{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2026,3,30]],"date-time":"2026-03-30T20:31:32Z","timestamp":1774902692630,"version":"3.50.1"},"reference-count":59,"publisher":"Springer Science and Business Media LLC","issue":"2","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2020,9,19]],"date-time":"2020-09-19T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1600473600000},"content-version":"tdm","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/www.springer.com\/tdm"},{"start":{"date-parts":[[2020,9,19]],"date-time":"2020-09-19T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1600473600000},"content-version":"vor","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/www.springer.com\/tdm"}],"funder":[{"DOI":"10.13039\/501100001809","name":"National Natural Science Foundation of China","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","award":["71703031"],"award-info":[{"award-number":["71703031"]}],"id":[{"id":"10.13039\/501100001809","id-type":"DOI","asserted-by":"crossref"}]},{"DOI":"10.13039\/501100001809","name":"National Natural Science Foundation of China","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","award":["71803136"],"award-info":[{"award-number":["71803136"]}],"id":[{"id":"10.13039\/501100001809","id-type":"DOI","asserted-by":"publisher"}]}],"content-domain":{"domain":["link.springer.com"],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":["Soc Choice Welf"],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2021,2]]},"DOI":"10.1007\/s00355-020-01284-w","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2020,9,19]],"date-time":"2020-09-19T11:02:59Z","timestamp":1600513379000},"page":"385-419","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/springer_crossmark_policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":7,"title":["The effects of centralized power and institutional legitimacy on collective action"],"prefix":"10.1007","volume":"56","author":[{"given":"Jos\u00e9 Gabriel","family":"Castillo","sequence":"first","affiliation":[]},{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0003-2198-8612","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Zhicheng Phil","family":"Xu","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[]},{"given":"Ping","family":"Zhang","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[]},{"given":"Xianchen","family":"Zhu","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[]}],"member":"297","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2020,9,19]]},"reference":[{"key":"1284_CR1","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"104053","DOI":"10.1016\/j.jpubeco.2019.104053","volume":"178","author":"A Ambrus","year":"2019","unstructured":"Ambrus A, Greiner B (2019) Individual, dictator, and democratic punishment in public good games with perfect and imperfect observability. J Public Econ 178:104053","journal-title":"J Public Econ"},{"issue":"1","key":"1284_CR2","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"1","DOI":"10.1016\/j.geb.2004.08.007","volume":"54","author":"CM Anderson","year":"2006","unstructured":"Anderson CM, Putterman L (2006) Do non-strategic sanctions obey the law of demand? The demand for punishment in the voluntary contribution mechanism. Games Econ Behav 54(1):1\u201324","journal-title":"Games Econ Behav"},{"issue":"11\u201312","key":"1284_CR3","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"1036","DOI":"10.1016\/j.jpubeco.2012.08.003","volume":"96","author":"J Andreoni","year":"2012","unstructured":"Andreoni J, Gee L (2012) Gun for hire: delegated enforcement and peer punishment in public goods provision. J Public Econ 96(11\u201312):1036\u20131046","journal-title":"J Public Econ"},{"issue":"27","key":"1284_CR4","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"11023","DOI":"10.1073\/pnas.1105456108","volume":"108","author":"D Baldassarri","year":"2011","unstructured":"Baldassarri D, Grossman G (2011) Centralized sanctioning and legitimate authority promote cooperation in humans. Proc Natl Acad Sci 108(27):11023\u201311027","journal-title":"Proc Natl Acad Sci"},{"issue":"1","key":"1284_CR5","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"161","DOI":"10.1162\/003355301556374","volume":"116","author":"S