{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2026,3,16]],"date-time":"2026-03-16T10:19:10Z","timestamp":1773656350355,"version":"3.50.1"},"reference-count":24,"publisher":"Springer Science and Business Media LLC","issue":"1","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2006,8,12]],"date-time":"2006-08-12T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1155340800000},"content-version":"tdm","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"http:\/\/www.springer.com\/tdm"}],"content-domain":{"domain":[],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":["Soc Choice Welfare"],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2006,11,14]]},"DOI":"10.1007\/s00355-006-0154-7","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2006,8,11]],"date-time":"2006-08-11T08:18:23Z","timestamp":1155284303000},"page":"61-76","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":11,"title":["Dictatorial domains in preference aggregation"],"prefix":"10.1007","volume":"28","author":[{"given":"Ugur","family":"Ozdemir","sequence":"first","affiliation":[],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]},{"given":"M. Remzi","family":"Sanver","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]}],"member":"297","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2006,8,12]]},"reference":[{"key":"154_CR1","volume-title":"Social choice and individual values","author":"K Arrow","year":"1951","unstructured":"Arrow K (1951) Social choice and individual values. J Wiley, New York"},{"key":"154_CR2","volume-title":"Social choice and individual values","author":"K Arrow","year":"1963","unstructured":"Arrow K (1963) Social choice and individual values. J Wiley, New York"},{"issue":"1","key":"154_CR3","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"45","DOI":"10.1007\/s00199-002-0285-8","volume":"22","author":"N Aswal","year":"2003","unstructured":"Aswal N, Chatterji S, Sen A (2003) Dictatorial domains. Econ Theory, 22(1): 45\u201362","journal-title":"Econ Theory"},{"issue":"3","key":"154_CR4","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"409","DOI":"10.1016\/S0165-1765(02)00014-9","volume":"75","author":"G A\u015fan","year":"2002","unstructured":"A\u015fan G, Sanver MR (2002) Another characterization of the majority rule. Econ Lett 75(3):409\u2013413","journal-title":"Econ Lett"},{"key":"154_CR5","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"23","DOI":"10.1086\/256633","volume":"56","author":"D Black","year":"1948","unstructured":"Black D (1948) On the rationale of group decision making. J Politi Econ 56:23\u201334","journal-title":"J Politi Econ"},{"key":"154_CR6","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"302","DOI":"10.2307\/1910256","volume":"25","author":"JH Blau","year":"1957","unstructured":"Blau JH (1957) The existence of social welfare functions. Econometrica 25:302\u2013313","journal-title":"Econometrica"},{"key":"154_CR7","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"1","DOI":"10.1007\/BF01832916","volume":"7","author":"GA Bordes","year":"1990","unstructured":"Bordes GA, le Breton M (1990) Arrovian theorems for economic domains: the case where there are simultaneously private and public goods. Soc Choice Welfare 7:1\u201317","journal-title":"Soc Choice Welfare"},{"key":"154_CR8","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"325","DOI":"10.1007\/s003550100114","volume":"19","author":"L Ehlers","year":"2002","unstructured":"Ehlers L (2002) Probabilistic allocation rules and single-dipped preferences. Soc Choice Welfare 19:325\u2013348","journal-title":"Soc Choice Welfare"},{"issue":"1","key":"154_CR9","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"83","DOI":"10.1137\/S0895480194263508","volume":"10","author":"PC Fishburn","year":"1997","unstructured":"Fishburn PC, Kelly JS (1997) Super Arrovian domains with strict preferences. SIAM J Discrete Math 10(1):83\u201395","journal-title":"SIAM J Discrete Math"},{"key":"154_CR10","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","DOI":"10.1017\/CBO9780511492303","volume-title":"Domain conditions in social choice theory","author":"W Gaertner","year":"2001","unstructured":"Gaertner W (2001) Domain conditions in social choice theory. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge"},{"key":"154_CR11","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"587","DOI":"10.2307\/1914083","volume":"41","author":"A Gibbard","year":"1973","unstructured":"Gibbard A (1973) Manipulation of voting schemes: a general result. Econometrica 41:587\u2013601","journal-title":"Econometrica"},{"key":"154_CR12","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"525","DOI":"10.2307\/1910176","volume":"32","author":"K Inada","year":"1964","unstructured":"Inada K (1964) A note on the simple majority decision rule. Econometrica 32:525\u2013531","journal-title":"Econometrica"},{"key":"154_CR13","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"457","DOI":"10.1016\/0022-0531(77)90019-9","volume":"16","author":"E