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Comput."],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2026,5]]},"abstract":"<jats:title>Abstract<\/jats:title>\n                  <jats:p>Our study explores the conditions and incentives for government officials in procuring entities (orderers) to initiate bid-rigging and the measures to deter it. First, we used gaming simulations with human agents to investigate the factors that enhance bid-rigging in public procurement. Next, we utilized agent-based modeling and simulation to replicate and verify the gaming simulation. Finally, we used the verified agent-based model and simulations to explore deterrence measures for government official-initiated bid-rigging. We specified two critical factors from the gaming simulation: the type of orderer players and the sense of compliance with social rules. We demonstrated that a strong orderer, unaffected by the surrounding players, could considerably enhance bid-rigging norms. In comparison, a weak orderer affected by the surrounding players was less effective at this enhancement. Next, we replicated the results of the gaming simulations in an agent-based simulation. The results of the agent-based model and simulations revealed that the chance of auction failure was more critical than weakness in the sense of compliance with social rules when a weak orderer intended to establish bid-rigging norms. Finally, we implemented the two existing significant measures into the agent-based models and simulations. In instances where the quality problem of procured goods was not critical, flexible setting of reserve prices was practical; conversely, in cases where bidders encountered challenges in accurately estimating reserve prices or effectively executing contracts, it became imperative to increase both the surcharge and the detection rate for bid-rigging.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1007\/s00354-026-00316-w","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2026,2,19]],"date-time":"2026-02-19T11:23:04Z","timestamp":1771500184000},"update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/springer_crossmark_policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":0,"title":["Government Official-Initiated Bid-Rigging: A Simulation-Based Approach Using Gaming and Agent-Based Methods"],"prefix":"10.1007","volume":"44","author":[{"given":"Hideyuki","family":"Morofuji","sequence":"first","affiliation":[],"role":[{"vocabulary":"crossref","role":"author"}]},{"given":"Setsuya","family":"Kurahashi","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[],"role":[{"vocabulary":"crossref","role":"author"}]}],"member":"297","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2026,2,19]]},"reference":[{"issue":"10","key":"316_CR1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"1872","DOI":"10.1016\/j.jedc.2010.03.002","volume":"34","author":"Y Lengwiler","year":"2010","unstructured":"Lengwiler, Y., Wolfstetter, E.: Auctions and corruption: An analysis of bid rigging by a corrupt auctioneer. 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