{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2025,10,12]],"date-time":"2025-10-12T20:20:36Z","timestamp":1760300436305,"version":"3.37.3"},"reference-count":38,"publisher":"Springer Science and Business Media LLC","issue":"1","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2020,6,19]],"date-time":"2020-06-19T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1592524800000},"content-version":"tdm","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/www.springer.com\/tdm"},{"start":{"date-parts":[[2020,6,19]],"date-time":"2020-06-19T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1592524800000},"content-version":"vor","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/www.springer.com\/tdm"}],"funder":[{"DOI":"10.13039\/501100001691","name":"Japan Society for the Promotion of Science","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","award":["19K13644"],"award-info":[{"award-number":["19K13644"]}],"id":[{"id":"10.13039\/501100001691","id-type":"DOI","asserted-by":"publisher"}]}],"content-domain":{"domain":["link.springer.com"],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":["Soc Choice Welf"],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2021,1]]},"DOI":"10.1007\/s00355-020-01270-2","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2020,6,19]],"date-time":"2020-06-19T10:02:55Z","timestamp":1592560975000},"page":"67-100","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/springer_crossmark_policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":2,"title":["Polarization and inefficient information aggregation under strategic voting"],"prefix":"10.1007","volume":"56","author":[{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0003-3582-8601","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Tomoya","family":"Tajika","sequence":"first","affiliation":[]}],"member":"297","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2020,6,19]]},"reference":[{"key":"1270_CR1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"233","DOI":"10.1007\/s100580200081","volume":"7","author":"Enriqueta Aragon\u00e9s","year":"2002","unstructured":"Aragon\u00e9s Enriqueta, Postlewaite Andrew (2002) Ambiguity in election games. Rev Econ Design 7:233\u2013255","journal-title":"Rev Econ Design"},{"key":"1270_CR2","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"257","DOI":"10.1016\/j.geb.2016.09.006","volume":"100","author":"Avidit Acharya","year":"2016","unstructured":"Acharya Avidit (2016) Information aggregation failure in a model of social mobility. Games Econ Behav 100:257\u2013272","journal-title":"Games Econ Behav"},{"key":"1270_CR3","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Ali S Nageeb, Mihm Maximilian, Siga Lucas (2017) \u201cThe perverse politics of polarization,\u201d Working paper","DOI":"10.2139\/ssrn.2907489"},{"key":"1270_CR4","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"34","DOI":"10.2307\/2082796","volume":"90","author":"David Austen-Smith","year":"1996","unstructured":"Austen-Smith David, Banks Jeffery S (1996) Information aggregation, rationality and the Condorcet jury theorem. Am Political Sci Rev 90:34\u201345","journal-title":"Am Political Sci Rev"},{"key":"1270_CR5","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Bhattacharya Sourav (2013a) Preference monotonicity and information aggregation in election. Econometrica, pp. 1229\u20131247","DOI":"10.3982\/ECTA8311"},{"key":"1270_CR6","unstructured":"Bhattacharya Sourav (2013b) Condorcet jury theorem in a spatial model of elections, Working paper"},{"key":"1270_CR7","volume-title":"The myth of the rational voter: Why democracies choose bad policies","author":"Bryan Caplan","year":"2007","unstructured":"Caplan Bryan (2007) The myth of the rational voter: Why democracies choose bad policies. Princeton University Press, Princeton"},{"key":"1270_CR8","unstructured":"Chen DL, Moti M, Daniel S (2017) Non-confrontational extremists, Working paper"},{"issue":"1","key":"1270_CR9","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"331","DOI":"10.1146\/annurev.polisci.3.1.331","volume":"3","author":"Philip E Converse","year":"2000","unstructured":"Converse Philip E (2000) Assessing the capacity of mass electorates. Ann Rev Polit Sci 3(1):331\u2013353","journal-title":"Ann Rev Polit Sci"},{"key":"1270_CR10","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"C Peter, N Shmuel (1981) Directional and local electoral equilibria with probabilistic voting, J Econ Theory 226\u2013239","DOI":"10.1016\/0022-0531(81)90056-9"},{"key":"1270_CR11","unstructured":"Dolan Mike, Geddie John (2016) \u201cANALYSIS-Sub-zero central banks may just chase inflation expectations lower,\u201d Reuters, https:\/\/uk.reuters.com\/article\/global-centralbanks-inflation\/analysis-sub-zero-central-banks-may-just-chase-inflation-expectations-lower-idUKL8N1695QT (Accessed, May 18, 2020)"},{"key":"1270_CR12","volume-title":"An economic theory of democracy","author":"Anthony Downs","year":"1957","unstructured":"Downs