{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2025,10,5]],"date-time":"2025-10-05T04:35:44Z","timestamp":1759638944399,"version":"3.37.3"},"reference-count":34,"publisher":"Springer Science and Business Media LLC","issue":"1","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2016,3,16]],"date-time":"2016-03-16T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1458086400000},"content-version":"unspecified","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"http:\/\/creativecommons.org\/licenses\/by\/4.0"}],"content-domain":{"domain":["link.springer.com"],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":["Soc Choice Welf"],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2016,6]]},"DOI":"10.1007\/s00355-016-0950-7","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2016,3,18]],"date-time":"2016-03-18T12:06:50Z","timestamp":1458302810000},"page":"141-186","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/springer_crossmark_policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":13,"title":["The Condorcet paradox revisited"],"prefix":"10.1007","volume":"47","author":[{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0002-1100-8601","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"P. Jean-Jacques","family":"Herings","sequence":"first","affiliation":[],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]},{"given":"Harold","family":"Houba","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]}],"member":"297","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2016,3,16]]},"reference":[{"key":"950_CR1","volume-title":"Majority judgment\u2013measuring, ranking, and electing","author":"M Balinski","year":"2010","unstructured":"Balinski M, Laraki R (2010) Majority judgment\u2013measuring, ranking, and electing. MIT Press, Cambridge"},{"key":"950_CR2","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"73","DOI":"10.2307\/2586381","volume":"94","author":"J Banks","year":"2000","unstructured":"Banks J, Duggan J (2000) A bargaining model of collective choice. Am Polit Sci Rev 94:73\u201388","journal-title":"Am Polit Sci Rev"},{"key":"950_CR3","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"1181","DOI":"10.2307\/1961664","volume":"83","author":"DP Baron","year":"1989","unstructured":"Baron DP, Ferejohn JA (1989) Bargaining in legislatures. Am Polit Sci Rev 83:1181\u20131206","journal-title":"Am Polit Sci Rev"},{"key":"950_CR4","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"1161","DOI":"10.1111\/j.1468-0262.2006.00701.x","volume":"74","author":"BD Bernheim","year":"2006","unstructured":"Bernheim BD, Rangel A, Rayo L (2006) The power of the last word in legislative policy making. Econometrica 74:1161\u20131190","journal-title":"Econometrica"},{"key":"950_CR5","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"925","DOI":"10.1093\/restud\/rds047","volume":"80","author":"V Bhaskar","year":"2013","unstructured":"Bhaskar V, Mailath GJ, Morris S (2013) A foundation for Markov equilibria in sequential games with finite social memory. Rev Econ Stud 80:925\u2013948","journal-title":"Rev Econ Stud"},{"key":"950_CR6","first-page":"77","volume-title":"The economics of bargaining","author":"K Binmore","year":"1987","unstructured":"Binmore K (1987) Perfect equilibria in bargaining models. In: Binmore K, Dasgupta P (eds) The economics of bargaining. Basil Blackwell, Oxford, pp 77\u2013105"},{"key":"950_CR7","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"90","DOI":"10.1006\/game.1996.0043","volume":"14","author":"F Bloch","year":"1996","unstructured":"Bloch F (1996) Sequential formation of coalitions in games with externalities and fixed payoff division. Games Econ Behav 14:90\u2013123","journal-title":"Games Econ Behav"},{"key":"950_CR8","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"263","DOI":"10.1007\/s00182-010-0237-7","volume":"40","author":"F Bloch","year":"2011","unstructured":"Bloch F, Diamantoudi E (2011) Noncooperative formation of coalitions in hedonic games. Int J Game Theory 40:263\u2013280","journal-title":"Int J Game Theory"},{"key":"950_CR9","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"463","DOI":"10.2307\/2298067","volume":"60","author":"K Chatterjee","year":"1993","unstructured":"Chatterjee K, Dutta B, Ray D, Sengupta K (1993) A noncooperative theory of coalitional bargaining. Rev Econ Stud 60:463\u2013477","journal-title":"Rev Econ Stud"},{"key":"950_CR10","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"299","DOI":"10.1006\/jeth.1994.1044","volume":"63","author":"MS-Y Chwe","year":"1994","unstructured":"Chwe MS-Y (1994) Farsighted coalitional stability. J Econ Theory 63:299\u2013325","journal-title":"J Econ Theory"},{"key":"950_CR11","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"159","DOI":"10.1007\/BF00452887","volume":"1","author":"GW Cox","year":"1984","unstructured":"Cox GW (1984) Non-collegial simple games and the nowhere denseness of the set of preference profiles having a core. Soc Choice Welf 1:159\u2013164","journal-title":"Soc Choice Welf"},{"key":"950_CR12","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"11","DOI":"10.1006\/jeth.2001.2820","volume":"103","author":"H Eraslan","year":"2002","unstructured":"Eraslan H (2002) Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in the Baron\u2013Ferejohn model. J Econ Theory 103:11\u201330","journal-title":"J Econ Theory"},{"key":"950_CR13","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"2195","DOI":"10.1016\/j.jet.2013.09.007","volume":"148","author":"H Eraslan","year":"2013","unstructured":"Eraslan H, McLennan A (2013) Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in coalitional bargaining. J Econ Theory 148:2195\u20132222","journal-title":"J Econ Theory"},{"key":"950_CR14","first-page":"89","volume":"28","author":"AM Fink","year":"1964","unstructured":"Fink AM (1964) Equilibrium in a stochastic $$n$$ n -person game. J Sci Hiroshima Univ Ser A-I 28:89\u201393","journal-title":"J Sci Hiroshima Univ Ser A-I"},{"key":"950_CR15","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"193","DOI":"10.1287\/moor.1090.0437","volume":"35","author":"J Flesch","year":"2010","unstructured":"Flesch J, Kuipers J, Schoenmakers G, Vrieze K (2010) Subgame perfection in positive recursive games with perfect information. Math Oper Res 35:193\u2013207","journal-title":"Math Oper Res"},{"key":"950_CR16","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"1231","DOI":"10.1111\/1468-0262.00156","volume":"68","author":"H Haller","year":"2000","unstructured":"Haller H, Lagunoff R (2000) Genericity and Markovian behavior in stochastic games. Econometrica 68:1231\u20131248","journal-title":"Econometrica"},{"key":"950_CR17","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","DOI":"10.1017\/CBO9780511571756","volume-title":"Rational behavior and bargaining equilibrium in games and social situations","author":"JC Harsanyi","year":"1977","unstructured":"Harsanyi JC (1977) Rational behavior and bargaining equilibrium in games and social situations. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge"},{"key":"950_CR18","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Herings PJJ, Houba H (2015) Costless delay in negotiations, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 2015\u2013010\/II, Amsterdam","DOI":"10.2139\/ssrn.2557998"},{"key":"950_CR19","first-page":"32","volume":"118","author":"PJJ Herings","year":"2004","unstructured":"Herings PJJ, Peeters RJAP (2004) Stationary equilibria in stochastic games: structure, selection, and computation. J Econ Theory 118:32\u201360","journal-title":"J Econ Theory"},{"key":"950_CR20","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"295","DOI":"10.1007\/BF00286870","volume":"4","author":"M Breton Le","year":"1987","unstructured":"Le Breton M (1987) On the core of voting games. Soc Choice Welf 4:295\u2013305","journal-title":"Soc Choice Welf"},{"key":"950_CR21","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"191","DOI":"10.1006\/jeth.2000.2785","volume":"100","author":"ES Maskin","year":"2001","unstructured":"Maskin ES, Tirole J (2001) Markov perfect equilibrium, I. Observable actions. J Econ Theory 100:191\u2013219","journal-title":"J Econ Theory"},{"key":"950_CR22","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"472","DOI":"10.1016\/0022-0531(76)90040-5","volume":"12","author":"RD McKelvey","year":"1976","unstructured":"McKelvey RD (1976) Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control. J Econ Theory 12:472\u2013482","journal-title":"J Econ Theory"},{"key":"950_CR23","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"1085","DOI":"10.2307\/1911951","volume":"47","author":"RD McKelvey","year":"1979","unstructured":"McKelvey RD (1979) General conditions for global intransitivities in formal voting models. Econometrica 47:1085\u20131112","journal-title":"Econometrica"},{"key":"950_CR24","first-page":"787","volume":"57","author":"CR