{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2026,3,18]],"date-time":"2026-03-18T02:38:38Z","timestamp":1773801518050,"version":"3.50.1"},"reference-count":27,"publisher":"Springer Science and Business Media LLC","issue":"2","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2019,4,3]],"date-time":"2019-04-03T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1554249600000},"content-version":"tdm","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"http:\/\/www.springer.com\/tdm"}],"funder":[{"DOI":"10.13039\/501100001711","name":"Schweizerischer Nationalfonds zur F\u00f6rderung der Wissenschaftlichen Forschung","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","award":["100018_162606"],"award-info":[{"award-number":["100018_162606"]}],"id":[{"id":"10.13039\/501100001711","id-type":"DOI","asserted-by":"publisher"}]},{"DOI":"10.13039\/501100000921","name":"European Cooperation in Science and Technology","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","award":["COST Action IC1205"],"award-info":[{"award-number":["COST Action IC1205"]}],"id":[{"id":"10.13039\/501100000921","id-type":"DOI","asserted-by":"publisher"}]}],"content-domain":{"domain":["link.springer.com"],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":["Soc Choice Welf"],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2019,8]]},"DOI":"10.1007\/s00355-019-01181-x","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2019,4,4]],"date-time":"2019-04-04T05:47:16Z","timestamp":1554356836000},"page":"213-259","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/springer_crossmark_policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":12,"title":["Random matching under priorities: stability and no envy concepts"],"prefix":"10.1007","volume":"53","author":[{"given":"Haris","family":"Aziz","sequence":"first","affiliation":[]},{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0001-9140-4729","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Bettina","family":"Klaus","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[]}],"member":"297","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2019,4,3]]},"reference":[{"key":"1181_CR1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"138","DOI":"10.1093\/acprof:oso\/9780199570515.003.0006","volume-title":"Handbook of market design","author":"A Abdulkadiro\u011flu","year":"2013","unstructured":"Abdulkadiro\u011flu A (2013) School choice, chapter 5. In: Vulkan N, Roth AE, Neeman Z (eds) Handbook of market design. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 138\u2013169"},{"issue":"3","key":"1181_CR2","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"729","DOI":"10.1257\/000282803322157061","volume":"93","author":"A Abdulkadiro\u011flu","year":"2003","unstructured":"Abdulkadiro\u011flu A, S\u00f6nmez T (2003) School choice: a mechanism design approach. Am Econ Rev 93(3):729\u2013747","journal-title":"Am Econ Rev"},{"key":"1181_CR3","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"71","DOI":"10.1016\/j.geb.2018.03.010","volume":"110","author":"MO Afacan","year":"2018","unstructured":"Afacan MO (2018) The object allocation problem with random priorities. Games Econ Behav 110:71\u201389","journal-title":"Games Econ Behav"},{"key":"1181_CR4","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"72","DOI":"10.1016\/S0095-8956(02)00028-X","volume":"87","author":"R Aharoni","year":"2003","unstructured":"Aharoni R, Fleiner T (2003) On a lemma of Scarf. J Combin Theory Ser B 87:72\u201380","journal-title":"J Combin Theory Ser B"},{"key":"1181_CR5","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Aziz H (2019) A probabilistic approach to voting, allocation, matching, and coalition formation. In: Laslier J-F, Moulin H, Sanver R, Zwicker WS (eds) The future of economic design. Springer, Berlin (forthcoming)","DOI":"10.1007\/978-3-030-18050-8_8"},{"issue":"1","key":"1181_CR6","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"73","DOI":"10.1006\/jeth.1998.2469","volume":"84","author":"M Balinski","year":"1999","unstructured":"Balinski M, S\u00f6nmez T (1999) A tale of two mechanisms: student placement. J Econ Theory 84(1):73\u201394","journal-title":"J Econ Theory"},{"key":"1181_CR7","first-page":"147","volume":"5","author":"G Birkhoff","year":"1946","unstructured":"Birkhoff G (1946) Three observations on linear algebra. Rev Univ Nac Tucum\u00e1n Rev Ser A 5:147\u2013151","journal-title":"Rev Univ Nac Tucum\u00e1n Rev Ser A"},{"key":"1181_CR8","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"241","DOI":"10.1016\/j.disopt.2015.02.002","volume":"22","author":"P Bir\u00f3","year":"2016","unstructured":"Bir\u00f3 P, Fleiner T (2016) Fractional solutions for capacitated NTU-games, with applications to stable matchings. Discrete Optim (Part A) 22:241\u2013254","journal-title":"Discrete Optim (Part A)"},{"issue":"2","key":"1181_CR9","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"362","DOI":"10.1006\/jeth.1997.2307","volume":"76","author":"Y Blum","year":"1997","unstructured":"Blum Y, Roth AE, Rothblum UG (1997) Vacancy chains and equilibration in senior-level labor markets. J Econ Theory 76(2):362\u2013411","journal-title":"J Econ Theory"},{"key":"1181_CR10","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"47","DOI":"10.1016\/j.geb.2015.12.001","volume":"95","author":"B Do\u011fan","year":"2016","unstructured":"Do\u011fan B, Yildiz K (2016) Efficiency and stability of probabilistic assignments in marriage problems. Games Econ Behav 95:47\u201358","journal-title":"Games Econ Behav"},{"key":"1181_CR11","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"648","DOI":"10.1016\/j.jet.2014.03.004","volume":"153","author":"L Ehlers","year":"2003","unstructured":"Ehlers L, Halafir IE, Yenmez MB, Yildirim MA (2003) School choice with controlled constraints: hard bounds versus soft bounds. J Econ Theory 153:648\u2013683","journal-title":"J Econ Theory"},{"key":"1181_CR12","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"9","DOI":"10.1080\/00029890.1962.11989827","volume":"69","author":"D Gale","year":"1962","unstructured":"Gale D, Shapley LS (1962) College admissions and the stability of marriage. Am Math Mon 69:9\u201315","journal-title":"Am Math Mon"},{"key":"1181_CR13","volume-title":"Topics in matrix analysis","author":"RA Horn","year":"1986","unstructured":"Horn RA (1986) Topics in matrix analysis. Cambridge University Press, New York"},{"key":"1181_CR14","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"261","DOI":"10.1016\/0166-218X(92)00179-P","volume":"48","author":"RW Irving","year":"1994","unstructured":"Irving RW (1994) Stable marriage and indifference. Discrete Appl Math 48:261\u2013272","journal-title":"Discrete Appl Math"},{"key":"1181_CR15","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"107","DOI":"10.1016\/j.jet.2016.12.006","volume":"168","author":"Y Kamada","year":"2017","unstructured":"Kamada Y, Kojima F (2017) Stability concepts in matching under distributional constraints. J Econ Theory 168:107\u2013142","journal-title":"J Econ Theory"},{"key":"1181_CR16","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"543","DOI":"10.3982\/TE1558","volume":"10","author":"O Kesten","year":"2015","unstructured":"Kesten O, \u00dcnver U (2015) A theory of school choice lotteries. Theor Econ 10:543\u2013595","journal-title":"Theor Econ"},{"issue":"1","key":"1181_CR17","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"106","DOI":"10.1016\/j.jet.2009.09.002","volume":"145","author":"F Kojima","year":"2010","unstructured":"Kojima F, Manea M (2010) Incentives in the probabilistic serial mechanism. J Econ Theory 145(1):106\u2013123","journal-title":"J Econ Theory"},{"key":"1181_CR18","unstructured":"Manjunath V (2013) Stability and the core of probabilistic marriage problems. Technical Report 1809941, SSRN"},{"key":"1181_CR19","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"513","DOI":"10.1146\/annurev-economics-061109-080213","volume":"3","author":"PA Pathak","year":"2011","unstructured":"Pathak PA (2011) The mechanism design approach to student assignment. Annu Rev Econ 3:513\u2013536","journal-title":"Annu Rev Econ"},{"issue":"2","key":"1181_CR20","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"425","DOI":"10.2307\/1913160","volume":"54","author":"AE Roth","year":"1986","unstructured":"Roth AE (1986) On the allocation of residents