Ou-Yang","year":"2003","unstructured":"Ou-Yang H (2003) Optimal contracts in a continuous-time delegated portfolio management problem. Rev Financ Stud 16(1): 173\u2013208","journal-title":"Rev Financ Stud"},{"issue":"2","key":"322_CR20","first-page":"134","volume":"63","author":"S Ross","year":"1973","unstructured":"Ross S (1973) The economic theory of agency: the principal\u2019s problem. Am Econ Rev 63(2): 134\u2013139","journal-title":"Am Econ Rev"},{"issue":"1","key":"322_CR21","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"207","DOI":"10.1111\/j.1540-6261.2004.00631.x","volume":"59","author":"S Ross","year":"2004","unstructured":"Ross S (2004) Compensation, incentives, and the duality of risk aversion and riskiness. J Finance 59(1): 207\u2013225","journal-title":"J Finance"}],"container-title":["Mathematical Methods of Operations Research"],"original-title":[],"language":"en","link":[{"URL":"http:\/\/link.springer.com\/content\/pdf\/10.1007\/s00186-010-0322-5.pdf","content-type":"application\/pdf","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"text-mining"},{"URL":"http:\/\/link.springer.com\/article\/10.1007\/s00186-010-0322-5\/fulltext.html","content-type":"text\/html","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"text-mining"},{"URL":"http:\/\/link.springer.com\/content\/pdf\/10.1007\/s00186-010-0322-5","content-type":"unspecified","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"similarity-checking"}],"deposited":{"date-parts":[[2019,6,1]],"date-time":"2019-06-01T23:46:57Z","timestamp":1559432817000},"score":1,"resource":{"primary":{"URL":"http:\/\/link.springer.com\/10.1007\/s00186-010-0322-5"}},"subtitle":[],"short-title":[],"issued":{"date-parts":[[2010,8,17]]},"references-count":21,"journal-issue":{"issue":"3","published-print":{"date-parts":[[2010,12]]}},"alternative-id":["322"],"URL":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/s00186-010-0322-5","relation":{},"ISSN":["1432-2994","1432-5217"],"issn-type":[{"value":"1432-2994","type":"print"},{"value":"1432-5217","type":"electronic"}],"subject":[],"published":{"date-parts":[[2010,8,17]]}}}