Anthony (1957) An economic theory of democracy. Harper and Row, New York"},{"key":"1270_CR13","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"259","DOI":"10.1006\/game.2001.0843","volume":"37","author":"John Duggan","year":"2001","unstructured":"Duggan John, Martinelli C\u00e9sar (2001) A Bayesian model of voting in juries. Games Econ Behav 37:259\u2013294","journal-title":"Games Econ Behav"},{"key":"1270_CR14","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"98","DOI":"10.1257\/jel.54.1.98","volume":"54","author":"Christian Dustmann","year":"2016","unstructured":"Dustmann Christian, G\u00f6rlach Joseph-Simon (2016) The economics of temporary migrations. J Econ Literat 54:98\u2013136","journal-title":"J Econ Literat"},{"key":"1270_CR15","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"865","DOI":"10.3982\/TE1284","volume":"11","author":"Andrew Ellis","year":"2016","unstructured":"Ellis Andrew (2016) Condorcet meets Ellsberg. Theoretical Econo 11:865\u2013895","journal-title":"Theoretical Econo"},{"key":"1270_CR16","first-page":"408","volume":"86","author":"Timothy Feddersen","year":"1996","unstructured":"Feddersen Timothy, Pesendorfer Wolfgang (1996) The swing voter\u2019s curse. Am Econ Rev 86:408\u2013424","journal-title":"Am Econ Rev"},{"key":"1270_CR17","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"1029","DOI":"10.2307\/2171878","volume":"65","author":"Timothy Feddersen","year":"1997","unstructured":"Feddersen Timothy, Pesendorfer Wolfgang (1997) Voting behavior and information aggregation in elections with private information. Econometrica 65:1029\u20131058","journal-title":"Econometrica"},{"key":"1270_CR18","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"120","DOI":"10.1016\/j.econlet.2017.02.033","volume":"154","author":"Boris Ginzburg","year":"2017","unstructured":"Ginzburg Boris (2017) Sincere voting in an electorate with heterogeneous preferences. Econ Lett 154:120\u2013123","journal-title":"Econ Lett"},{"key":"1270_CR19","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"163","DOI":"10.1016\/j.geb.2014.01.006","volume":"84","author":"Gabriele Gratton","year":"2014","unstructured":"Gratton Gabriele (2014) Pandering and electoral competition. Games Econ Behav 84:163\u2013179","journal-title":"Games Econ Behav"},{"key":"1270_CR20","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"146","DOI":"10.1016\/j.jet.2008.04.005","volume":"144","author":"Faruk Gul","year":"2009","unstructured":"Gul Faruk, Pesendorfer Wolfgang (2009) Partisan politics and election failure with ignorant voters. J Econ Theory 144:146\u2013174","journal-title":"J Econ Theory"},{"key":"1270_CR21","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"48","DOI":"10.1016\/S0899-8256(02)00531-6","volume":"42","author":"Paul Heidhues","year":"2003","unstructured":"Heidhues Paul, Lagerl\u00f6f Johan (2003) Hiding information in electoral competition. Games Econ Behav 42:48\u201374","journal-title":"Games Econ Behav"},{"issue":"4","key":"1270_CR22","first-page":"203","volume":"6","author":"Yuichiro Kamada","year":"2014","unstructured":"Kamada Yuichiro, Kojima Fuhito (2014) Voter preferences, polarization, and electoral policies. Am Econ J 6(4):203\u2013236","journal-title":"Am Econ J"},{"key":"1270_CR23","unstructured":"Navin K, Francesco S, Katrin T (2015) Information revelation and pandering in elections, Working paper"},{"key":"1270_CR24","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"322","DOI":"10.1257\/aer.20131063","volume":"105","author":"Chad Kendall","year":"2015","unstructured":"Kendall Chad, Nannicini Tommaso, Trebbi Francesco (2015) How do voters respond to information? Evidence from a randomized campaign. Am Econ Rev 105:322\u2013353","journal-title":"Am Econ Rev"},{"key":"1270_CR25","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"236","DOI":"10.1016\/j.jet.2006.04.001","volume":"135","author":"Jaehoon Kim","year":"2007","unstructured":"Kim Jaehoon, Fey Mark (2007) The swing voter\u2019s curse with adversarial preferences. J Econ Theory 135:236\u2013252","journal-title":"J Econ Theory"},{"key":"1270_CR26","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"7","DOI":"10.1007\/BF00124816","volume":"44","author":"Ledyard John O.","year":"1984","unstructured":"John O. Ledyard (1984) The pure theory of large two-candidate elections. Public Choice 44:7\u201341","journal-title":"Public Choice"},{"key":"1270_CR27","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"257","DOI":"10.1016\/j.geb.2011.03.004","volume":"74","author":"Michael Mandler","year":"2012","unstructured":"Mandler Michael (2012) The fragility of information aggregation in large elections. Games Econ Behav 74:257\u2013268","journal-title":"Games Econ Behav"},{"key":"1270_CR28","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"147","DOI":"10.1023\/A:1017514106456","volume":"108","author":"C\u00e9sar Martinelli","year":"2001","unstructured":"Martinelli C\u00e9sar (2001) Elections