Plott","year":"1967","unstructured":"Plott CR (1967) A notion of equilibrium and its possibility under majority rule. Am Econ Rev 57:787\u2013806","journal-title":"Am Econ Rev"},{"key":"950_CR25","unstructured":"Roessler C, Shelegia S, Strulovici B (2013) The Roman metro problem: dynamic voting and the limited power of commitment. Working Paper, pp 1\u201330"},{"key":"950_CR26","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"511","DOI":"10.2307\/1914198","volume":"47","author":"A Rubinstein","year":"1979","unstructured":"Rubinstein A (1979) A note about the \u201cnowhere denseness\u201d of societies having an equilibrium under majority rule. Econometrica 47:511\u2013514","journal-title":"Econometrica"},{"key":"950_CR27","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"97","DOI":"10.2307\/1912531","volume":"50","author":"A Rubinstein","year":"1982","unstructured":"Rubinstein A (1982) Perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model. Econometrica 50:97\u2013109","journal-title":"Econometrica"},{"key":"950_CR28","first-page":"131","volume-title":"Essays in game theory and mathematical economics in honor of Oskar Morgenstern","author":"R Selten","year":"1981","unstructured":"Selten R (1981) A noncooperative model of characteristic function bargaining. In: B\u00f6hm V, Nachtkamp HH (eds) Essays in game theory and mathematical economics in honor of Oskar Morgenstern. Bibliografisches Institut, Mannheim, pp 131\u2013151"},{"key":"950_CR29","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"695","DOI":"10.2307\/2297770","volume":"50","author":"N Schofield","year":"1983","unstructured":"Schofield N (1983) Generic instability of majority rule. Rev Econ Stud 50:695\u2013705","journal-title":"Rev Econ Stud"},{"key":"950_CR30","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"1930","DOI":"10.1214\/aoms\/1177693059","volume":"42","author":"MJ Sobel","year":"1971","unstructured":"Sobel MJ (1971) Noncooperative stochastic games. Ann Math Stud 42:1930\u20131935","journal-title":"Ann Math Stud"},{"key":"950_CR31","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"669","DOI":"10.1287\/moor.24.3.669","volume":"24","author":"E Solan","year":"1999","unstructured":"Solan E (1999) Three-player absorbing games. Math Oper Res 24:669\u2013698","journal-title":"Math Oper Res"},{"key":"950_CR32","first-page":"95","volume":"28","author":"M Takahashi","year":"1964","unstructured":"Takahashi M (1964) Equilibrium points of stochastic, non-cooperative $$n$$ n -person games. J Sci Hiroshima Univ Ser A-I 28:95\u201399","journal-title":"J Sci Hiroshima Univ Ser A-I"},{"key":"950_CR33","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"403","DOI":"10.1007\/BF01263280","volume":"26","author":"F Thuijsman","year":"1997","unstructured":"Thuijsman F, Raghavan TES (1997) Perfect information stochastic games and related classes. Int J Game Theory 26:403\u2013408","journal-title":"Int J Game Theory"},{"key":"950_CR34","volume-title":"Problems of monopoly and economic welfare","author":"F Zeuthen","year":"1930","unstructured":"Zeuthen F (1930) Problems of monopoly and economic welfare. Routledge, London"}],"container-title":["Social Choice and Welfare"],"original-title":[],"language":"en","link":[{"URL":"http:\/\/link.springer.com\/content\/pdf\/10.1007\/s00355-016-0950-7.pdf","content-type":"application\/pdf","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"text-mining"},{"URL":"http:\/\/link.springer.com\/article\/10.1007\/s00355-016-0950-7\/fulltext.html","content-type":"text\/html","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"text-mining"},{"URL":"http:\/\/link.springer.com\/content\/pdf\/10.1007\/s00355-016-0950-7","content-type":"unspecified","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"similarity-checking"}],"deposited":{"date-parts":[[2019,9,5]],"date-time":"2019-09-05T13:54:45Z","timestamp":1567691685000},"score":1,"resource":{"primary":{"URL":"http:\/\/link.springer.com\/10.1007\/s00355-016-0950-7"}},"subtitle":[],"short-title":[],"issued":{"date-parts":[[2016,3,16]]},"references-count":34,"journal-issue":{"issue":"1","published-print":{"date-parts":[[2016,6]]}},"alternative-id":["950"],"URL":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/s00355-016-0950-7","relation":{},"ISSN":["0176-1714","1432-217X"],"issn-type":[{"type":"print","value":"0176-1714"},{"type":"electronic","value":"1432-217X"}],"subject":[],"published":{"date-parts":[[2016,3,16]]}}}