{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2026,4,3]],"date-time":"2026-04-03T20:48:52Z","timestamp":1775249332718,"version":"3.50.1"},"reference-count":24,"publisher":"Springer Science and Business Media LLC","issue":"3","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2018,10,13]],"date-time":"2018-10-13T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1539388800000},"content-version":"tdm","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/creativecommons.org\/licenses\/by\/4.0"}],"funder":[{"DOI":"10.13039\/501100009057","name":"University of Graz","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","id":[{"id":"10.13039\/501100009057","id-type":"DOI","asserted-by":"crossref"}]}],"content-domain":{"domain":["link.springer.com"],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":["Soc Choice Welf"],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2019,3]]},"DOI":"10.1007\/s00355-018-1155-z","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2018,10,12]],"date-time":"2018-10-12T22:12:02Z","timestamp":1539382322000},"page":"527-557","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/springer_crossmark_policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":4,"title":["Manipulability in a group activity selection problem"],"prefix":"10.1007","volume":"52","author":[{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0002-0477-4578","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Andreas","family":"Darmann","sequence":"first","affiliation":[]}],"member":"297","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2018,10,13]]},"reference":[{"issue":"8","key":"1155_CR1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"869","DOI":"10.1016\/j.jmateco.2003.12.001","volume":"40","author":"J Alcalde","year":"2004","unstructured":"Alcalde J, Revilla P (2004) Researching with whom? Stability and manipulation. J Math Econ 40(8):869\u2013887","journal-title":"J Math Econ"},{"key":"1155_CR2","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"731","DOI":"10.1016\/S0169-7218(10)00025-0","volume-title":"Handbook of social choice and welfare","author":"S Barber\u00e0","year":"2010","unstructured":"Barber\u00e0 S (2010) Strategyproof social choice. In: Arrow K, Sen A, Suzumura K (eds) Handbook of social choice and welfare, vol 2. Elsevier, Amsterdam, pp 731\u2013832 chapter\u00a025"},{"issue":"2","key":"1155_CR3","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"374","DOI":"10.1006\/jeth.2000.2782","volume":"101","author":"S Barber\u00e0","year":"2001","unstructured":"Barber\u00e0 S, Dutta B, Sen A (2001) Strategy-proof social choice correspondences. J Econ Theory 101(2):374\u2013394","journal-title":"J Econ Theory"},{"key":"1155_CR4","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"893","DOI":"10.1007\/978-1-4020-7964-1_4","volume-title":"Handbook of utility theory","author":"S Barber\u00e0","year":"2004","unstructured":"Barber\u00e0 S, Bossert W, Pattanaik PK (2004) Ranking sets of objects. In: Barber\u00e0 S, Hammond PJ, Seidl C (eds) Handbook of utility theory. Springer, Berlin, pp 893\u2013977"},{"key":"1155_CR5","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Brandt F, Brill M (2011) Necessary and sufficient conditions for the strategyproofness of irresolute social choice functions. In: Proceedings of the 13th conference on theoretical aspects of rationality and knowledge, TARK XIII, pp 136\u2013142","DOI":"10.1145\/2000378.2000394"},{"key":"1155_CR6","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Brandt F, Geist C (2014) Finding strategyproof social choice functions via SAT solving. In: Proceedings of the 2014 international conference on autonomous agents and multi-agent systems, AAMAS \u201914, pp 1193\u20131200. ISBN: 978-1-4503-2738-1","DOI":"10.65109\/FBLR5684"},{"issue":"4","key":"1155_CR7","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"487","DOI":"10.1007\/s001820000053","volume":"29","author":"K Cechl\u00e1rov\u00e1","year":"2001","unstructured":"Cechl\u00e1rov\u00e1 K, Romero-Medina A (2001) Stability in coalition formation games. Int J Game Theory 29(4):487\u2013494","journal-title":"Int J Game Theory"},{"key":"1155_CR8","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","unstructured":"Darmann A (2018) Stable and Pareto optimal group activity selection problem from ordinal preferences. Int J Game Theory. https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/s00182-018-0612-3","DOI":"10.1007\/s00182-018-0612-3"},{"key":"1155_CR9","unstructured":"Darmann A, Lang J (2017) Group activity selection problems. In Endriss U (ed) Trends in computational social choice, pp 385\u2013410. AI Access"},{"issue":"3","key":"1155_CR10","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"767","DOI":"10.1007\/s00182-017-0596-4","volume":"47","author":"A Darmann","year":"2018","unstructured":"Darmann A, Elkind E, Kurz S, Lang J, Schauer J, Woeginger G (2018) Group activity selection problem with approval preferences. Int J Game Theory 47(3):767\u2013796","journal-title":"Int J Game Theory"},{"issue":"2","key":"1155_CR11","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"217","DOI":"10.1016\/0022-0531(76)90016-8","volume":"13","author":"P G\u00e4rdenfors","year":"1976","unstructured":"G\u00e4rdenfors P (1976) Manipulation of social choice functions. J Econ Theory 13(2):217\u2013228","journal-title":"J Econ Theory"},{"issue":"4","key":"1155_CR12","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"587","DOI":"10.2307\/1914083","volume":"41","author":"A Gibbard","year":"1973","unstructured":"Gibbard A (1973) Manipulation of voting schemes: a general result. Econometrica 