Ball","year":"2001","unstructured":"Ball S, Eckel C, Grossman PJ, Zame W (2001) Status in markets. Q J Econ 116(1):161\u2013188","journal-title":"Q J Econ"},{"key":"1284_CR6","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"26","DOI":"10.1016\/j.jebo.2016.09.015","volume":"132","author":"L Boosey","year":"2016","unstructured":"Boosey L, Isaac RM (2016) Asymmetric network monitoring and punishment in public goods experiments. J Econ Behav Organ 132:26\u201341","journal-title":"J Econ Behav Organ"},{"issue":"6","key":"1284_CR7","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"1223","DOI":"10.1162\/JEEA.2007.5.6.1223","volume":"5","author":"J Brandts","year":"2007","unstructured":"Brandts J, Cooper DJ (2007) It\u2019s what you say, not what you pay: an experimental study of manager\u2013employee relationships in overcoming coordination failure. J Eur Econ Assoc 5(6):1223\u20131268","journal-title":"J Eur Econ Assoc"},{"issue":"11","key":"1284_CR8","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"2627","DOI":"10.1287\/mnsc.2014.2021","volume":"61","author":"J Brandts","year":"2014","unstructured":"Brandts J, Cooper DJ, Weber RA (2014) Legitimacy, communication, and leadership in the turnaround game. Manag Sci 61(11):2627\u20132645","journal-title":"Manag Sci"},{"issue":"4","key":"1284_CR9","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"522","DOI":"10.1016\/j.jebo.2005.05.004","volume":"62","author":"JP Carpenter","year":"2007","unstructured":"Carpenter JP (2007) The demand for punishment. J Econ Behav Organ 62(4):522\u2013542","journal-title":"J Econ Behav Organ"},{"issue":"2\u20133","key":"1284_CR10","first-page":"93","volume":"16","author":"J Carpenter","year":"2012","unstructured":"Carpenter J, Kariv S, Schotter A (2012) Network architecture, cooperation and punishment in public good experiments. Rev Econ Des 16(2\u20133):93\u2013118","journal-title":"Rev Econ Des"},{"issue":"4","key":"1284_CR11","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"2028","DOI":"10.1111\/ecin.12003","volume":"51","author":"E Cartwright","year":"2013","unstructured":"Cartwright E, Gillet J, Van Vugt M (2013) Leadership by example in the weak-link game. Econ Inq 51(4):2028\u20132043","journal-title":"Econ Inq"},{"issue":"2","key":"1284_CR12","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"107","DOI":"10.1007\/s10683-005-0869-9","volume":"8","author":"M Casari","year":"2005","unstructured":"Casari M (2005) On the design of peer punishment experiments. Exp Econ 8(2):107\u2013115","journal-title":"Exp Econ"},{"issue":"2","key":"1284_CR13","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"241","DOI":"10.1007\/s10683-011-9292-6","volume":"15","author":"M Casari","year":"2012","unstructured":"Casari M, Luini L (2012) Peer punishment in teams: expressive or instrumental choice? Exp Econ 15(2):241\u2013259","journal-title":"Exp Econ"},{"key":"1284_CR14","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1017\/XPS.2020.10","author":"JG Castillo","year":"2020","unstructured":"Castillo JG, Hamman J (2020) Political accountability and democratic institutions: an experimental assessment. J Exp Polit Sci. https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1017\/XPS.2020.10 (forthcoming)","journal-title":"J Exp Polit Sci"},{"issue":"1","key":"1284_CR15","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"48","DOI":"10.1007\/s10683-010-9257-1","volume":"14","author":"A Chaudhuri","year":"2011","unstructured":"Chaudhuri A (2011) Sustaining cooperation in laboratory public goods experiments: a selective survey of the literature. Exp Econ 14(1):48\u201383","journal-title":"Exp Econ"},{"issue":"3","key":"1284_CR16","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"346","DOI":"10.1007\/s10683-010-9245-5","volume":"13","author":"A Chaudhuri","year":"2010","unstructured":"Chaudhuri A, Paichayontvijit T (2010) Recommended play and performance bonuses in the minimum effort coordination game. Exp Econ 13(3):346\u2013363","journal-title":"Exp Econ"},{"key":"1284_CR17","first-page":"266","volume-title":"Experimental evidence on the workings of democratic institutions","author":"P Dal B\u00f3","year":"2014","unstructured":"Dal B\u00f3 P (2014) Experimental evidence on the workings of democratic institutions. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 266\u2013288"},{"issue":"5","key":"1284_CR18","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"2205","DOI":"10.1257\/aer.100.5.2205","volume":"100","author":"P Dal B\u00f3","year":"2010","unstructured":"Dal B\u00f3 P, Foster A, Putterman L (2010) Institutions and behavior: experimental evidence on the effects of democracy. Am Econ Rev 100(5):2205\u20132229","journal-title":"Am Econ Rev"},{"issue":"6","key":"1284_CR19","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"751","DOI":"10.1177\/0022002703258795","volume":"47","author":"T Decker","year":"2003","unstructured":"Decker T, Stiehler A, Strobel M (2003) A comparison of punishment rules in repeated public good games an experimental study. J Confl Resolut 47(6):751\u2013772","journal-title":"J Confl Resolut"},{"issue":"1","key":"1284_CR20","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"145","DOI":"10.1007\/s00199-007-0212-0","volume":"33","author":"L Denant-Boemont","year":"2007","unstructured":"Denant-Boemont L, Masclet D, Noussair CN (2007) Punishment, counterpunishment and sanction enforcement in a social dilemma experiment. Econ Theory 33(1):145\u2013167","journal-title":"Econ Theory"},{"issue":"3","key":"1284_CR21","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"317","DOI":"10.1007\/s10683-007-9185-x","volume":"10","author":"CC Eckel","year":"2007","unstructured":"Eckel CC, Wilson RK (2007) Social learning in coordination games: does status matter? Exp Econ 10(3):317\u2013329","journal-title":"Exp Econ"},{"issue":"4","key":"1284_CR22","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"737","DOI":"10.1111\/j.1467-9779.2010.01472.x","volume":"12","author":"CC Eckel","year":"2010","unstructured":"Eckel CC, Fatas E, Wilson R (2010) Cooperation and status in organizations. J Public Econ Theory 12(4):737\u2013762","journal-title":"J Public Econ Theory"},{"key":"1284_CR23","first-page":"13","volume-title":"Four classic public goods experiments: a replication study, chap 1","author":"CC Eckel","year":"2015","unstructured":"Eckel CC, Harwell H, Castillo JG (2015) Four classic public goods experiments: a replication study, chap 1. Emerald Group Publishing Limited, Bingley, pp 13\u201340"},{"issue":"5","key":"1284_CR24","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"495","DOI":"10.1016\/j.euroecorev.2008.09.007","volume":"53","author":"A Ertan","year":"2009","unstructured":"Ertan A, Page T, Putterman L (2009) Who to punish? Individual decisions and majority rule in mitigating the free rider problem. Eur Econ Rev 53(5):495\u2013511","journal-title":"Eur Econ Rev"},{"issue":"6","key":"1284_CR25","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"2017","DOI":"10.1111\/j.1468-0262.2005.00644.x","volume":"73","author":"A Falk","year":"2005","unstructured":"Falk A, Fehr E, Fischbacher U (2005) Driving forces behind informal sanctions. Econometrica 73(6):2017\u20132030","journal-title":"Econometrica"},{"issue":"4","key":"1284_CR26","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"399","DOI":"10.1007\/s10683-010-9248-2","volume":"13","author":"E Fatas","year":"2010","unstructured":"Fatas E, Mel\u00e9ndez-Jim\u00e9nez MA, Solaz H (2010) An experimental analysis of team production in networks. Exp Econ 13(4):399\u2013411","journal-title":"Exp Econ"},{"key":"1284_CR27","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"71","DOI":"10.1016\/j.euroecorev.2018.02.009","volume":"105","author":"E Fatas","year":"2018","unstructured":"Fatas E, Hargreaves Heap SP, Rojo Arjona D (2018) Preference conformism: an experiment. Eur Econ Rev 105:71\u201382","journal-title":"Eur Econ Rev"},{"issue":"1","key":"1284_CR28","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"104","DOI":"10.1111\/ecin.12766","volume":"58","author":"E Fatas","year":"2020","unstructured":"Fatas E, Mel\u00e9ndez-Jim\u00e9nez MA, Solaz H (2020) Social hierarchies: a laboratory study on punishment patterns across networks. Econ Inq 58(1):104\u2013119","journal-title":"Econ Inq"},{"issue":"4","key":"1284_CR29","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"980","DOI":"10.1257\/aer.90.4.980","volume":"90","author":"E Fehr","year":"2000","unstructured":"Fehr E, G\u00e4chter S (2000) Cooperation and punishment in public goods experiments. Am Econ Rev 90(4):980\u2013994","journal-title":"Am Econ Rev"},{"issue":"3","key":"1284_CR30","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"159","DOI":"10.1257\/jep.14.3.159","volume":"14","author":"E Fehr","year":"2000","unstructured":"Fehr E, G\u00e4chter S (2000) Fairness and retaliation: the economics of reciprocity. J Econ Perspect 14(3):159\u2013181","journal-title":"J Econ Perspect"},{"issue":"2","key":"1284_CR31","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"171","DOI":"10.1007\/s10683-006-9159-4","volume":"10","author":"U Fischbacher","year":"2007","unstructured":"Fischbacher U (2007) z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments. Exp Econ 10(2):171\u2013178","journal-title":"Exp Econ"},{"issue":"4","key":"1284_CR32","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"964","DOI":"10.1111\/j.1540-5907.2012.00596.x","volume":"56","author":"G Grossman","year":"2012","unstructured":"Grossman G, Baldassarri D (2012) The impact of elections on cooperation: evidence from a lab-in-the-field experiment in Uganda. Am J Polit Sci 56(4):964\u2013985","journal-title":"Am J Polit Sci"},{"issue":"1\u20132","key":"1284_CR33","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"115","DOI":"10.1007\/s11127-006-9075-3","volume":"130","author":"P Guillen","year":"2007","unstructured":"Guillen P, Schwieren C, Staffiero G (2007) Why feed the leviathan? Public Choice 130(1\u20132):115\u2013128","journal-title":"Public Choice"},{"issue":"5770","key":"1284_CR34","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"108","DOI":"10.1126\/science.1123633","volume":"312","author":"O G\u00fcrerk","year":"2006","unstructured":"G\u00fcrerk O, Irlenbusch B, Rockenbach B (2006) The competitive advantage of sanctioning institutions. Science 312(5770):108\u2013111","journal-title":"Science"},{"issue":"4","key":"1284_CR35","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"738","DOI":"10.1111\/j.1540-5907.2011.00531.x","volume":"55","author":"JR Hamman","year":"2011","unstructured":"Hamman JR, Weber RA, Woon J (2011) An experimental investigation of electoral delegation and the provision of public goods. Am J Polit Sci 55(4):738\u2013752","journal-title":"Am J Polit Sci"},{"issue":"5868","key":"1284_CR36","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"1362","DOI":"10.1126\/science.1153808","volume":"319","author":"B Herrmann","year":"2008","unstructured":"Herrmann B, Th\u00f6ni C, G\u00e4chter S (2008) Antisocial punishment across societies. Science 319(5868):1362\u20131367","journal-title":"Science"},{"key":"1284_CR37","volume-title":"Leviathan","author":"T Hobbes","year":"2006","unstructured":"Hobbes T (2006) Leviathan. A&C Black, London"},{"issue":"2","key":"1284_CR38","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"247","DOI":"10.1111\/j.0092-5853.2004.00068.x","volume":"48","author":"GA Huber","year":"2004","unstructured":"Huber GA, Gordon SC (2004) Accountability and coercion: is justice blind when it runs for office? Am J Polit Sci 48(2):247\u2013263","journal-title":"Am J Polit Sci"},{"key":"1284_CR39","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Kamei K (2017) Collective selection of representatives and the democracy effect. SSRN working paper. Available at SSRN. https:\/\/ssrn.com\/abstract=2932094. Accessed 1 May 2017","DOI":"10.2139\/ssrn.2932094"},{"issue":"4","key":"1284_CR40","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"709","DOI":"10.1111\/j.1467-9779.2010.01471.x","volume":"12","author":"CS Kumru","year":"2010","unstructured":"Kumru CS, Vesterlund L (2010) The effect of status on charitable giving. J Public Econ Theory 12(4):709\u2013735","journal-title":"J Public Econ Theory"},{"key":"1284_CR41","volume-title":"Handbook of experimental economics","author":"JO Ledyard","year":"1995","unstructured":"Ledyard JO (1995) Public goods: a survey of experimental research. In: Kagel J, Roth A (eds) Handbook of experimental economics. Princeton