{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2026,4,24]],"date-time":"2026-04-24T23:08:28Z","timestamp":1777072108936,"version":"3.51.4"},"reference-count":40,"publisher":"Springer Science and Business Media LLC","issue":"3","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2021,8,2]],"date-time":"2021-08-02T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1627862400000},"content-version":"tdm","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/www.springer.com\/tdm"},{"start":{"date-parts":[[2021,8,2]],"date-time":"2021-08-02T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1627862400000},"content-version":"vor","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/www.springer.com\/tdm"}],"content-domain":{"domain":["link.springer.com"],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":["Theory Comput Syst"],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2022,6]]},"DOI":"10.1007\/s00224-021-10054-9","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2021,8,2]],"date-time":"2021-08-02T16:04:48Z","timestamp":1627920288000},"page":"616-644","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/springer_crossmark_policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":1,"title":["Risk-Robust Mechanism Design for a Prospect-Theoretic Buyer"],"prefix":"10.1007","volume":"66","author":[{"given":"Siqi","family":"Liu","sequence":"first","affiliation":[],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]},{"given":"J. Benjamin","family":"Miller","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]},{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0002-7709-5058","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Alexandros","family":"Psomas","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]}],"member":"297","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2021,8,2]]},"reference":[{"key":"10054_CR1","unstructured":"Allais, M.: Fondements d\u2019une th\u00e9orie positive des choix comportant un risque et critique des postulats et axiomes de l\u2019\u00e9cole am\u00e9ricaine, volume 144 Imprimerie nationale (1955)"},{"key":"10054_CR2","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","unstructured":"Azevedo, E.M., Gottlieb, D.: Risk-neutral firms can extract unbounded profits from consumers with prospect theory preferences, vol. 147. https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1016\/j.jet.2012.01.002. http:\/\/www.sciencedirect.com\/science\/article\/pii\/S0022053112000038(2012)","DOI":"10.1016\/j.jet.2012.01.002"},{"key":"10054_CR3","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Babaioff, M., Immorlica, N., Lucier, B., Matthew Weinberg, S: A simple and approximately optimal mechanism for an additive buyer. In: 2014 IEEE 55th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, pp. 21\u201330. IEEE (2014)","DOI":"10.1109\/FOCS.2014.11"},{"issue":"4","key":"10054_CR4","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"333","DOI":"10.1023\/B:ORDE.0000034596.50352.f7","volume":"20","author":"GR Brightwell","year":"2003","unstructured":"Brightwell, G.R, Tetali, P.: The number of linear extensions of the boolean lattice. Order 20(4), 333\u2013345 (2003)","journal-title":"Order"},{"issue":"1","key":"10054_CR5","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"71","DOI":"10.1145\/2994501.2994506","volume":"15","author":"Y Cai","year":"2016","unstructured":"Cai, Y., Devanur, N.R, Matthew Weinberg, S: A duality-based unified approach to bayesian mechanism design. ACM SIGecom Exchanges 15 (1), 71\u201377 (2016)","journal-title":"ACM SIGecom Exchanges"},{"key":"10054_CR6","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Cai, Y., Zhao, M.: Simplemechanisms for subadditive buyers via duality. In: Proceedings of the 49th Annual ACM SIGACT Symposium on Theory of Computing, pp. 170\u2013183. ACM (2017)","DOI":"10.1145\/3055399.3055465"},{"issue":"2","key":"10054_CR7","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"163","DOI":"10.1023\/A:1009944326196","volume":"1","author":"C Camerer","year":"1998","unstructured":"Camerer, C.: Bounded rationality in individual decision making. Exper. Econ. 1 (2), 163\u2013183 (1998). https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1023\/A:1009944326196","journal-title":"Exper. Econ."},{"issue":"2","key":"10054_CR8","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"453","DOI":"10.3982\/ECTA14165","volume":"85","author":"G Carroll","year":"2017","unstructured":"Carroll, G.: Robustness and separation in multidimensional screening. Econometrica 85(2), 453\u2013488 (2017)","journal-title":"Econometrica"},{"key":"10054_CR9","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Chawla, S., Goldner, K., Benjamin Miller, J, Pountourakis, E.: Revenue maximization with an uncertainty-averse buyer. In: Proceedings of the Twenty-Ninth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, pp. 2050\u20132068. SIAM (2018)","DOI":"10.1137\/1.9781611975031.134"},{"key":"10054_CR10","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Chawla, S., Benjamin Miller, J: Mechanism design for subadditive agents via an ex ante relaxation. In: Proceedings of the 2016 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, pp. 579\u2013596. ACM (2016)","DOI":"10.1145\/2940716.2940756"},{"key":"10054_CR11","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Chawla, S., Teng, Y., Tzamos, C.: Buy-many mechanisms are not much better than item pricing. In: Proceedings of the 2019 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, pp. 237\u2013238 (2019)","DOI":"10.1145\/3328526.3329583"},{"key":"10054_CR12","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Chawla, S., Teng, Y., Tzamos, C.: Menu-size complexity and revenue continuity of buy-many mechanisms. In: Proceedings of the 21st ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, pp. 475\u2013476 (2020)","DOI":"10.1145\/3391403.3399453"},{"key":"10054_CR13","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Devanur, N.R, Matthew Weinberg, S: The optimal mechanism for selling to a budget constrained buyer: The general case. In: Proceedings of the 2017 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, pp. 39\u201340. ACM (2017)","DOI":"10.1145\/3033274.3085132"},{"key":"10054_CR14","unstructured":"Dughmi, S., Peres, Y.: Mechanisms for risk averse agents, without loss. arXiv:1206.2957 (2012)"},{"key":"10054_CR15","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Easley, D., Ghosh, A.: Behavioral mechanism design: Optimal crowdsourcing contracts and prospect theory. In: Proceedings of the Sixteenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, pp. 679\u2013696. ACM (2015)","DOI":"10.1145\/2764468.2764513"},{"issue":"4","key":"10054_CR16","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"1618","DOI":"10.1257\/aer.20130896","volume":"105","author":"S Ebert","year":"2015","unstructured":"Ebert, S., Strack, P.: Until the bitter end: On prospect theory in a dynamic context. Amer. Econ. Rev. 105(4), 1618\u201333 (2015). https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1257\/aer.20130896, http:\/\/www.aeaweb.org\/articles?id=10.1257\/aer.20130896","journal-title":"Amer. Econ. Rev."},{"key":"10054_CR17","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Eden, A., Feldman, M., Friedler, O., Talgam-Cohen, I., Matthew Weinberg, S: The competition complexity of auctions: A bulow-klemperer result for multi-dimensional bidders. In: Proceedings of the 2017 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, pp. 343\u2013343. ACM (2017a)","DOI":"10.1145\/3033274.3085115"},{"key":"10054_CR18","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Eden, A., Feldman, M., Friedler, O., Talgam-Cohen, I., Matthew Weinberg, S: A simple and approximately optimal mechanism for a buyer with complements. In: Proceedings of the 2017 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, pp. 323\u2013323. ACM (2017b)","DOI":"10.1145\/3033274.3085116"},{"key":"10054_CR19","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Fiat, A., Papadimitriou, C.: When the players are not expectation maximizers. In: Proceedings of the Third International Conference on Algorithmic Game Theory, SAGT\u201910. http:\/\/dl.acm.org\/citation.cfm?id=1929237.1929238, pp 1\u201314. Springer, Berlin (2010)","DOI":"10.1007\/978-3-642-16170-4_1"},{"key":"10054_CR20","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Fu, H., Hartline, J., Hoy, D.: Prior-independent auctions for risk-averse agents. In: Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce, pp. 471\u2013488. ACM (2013)","DOI":"10.1145\/2482540.2482551"},{"key":"10054_CR21","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Fu, H., Liaw, C., Lu, P., Tang, Z.G.: The value of information concealment. In: Proceedings of the Twenty-Ninth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, pp. 2533\u20132544. Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics (2018)","DOI":"10.1137\/1.9781611975031.162"},{"key":"10054_CR22","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Gravin, N., Pinyan, L u: Separation in correlation-robust monopolist problem with budget. In: Proceedings of the Twenty-Ninth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, pp. 2069\u20132080. SIAM (2018)","DOI":"10.1137\/1.9781611975031.135"},{"key":"10054_CR23","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"313","DOI":"10.1016\/j.jet.2017.09.001","volume":"172","author":"S Hart","year":"2017","unstructured":"Hart, S., Nisan, N.: Approximate revenue maximization with multiple items. J. Econ. Theory 172, 313\u2013347 (2017)","journal-title":"J. Econ. Theory"},{"key":"10054_CR24","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"991","DOI":"10.1016\/j.jet.2019.07.006","volume":"183","author":"S Hart","year":"2019","unstructured":"Hart, S., Nisan, N.: Selling multiple correlated goods: Revenue maximization and menu-size complexity. J. Econ. Theory 183, 991\u20131029 (2019)","journal-title":"J. Econ. Theory"},{"issue":"2","key":"10054_CR25","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"263","DOI":"10.2307\/1914185","volume":"47","author":"D Kahneman","year":"1979","unstructured":"Kahneman, D., Tversky, A.: Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk. Econometrica 47(2), 263\u2013291 (1979). http:\/\/www.jstor.org\/stable\/1914185","journal-title":"Econometrica"},{"issue":"28","key":"10054_CR26","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"11232","DOI":"10.1073\/pnas.1309533110","volume":"110","author":"X Li","year":"2013","unstructured":"Li, X., Yao, A.C.-C.: On revenue maximization for selling multiple independently distributed items. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. 110(28), 11232\u201311237 (2013)","journal-title":"Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci."},{"key":"10054_CR27","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Liu, S., Psomas, C.-A.: On the competition complexity of dynamic mechanism design. http:\/\/dl.acm.org\/citation.cfm?id=3174304.3175436 (2018)","DOI":"10.1137\/1.9781611975031.131"},{"issue":"1","key":"10054_CR28","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"121","DOI":"10.1257\/jep.1.1.121","volume":"1","author":"MJ Machina","year":"1987","unstructured":"Machina, M.J.: Choice under uncertainty: Problems solved and unsolved. J. Econ. Perspect. 1(1), 121\u2013154 (1987)","journal-title":"J. Econ. Perspect."},{"key":"10054_CR29","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Nikolova, E., Pountourakis, E., Yang, G.: Optimal mechanism design with risk-loving agents. In: International Conference on Web and Internet Economics, pp. 375\u2013392. Springer (2018)","DOI":"10.1007\/978-3-030-04612-5_25"},{"issue":"4","key":"10054_CR30","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"323","DOI":"10.1016\/0167-2681(82)90008-7","volume":"3","author":"J Quiggin","year":"1982","unstructured":"Quiggin, J.: A theory of anticipated utility. J. Econ. Behav. Organ. 3(4), 323\u2013343 (1982). https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1016\/0167-2681(82)90008-7, http:\/\/www.sciencedirect.com\/science\/article\/pii\/0167268182900087","journal-title":"J. Econ. Behav. Organ."},{"key":"10054_CR31","volume-title":"Generalized Expected Utility Theory: The Rank-Dependent Model","author":"J Quiggin","year":"2012","unstructured":"Quiggin, J.: Generalized Expected Utility Theory: The Rank-Dependent Model. Springer Science & Business Media, Berlin (2012)"},{"issue":"1","key":"10054_CR32","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"339","DOI":"10.1111\/j.1467-937X.2009.00564.x","volume":"77","author":"M Rostek","year":"2010","unstructured":"Rostek, M.: Quantile maximization in decision theory. Rev. Econ. Stud. 77(1), 339\u2013371 (2010)","journal-title":"Rev. Econ. Stud."