Kalai","year":"1977","unstructured":"Kalai E, Muller E (1977) Characterization of domains admitting non-dictatorial social welfare functions and nonmanipulable voting procedures. J Econ Theory 16:457\u2013469","journal-title":"J Econ Theory"},{"key":"154_CR14","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"87","DOI":"10.1007\/BF00125755","volume":"34","author":"E Kalai","year":"1979","unstructured":"Kalai E, Muller E, Satterthwaite MA (1979) Social welfare functions when preferences are convex, strictly monotonic and continuous. Public Choice 34:87\u201397","journal-title":"Public Choice"},{"key":"154_CR15","first-page":"97","volume":"11","author":"JS Kelly","year":"1994a","unstructured":"Kelly JS (1994a) The free triple assumption. Soc Choice Welfare 11:97\u2013101","journal-title":"Soc Choice Welfare"},{"key":"154_CR16","first-page":"273","volume":"11","author":"JS Kelly","year":"1994b","unstructured":"Kelly JS (1994b) The Bordes-Le Breton exceptional case. Soc Choice Welfare 11:273\u2013281","journal-title":"Soc Choice Welfare"},{"key":"154_CR17","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"339","DOI":"10.1016\/S0165-1765(97)00097-9","volume":"55","author":"B Klaus","year":"1997","unstructured":"Klaus B, Peters H, Storcken T (1997) Strategy-proof division of a private good when preferences are single-dipped. Econ Lett 55:339\u2013346","journal-title":"Econ Lett"},{"key":"154_CR18","volume-title":"Handbook of social choice and welfare: volume 2.","author":"M Le Breton","year":"2003","unstructured":"Le Breton M, Weymark JA (2003) Arrovian social choice theory on economic domains. In: Arrow KJ, Sen AK, Suzumura K (eds). Handbook of social choice and welfare: volume 2. Amsterdam, North-Holland"},{"key":"154_CR19","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"100","DOI":"10.1093\/oso\/9780198287896.003.0007","volume-title":"Choice, welfare and development.","author":"ES Maskin","year":"1995","unstructured":"Maskin ES (1995) Majority rule, social welfare functions and game forms. In: Basu K, Pattanaik PK, Suzumura K (eds). Choice, welfare and development. The Clarendon Press, Oxford, p. 100\u2013109"},{"key":"154_CR20","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"680","DOI":"10.2307\/1907651","volume":"20","author":"K May","year":"1952","unstructured":"May K (1952) A set of independent, necessary and sufficient conditions for simple majority decision. Econometrica 20: 680\u2013684","journal-title":"Econometrica"},{"key":"154_CR21","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"187","DOI":"10.1016\/0022-0531(75)90050-2","volume":"10","author":"MA Satterthwaite","year":"1975","unstructured":"Satterthwaite MA (1975) Strategy-proofness and Arrow\u2019s conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions. J Econ Theory 10:187\u2013217","journal-title":"J Econ Theory"},{"key":"154_CR22","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"491","DOI":"10.2307\/1909947","volume":"34","author":"A Sen","year":"1966","unstructured":"Sen A (1966) A possibility theorem on majority decisions. Econometrica 34:491\u2013499","journal-title":"Econometrica"},{"key":"154_CR23","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"507","DOI":"10.2307\/1884349","volume":"75","author":"W Vickrey","year":"1960","unstructured":"Vickrey W (1960) Utility, strategy and social decision rules. Q J Econ 75:507\u2013535","journal-title":"Q J Econ"},{"key":"154_CR24","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"89","DOI":"10.1016\/S0165-1765(03)00145-9","volume":"81","author":"G Woeginger","year":"2003","unstructured":"Woeginger G (2003) A new characterization of the majority rule. Econ Lett 81:89\u201394","journal-title":"Econ Lett"}],"container-title":["Social Choice and Welfare"],"original-title":[],"language":"en","link":[{"URL":"http:\/\/link.springer.com\/content\/pdf\/10.1007\/s00355-006-0154-7.pdf","content-type":"application\/pdf","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"text-mining"},{"URL":"http:\/\/link.springer.com\/article\/10.1007\/s00355-006-0154-7\/fulltext.html","content-type":"text\/html","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"text-mining"},{"URL":"http:\/\/link.springer.com\/content\/pdf\/10.1007\/s00355-006-0154-7","content-type":"unspecified","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"similarity-checking"}],"deposited":{"date-parts":[[2024,2,5]],"date-time":"2024-02-05T23:28:24Z","timestamp":1707175704000},"score":1,"resource":{"primary":{"URL":"http:\/\/link.springer.com\/10.1007\/s00355-006-0154-7"}},"subtitle":[],"short-title":[],"issued":{"date-parts":[[2006,8,12]]},"references-count":24,"journal-issue":{"issue":"1","published-print":{"date-parts":[[2006,11,14]]}},"alternative-id":["154"],"URL":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/s00355-006-0154-7","relation":{},"ISSN":["0176-1714","1432-217X"],"issn-type":[{"value":"0176-1714","type":"print"},{"value":"1432-217X","type":"electronic"}],"subject":[],"published":{"date-parts":[[2006,8,12]]}}}