{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2025,2,21]],"date-time":"2025-02-21T03:24:19Z","timestamp":1740108259267,"version":"3.37.3"},"reference-count":8,"publisher":"Springer Science and Business Media LLC","issue":"3","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2023,6,1]],"date-time":"2023-06-01T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1685577600000},"content-version":"tdm","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/creativecommons.org\/licenses\/by\/4.0"},{"start":{"date-parts":[[2023,6,1]],"date-time":"2023-06-01T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1685577600000},"content-version":"vor","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/creativecommons.org\/licenses\/by\/4.0"}],"content-domain":{"domain":["link.springer.com"],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":["Math Meth Oper Res"],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2023,6]]},"abstract":"<jats:title>Abstract<\/jats:title><jats:p>A non-negative transferable utility (TU) game is <jats:italic>average<\/jats:italic> monotonic if there exists a non-negative vector according to which the relative worth is not decreasing when enlarging the coalition. We generalize this definition to the nontransferable utility (NTU) case. It is shown that an average monotonic NTU game shares several properties with an average monotonic TU game. In particular it has a special core element and there exists a population monotonic allocation scheme. We show that an NTU bankruptcy game is average monotonic with respect to the claims vector.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1007\/s00186-023-00819-y","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2023,6,1]],"date-time":"2023-06-01T06:02:22Z","timestamp":1685599342000},"page":"383-390","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/springer_crossmark_policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":1,"title":["Average monotonic cooperative games with nontransferable utility"],"prefix":"10.1007","volume":"97","author":[{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0003-0202-4623","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Jos\u00e9-Manuel","family":"Gim\u00e9nez-G\u00f3mez","sequence":"first","affiliation":[],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]},{"given":"Peter","family":"Sudh\u00f6lter","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]},{"given":"Cori","family":"Vilella","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]}],"member":"297","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2023,6,1]]},"reference":[{"key":"819_CR1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"357","DOI":"10.2307\/2171787","volume":"64","author":"S Hart","year":"1996","unstructured":"Hart S, Mas-Colell A (1996) Bargaining and value. 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