to rural hospitals: a general property of two-sided matching markets. Econometrica 54(2):425\u2013427","journal-title":"Econometrica"},{"issue":"4","key":"1181_CR21","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"803","DOI":"10.1287\/moor.18.4.803","volume":"18","author":"AE Roth","year":"1993","unstructured":"Roth AE, Rothblum UG, Vande Vate JH (1993) Stable matchings, optimal assignments, and linear programming. Math Oper Res 18(4):803\u2013828","journal-title":"Math Oper Res"},{"issue":"1\u20133","key":"1181_CR22","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"57","DOI":"10.1007\/BF01586041","volume":"54","author":"UG Rothblum","year":"1992","unstructured":"Rothblum UG (1992) Characterization of stable matchings as extreme points of a polytope. Math Program 54(1\u20133):57\u201367","journal-title":"Math Program"},{"key":"1181_CR23","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"90","DOI":"10.1016\/j.econlet.2018.01.017","volume":"164","author":"JC Schlegel","year":"2018","unstructured":"Schlegel JC (2018) A note on ex-ante stable lotteries. Econ Lett 164:90\u201393","journal-title":"Econ Lett"},{"issue":"4","key":"1181_CR24","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"874","DOI":"10.1287\/moor.23.4.874","volume":"23","author":"C-P Teo","year":"1998","unstructured":"Teo C-P, Sethuraman J (1998) The geometry of fractional stable matchings and its applications. Math Oper Res 23(4):874\u2013891","journal-title":"Math Oper Res"},{"issue":"3","key":"1181_CR25","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"147","DOI":"10.1016\/0167-6377(89)90041-2","volume":"8","author":"JH Vande Vate","year":"1989","unstructured":"Vande Vate JH (1989) Linear programming brings marital bliss. Oper Res Lett 8(3):147\u2013153","journal-title":"Oper Res Lett"},{"key":"1181_CR26","volume-title":"Contributions to the theory of games","author":"J Neumann Von","year":"1953","unstructured":"Von Neumann J (1953) A certain zero-sum two-person game equivalent to the optimal assignment problem. In: Kuhn H, Tucker A (eds) Contributions to the theory of games. Princeton University Press, Princeton"},{"issue":"3","key":"1181_CR27","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"201","DOI":"10.1016\/j.geb.2017.12.016","volume":"109","author":"Q Wu","year":"2018","unstructured":"Wu Q, Roth AE (2018) The lattice of envy-free matchings. Games Econ Behav 109(3):201\u20132011","journal-title":"Games Econ Behav"}],"container-title":["Social Choice and Welfare"],"original-title":[],"language":"en","link":[{"URL":"http:\/\/link.springer.com\/content\/pdf\/10.1007\/s00355-019-01181-x.pdf","content-type":"application\/pdf","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"text-mining"},{"URL":"http:\/\/link.springer.com\/article\/10.1007\/s00355-019-01181-x\/fulltext.html","content-type":"text\/html","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"text-mining"},{"URL":"http:\/\/link.springer.com\/content\/pdf\/10.1007\/s00355-019-01181-x.pdf","content-type":"application\/pdf","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"similarity-checking"}],"deposited":{"date-parts":[[2022,9,15]],"date-time":"2022-09-15T05:59:55Z","timestamp":1663221595000},"score":1,"resource":{"primary":{"URL":"http:\/\/link.springer.com\/10.1007\/s00355-019-01181-x"}},"subtitle":[],"short-title":[],"issued":{"date-parts":[[2019,4,3]]},"references-count":27,"journal-issue":{"issue":"2","published-print":{"date-parts":[[2019,8]]}},"alternative-id":["1181"],"URL":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/s00355-019-01181-x","relation":{},"ISSN":["0176-1714","1432-217X"],"issn-type":[{"value":"0176-1714","type":"print"},{"value":"1432-217X","type":"electronic"}],"subject":[],"published":{"date-parts":[[2019,4,3]]},"assertion":[{"value":"9 May 2018","order":1,"name":"received","label":"Received","group":{"name":"ArticleHistory","label":"Article History"}},{"value":"5 March 2019","order":2,"name":"accepted","label":"Accepted","group":{"name":"ArticleHistory","label":"Article History"}},{"value":"3 April 2019","order":3,"name":"first_online","label":"First Online","group":{"name":"ArticleHistory","label":"Article History"}}]}}