41(4):587\u2013601","journal-title":"Econometrica"},{"issue":"2","key":"1155_CR13","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"278","DOI":"10.1016\/S0022-0531(03)00223-0","volume":"115","author":"M Jackson","year":"2004","unstructured":"Jackson M, Nicol\u00f2 A (2004) The strategy-proof provision of public goods under congestion and crowding preferences. J Econ Theory 115(2):278\u2013308","journal-title":"J Econ Theory"},{"key":"1155_CR14","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Lee H, Shoham Y (2015) Stable invitations. In: Proceedings of the twenty-ninth AAAI conference on artificial intelligence, AAAI\u201915, pp 965\u2013971","DOI":"10.1609\/aaai.v29i1.9296"},{"key":"1155_CR15","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","unstructured":"Long Y (2018) Strategy-proof group selection under single-peaked preferences over group size. Econ Theory. https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/s00199-018-1135-7","DOI":"10.1007\/s00199-018-1135-7"},{"issue":"2","key":"1155_CR16","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"591","DOI":"10.1016\/j.geb.2007.12.007","volume":"64","author":"J Mass\u00f3","year":"2008","unstructured":"Mass\u00f3 J, Nicol\u00f2 A (2008) Efficient and stable collective choices under gregarious preferences. Games Econ Behav 64(2):591\u2013611","journal-title":"Games Econ Behav"},{"key":"1155_CR17","unstructured":"Moretti S, Tsouki\u00e0s A (2012) Ranking sets of possibly interacting objects using Shapley extensions. In: Proceedings of the thirteenth international conference on principles of knowledge representation and reasoning, KR\u201912. AAAI Press"},{"key":"1155_CR18","volume-title":"The strategy of social choice, advanced textbooks in economics","author":"H Moulin","year":"1983","unstructured":"Moulin H (1983) The strategy of social choice, advanced textbooks in economics. North-Holland Publishing Company, Amsterdam"},{"issue":"1","key":"1155_CR19","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"89","DOI":"10.1007\/s00355-007-0223-6","volume":"30","author":"S \u00d6zyurt","year":"2008","unstructured":"\u00d6zyurt S, Sanver R (2008) Strategy-proof resolute social choice correspondences. Soc Choice Welf 30(1):89\u2013101","journal-title":"Soc Choice Welf"},{"issue":"2","key":"1155_CR20","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"337","DOI":"10.1016\/j.geb.2003.09.004","volume":"48","author":"S P\u00e1pai","year":"2004","unstructured":"P\u00e1pai S (2004) Unique stability in simple coalition formation games. Games Econ Behav 48(2):337\u2013354","journal-title":"Games Econ Behav"},{"issue":"3","key":"1155_CR21","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"431","DOI":"10.1007\/s00182-009-0162-9","volume":"38","author":"C Rodr\u00edguez-\u00c1lvarez","year":"2009","unstructured":"Rodr\u00edguez-\u00c1lvarez C (2009) Strategy-proof coalition formation. Int J Game Theory 38(3):431\u2013452","journal-title":"Int J Game Theory"},{"issue":"2","key":"1155_CR22","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"187","DOI":"10.1016\/0022-0531(75)90050-2","volume":"10","author":"M Satterthwaite","year":"1975","unstructured":"Satterthwaite M (1975) Strategy-proofness and Arrow\u2019s conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions. J Econ Theory 10(2):187\u2013217","journal-title":"J Econ Theory"},{"key":"1155_CR23","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"67","DOI":"10.1016\/j.artint.2015.01.003","volume":"222","author":"P Skowron","year":"2015","unstructured":"Skowron P, Faliszewski P, Slinko A (2015) Achieving fully proportional representation: approximability results. Artif Intell 222:67\u2013103","journal-title":"Artif Intell"},{"issue":"3","key":"1155_CR24","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"677","DOI":"10.1111\/1468-0262.00044","volume":"67","author":"T S\u00f6nmez","year":"1999","unstructured":"S\u00f6nmez T (1999) Strategy-proofness and essentially single-valued cores. Econometrica 67(3):677\u2013689","journal-title":"Econometrica"}],"container-title":["Social Choice and Welfare"],"original-title":[],"language":"en","link":[{"URL":"http:\/\/link.springer.com\/content\/pdf\/10.1007\/s00355-018-1155-z.pdf","content-type":"application\/pdf","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"text-mining"},{"URL":"http:\/\/link.springer.com\/article\/10.1007\/s00355-018-1155-z\/fulltext.html","content-type":"text\/html","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"text-mining"},{"URL":"http:\/\/link.springer.com\/content\/pdf\/10.1007\/s00355-018-1155-z.pdf","content-type":"application\/pdf","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"similarity-checking"}],"deposited":{"date-parts":[[2026,4,3]],"date-time":"2026-04-03T19:48:58Z","timestamp":1775245738000},"score":1,"resource":{"primary":{"URL":"http:\/\/link.springer.com\/10.1007\/s00355-018-1155-z"}},"subtitle":[],"short-title":[],"issued":{"date-parts":[[2018,10,13]]},"references-count":24,"journal-issue":{"issue":"3","published-print":{"date-parts":[[2019,3]]}},"alternative-id":["1155"],"URL":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/s00355-018-1155-z","relation":{},"ISSN":["0176-1714","1432-217X"],"issn-type":[{"value":"0176-1714","type":"print"},{"value":"1432-217X","type":"electronic"}],"subject":[],"published":{"date-parts":[[2018,10,13]]},"assertion":[{"value":"21 April 2017","order":1,"name":"received","label":"Received","group":{"name":"ArticleHistory","label":"Article History"}},{"value":"29 September 2018","order":2,"name":"accepted","label":"Accepted","group":{"name":"ArticleHistory","label":"Article History"}},{"value":"13 October 2018","order":3,"name":"first_online","label":"First Online","group":{"name":"ArticleHistory","label":"Article History"}}]}}