with privately informed parties and voters. Public Choice 108:147\u2013167","journal-title":"Public Choice"},{"key":"1270_CR29","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"225","DOI":"10.1016\/j.jet.2005.02.005","volume":"129","author":"C\u00e9sar Martinelli","year":"2006","unstructured":"Martinelli C\u00e9sar (2006) Would rational voters acquire costly information? J Econ Theory 129:225\u2013251","journal-title":"J Econ Theory"},{"key":"1270_CR30","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"373","DOI":"10.1561\/100.00005011","volume":"1","author":"Adam Meirowitz","year":"2006","unstructured":"Meirowitz Adam (2006) Designing institutions to aggregate preferences and information. Quarterly Journal of Political Science 1:373\u2013392","journal-title":"Quarterly Journal of Political Science"},{"key":"1270_CR31","unstructured":"Nordqvist Christian (2017) \u201cWhat is BREGRET? Definition and meaning,\u201d Market Business News, https:\/\/marketbusinessnews.com\/bregret-definition-meaning\/138405\/. Accessed on Feb 20 2019"},{"key":"1270_CR32","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"261","DOI":"10.2307\/136033","volume":"28","author":"Martin J Osborne","year":"1995","unstructured":"Osborne Martin J (1995) Spatial models of political competition under plurality rule: a survey of some explanations of the number of candidates and the positions they take. Can J Econ 28:261\u2013301","journal-title":"Can J Econ"},{"key":"1270_CR33","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Prato Carlo, Wolton Stephane (2017) \u201cWisdom of the crowd? Information aggregation and electoral incentives,\u201d SSRN working paper","DOI":"10.2139\/ssrn.2995012"},{"issue":"4","key":"1270_CR34","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"1083","DOI":"10.1111\/1468-0262.00440","volume":"71","author":"Ronny Razin","year":"2003","unstructured":"Razin Ronny (2003) Signaling and election motivation in a voting model with common values and responsive candidates. Econometrica 71(4):1083\u20131119","journal-title":"Econometrica"},{"issue":"1","key":"1270_CR35","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"25","DOI":"10.1017\/S000305540011562X","volume":"62","author":"Willian H Riker","year":"1968","unstructured":"Riker Willian H, Ordeshook Peter C (1968) A theory of the calculus of voting. Am Polit Sci Rev 62(1):25\u201342","journal-title":"Am Polit Sci Rev"},{"issue":"2","key":"1270_CR36","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"555","DOI":"10.2307\/1957799","volume":"66","author":"Kenneth A Shepsle","year":"1972","unstructured":"Shepsle Kenneth A (1972) The strategy of ambiguity: uncertainty and electoral competition. Am Polit Sci Rev 66(2):555\u2013568","journal-title":"Am Polit Sci Rev"},{"key":"1270_CR37","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"331","DOI":"10.2307\/2297855","volume":"63","author":"Christian Schultz","year":"1996","unstructured":"Schultz Christian (1996) Polarization and inefficient policies. Rev Econ Stud 63:331\u2013344","journal-title":"Rev Econ Stud"},{"key":"1270_CR38","unstructured":"Tajika Tomoya (2019) \u201cCollective mistakes for a trick question under strategic voting,\u201d SSRN working paper"}],"container-title":["Social Choice and Welfare"],"original-title":[],"language":"en","link":[{"URL":"https:\/\/link.springer.com\/content\/pdf\/10.1007\/s00355-020-01270-2.pdf","content-type":"application\/pdf","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"text-mining"},{"URL":"https:\/\/link.springer.com\/article\/10.1007\/s00355-020-01270-2\/fulltext.html","content-type":"text\/html","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"text-mining"},{"URL":"https:\/\/link.springer.com\/content\/pdf\/10.1007\/s00355-020-01270-2.pdf","content-type":"application\/pdf","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"similarity-checking"}],"deposited":{"date-parts":[[2021,6,18]],"date-time":"2021-06-18T23:31:45Z","timestamp":1624059105000},"score":1,"resource":{"primary":{"URL":"https:\/\/link.springer.com\/10.1007\/s00355-020-01270-2"}},"subtitle":[],"short-title":[],"issued":{"date-parts":[[2020,6,19]]},"references-count":38,"journal-issue":{"issue":"1","published-print":{"date-parts":[[2021,1]]}},"alternative-id":["1270"],"URL":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/s00355-020-01270-2","relation":{},"ISSN":["0176-1714","1432-217X"],"issn-type":[{"type":"print","value":"0176-1714"},{"type":"electronic","value":"1432-217X"}],"subject":[],"published":{"date-parts":[[2020,6,19]]},"assertion":[{"value":"4 July 2019","order":1,"name":"received","label":"Received","group":{"name":"ArticleHistory","label":"Article History"}},{"value":"10 June 2020","order":2,"name":"accepted","label":"Accepted","group":{"name":"ArticleHistory","label":"Article History"}},{"value":"19 June 2020","order":3,"name":"first_online","label":"First Online","group":{"name":"ArticleHistory","label":"Article History"}}]}}