University Press, Princeton"},{"issue":"1","key":"1284_CR42","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"40","DOI":"10.1016\/j.jebo.2010.02.018","volume":"77","author":"DM Levy","year":"2011","unstructured":"Levy DM, Padgitt K, Peart SJ, Houser D, Xiao E (2011) Leadership, cheap talk and really cheap talk. J Econ Behav Organ 77(1):40\u201352","journal-title":"J Econ Behav Organ"},{"issue":"01","key":"1284_CR43","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"69","DOI":"10.2307\/1951731","volume":"53","author":"SM Lipset","year":"1959","unstructured":"Lipset SM (1959) Some social requisites of democracy: economic development and political legitimacy. Am Polit Sci Rev 53(01):69\u2013105","journal-title":"Am Polit Sci Rev"},{"key":"1284_CR44","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"243","DOI":"10.1016\/j.jebo.2019.03.007","volume":"161","author":"I Marcin","year":"2019","unstructured":"Marcin I, Robalo P, Tausch F (2019) Institutional endogeneity and third-party punishment in social dilemmas. J Econ Behav Organ 161:243\u2013264","journal-title":"J Econ Behav Organ"},{"key":"1284_CR45","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"1","DOI":"10.1016\/j.jpubeco.2016.09.008","volume":"144","author":"A Nicklisch","year":"2016","unstructured":"Nicklisch A, Grechenig K, Th\u00f6ni C (2016) Information-sensitive leviathans. J Public Econ 144:1\u201313","journal-title":"J Public Econ"},{"issue":"1\u20132","key":"1284_CR46","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"91","DOI":"10.1016\/j.jpubeco.2007.04.008","volume":"92","author":"N Nikiforakis","year":"2008","unstructured":"Nikiforakis N (2008) Punishment and counter-punishment in public good games: can we really govern ourselves? J Public Econ 92(1\u20132):91\u2013112","journal-title":"J Public Econ"},{"issue":"4","key":"1284_CR47","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"358","DOI":"10.1007\/s10683-007-9171-3","volume":"11","author":"N Nikiforakis","year":"2008","unstructured":"Nikiforakis N, Normann HT (2008) A comparative statics analysis of punishment in public-good experiments. Exp Econ 11(4):358\u2013369","journal-title":"Exp Econ"},{"issue":"1655","key":"1284_CR48","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"323","DOI":"10.1098\/rspb.2008.1082","volume":"276","author":"R O\u2019Gorman","year":"2009","unstructured":"O\u2019Gorman R, Henrich J, Van Vugt M (2009) Constraining free riding in public goods games: designated solitary punishers can sustain human cooperation. Proc R Soc B Biol Sci 276(1655):323\u2013329","journal-title":"Proc R Soc B Biol Sci"},{"key":"1284_CR49","volume-title":"Governing the commons: the evolution of institutions for collective action","author":"E Ostrom","year":"1992","unstructured":"Ostrom E (1992) Governing the commons: the evolution of institutions for collective action. Cambridge University Press, New York"},{"issue":"2","key":"1284_CR50","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"404","DOI":"10.2307\/1964229","volume":"86","author":"E Ostrom","year":"1992","unstructured":"Ostrom E, Walker J, Gardner R (1992) Covenants with and without a sword: self-governance is possible. Am Polit Sci Rev 86(2):404\u2013417","journal-title":"Am Polit Sci Rev"},{"issue":"9","key":"1284_CR51","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"1213","DOI":"10.1016\/j.jpubeco.2011.05.001","volume":"95","author":"L Putterman","year":"2011","unstructured":"Putterman L, Tyran JR, Kamei K (2011) Public goods and voting on formal sanction schemes. J Public Econ 95(9):1213\u20131222","journal-title":"J Public Econ"},{"issue":"4","key":"1284_CR52","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"671","DOI":"10.1111\/j.1465-7295.2007.00051.x","volume":"45","author":"M Sefton","year":"2007","unstructured":"Sefton M, Shupp R, Walker J (2007) The effect of rewards and sanctions in provision of public goods. Econ Inq 45(4):671\u2013690","journal-title":"Econ Inq"},{"issue":"11","key":"1284_CR53","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"593","DOI":"10.1016\/j.tree.2007.06.012","volume":"22","author":"K Sigmund","year":"2007","unstructured":"Sigmund K (2007) Punish or perish? Retaliation