},{"key":"10054_CR33","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Rubinstein, A., Weinberg, M.S.: Simple mechanisms for a subadditive buyer and applications to revenue monotonicity. In: Proceedings of the Sixteenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, pp. 377\u2013394. ACM (2015)","DOI":"10.1145\/2764468.2764510"},{"key":"10054_CR34","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Schmeidler, D.: Subjective probability and expected utility without additivity. Econometrica, 571\u2013587 (1989)","DOI":"10.2307\/1911053"},{"issue":"4","key":"10054_CR35","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"297","DOI":"10.1007\/BF00122574","volume":"5","author":"A Tversky","year":"1992","unstructured":"Tversky, A., Kahneman, D.: Advances in prospect theory: Cumulative representation of uncertainty. J. Risk Uncertain. 5(4), 297\u2013323 (1992). https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/BF00122574","journal-title":"J. Risk Uncertain."},{"key":"10054_CR36","volume-title":"Theory of Games and Economic Behavior","author":"J von Neumann","year":"1944","unstructured":"von Neumann, J., Morgenstern, O.: Theory of Games and Economic Behavior. Princeton University Press, Princeton (1944). http:\/\/jmvidal.cse.sc.edu\/library\/neumann44a.pdf"},{"key":"10054_CR37","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1017\/CBO9780511779329","volume-title":"Prospect Theory: For Risk and Ambiguity","author":"PP Wakker","year":"2010","unstructured":"Wakker, P.P.: Prospect Theory: For Risk and Ambiguity. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (2010). https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1017\/CBO9780511779329"},{"issue":"4","key":"10054_CR38","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"409","DOI":"10.1016\/0165-4896(81)90018-4","volume":"1","author":"JA Weymark","year":"1981","unstructured":"Weymark, J.A.: Generalized gini inequality indices. Math. Soc. Sci. 1(4), 409\u2013430 (1981)","journal-title":"Math. Soc. Sci."},{"key":"10054_CR39","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Yaari, M.E.: The dual theory of choice under risk. Econometrica (1987)","DOI":"10.2307\/1911158"},{"key":"10054_CR40","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Yao, A.C.-C.: An n-to-1 bidder reduction for multi-item auctions and its applications. In: Proceedings of the twenty-sixth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms, pp. 92\u2013109. Society for Industrialand Applied Mathematics (2015)","DOI":"10.1137\/1.9781611973730.8"}],"container-title":["Theory of Computing Systems"],"original-title":[],"language":"en","link":[{"URL":"https:\/\/link.springer.com\/content\/pdf\/10.1007\/s00224-021-10054-9.pdf","content-type":"application\/pdf","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"text-mining"},{"URL":"https:\/\/link.springer.com\/article\/10.1007\/s00224-021-10054-9\/fulltext.html","content-type":"text\/html","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"text-mining"},{"URL":"https:\/\/link.springer.com\/content\/pdf\/10.1007\/s00224-021-10054-9.pdf","content-type":"application\/pdf","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"similarity-checking"}],"deposited":{"date-parts":[[2022,6,17]],"date-time":"2022-06-17T06:06:46Z","timestamp":1655446006000},"score":1,"resource":{"primary":{"URL":"https:\/\/link.springer.com\/10.1007\/s00224-021-10054-9"}},"subtitle":[],"short-title":[],"issued":{"date-parts":[[2021,8,2]]},"references-count":40,"journal-issue":{"issue":"3","published-print":{"date-parts":[[2022,6]]}},"alternative-id":["10054"],"URL":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/s00224-021-10054-9","relation":{},"ISSN":["1432-4350","1433-0490"],"issn-type":[{"value":"1432-4350","type":"print"},{"value":"1433-0490","type":"electronic"}],"subject":[],"published":{"date-parts":[[2021,8,2]]},"assertion":[{"value":"1 June 2021","order":1,"name":"accepted","label":"Accepted","group":{"name":"ArticleHistory","label":"Article History"}},{"value":"2 August 2021","order":2,"name":"first_online","label":"First Online","group":{"name":"ArticleHistory","label":"Article History"}}]}}