and collaboration among humans. Trends Ecol Evol 22(11):593\u2013600","journal-title":"Trends Ecol Evol"},{"issue":"4","key":"1284_CR54","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"1540","DOI":"10.1111\/j.1467-937X.2010.00608.x","volume":"77","author":"M Sutter","year":"2010","unstructured":"Sutter M, Haigner S, Kocher MG (2010) Choosing the carrot or the stick? Endogenous institutional choice in social dilemma situations. Rev Econ Stud 77(4):1540\u20131566","journal-title":"Rev Econ Stud"},{"issue":"1","key":"1284_CR55","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"135","DOI":"10.1111\/j.1467-9442.2006.00444.x","volume":"108","author":"JR Tyran","year":"2006","unstructured":"Tyran JR, Feld LP (2006) Achieving compliance when legal sanctions are non-deterrent. Scand J Econ 108(1):135\u2013156","journal-title":"Scand J Econ"},{"key":"1284_CR56","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","DOI":"10.1093\/acprof:oso\/9780199300730.001.0001","volume-title":"Reward and punishment in social dilemmas","author":"PA Van Lange","year":"2014","unstructured":"Van Lange PA, Rockenbach B, Yamagishi T (2014) Reward and punishment in social dilemmas. Oxford University Press, Oxford"},{"key":"1284_CR57","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"90","DOI":"10.1016\/j.euroecorev.2017.01.007","volume":"93","author":"B Vollan","year":"2017","unstructured":"Vollan B, Landmann A, Zhou Y, Hu B, Herrmann-Pillath C (2017) Cooperation and authoritarian values: an experimental study in China. Eur Econ Rev 93:90\u2013105","journal-title":"Eur Econ Rev"},{"key":"1284_CR58","volume-title":"From max weber: essays in sociology","author":"M Weber","year":"2009","unstructured":"Weber M (2009) From max weber: essays in sociology. Routledge, Abingdon"},{"issue":"41","key":"1284_CR59","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"17448","DOI":"10.1073\/pnas.0905918106","volume":"106","author":"JJ Wu","year":"2009","unstructured":"Wu JJ, Zhang BY, Zhou ZX, He QQ, Zheng XD, Cressman R, Tao Y (2009) Costly punishment does not always increase cooperation. Proc Natl Acad Sci 106(41):17448\u201317451","journal-title":"Proc Natl Acad Sci"}],"container-title":["Social Choice and Welfare"],"original-title":[],"language":"en","link":[{"URL":"https:\/\/link.springer.com\/content\/pdf\/10.1007\/s00355-020-01284-w.pdf","content-type":"application\/pdf","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"text-mining"},{"URL":"https:\/\/link.springer.com\/article\/10.1007\/s00355-020-01284-w\/fulltext.html","content-type":"text\/html","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"text-mining"},{"URL":"https:\/\/link.springer.com\/content\/pdf\/10.1007\/s00355-020-01284-w.pdf","content-type":"application\/pdf","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"similarity-checking"}],"deposited":{"date-parts":[[2021,9,19]],"date-time":"2021-09-19T00:44:56Z","timestamp":1632012296000},"score":1,"resource":{"primary":{"URL":"https:\/\/link.springer.com\/10.1007\/s00355-020-01284-w"}},"subtitle":[],"short-title":[],"issued":{"date-parts":[[2020,9,19]]},"references-count":59,"journal-issue":{"issue":"2","published-print":{"date-parts":[[2021,2]]}},"alternative-id":["1284"],"URL":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/s00355-020-01284-w","relation":{},"ISSN":["0176-1714","1432-217X"],"issn-type":[{"value":"0176-1714","type":"print"},{"value":"1432-217X","type":"electronic"}],"subject":[],"published":{"date-parts":[[2020,9,19]]},"assertion":[{"value":"18 May 2019","order":1,"name":"received","label":"Received","group":{"name":"ArticleHistory","label":"Article History"}},{"value":"8 September 2020","order":2,"name":"accepted","label":"Accepted","group":{"name":"ArticleHistory","label":"Article History"}},{"value":"19 September 2020","order":3,"name":"first_online","label":"First Online","group":{"name":"ArticleHistory","label":"Article History"}},{"order":1,"name":"Ethics","group":{"name":"EthicsHeading","label":"Compliance with ethical standards"}},{"value":"The authors declare that they have no conflict of interest.","order":2,"name":"Ethics","group":{"name":"EthicsHeading","label":"Conflict of interest"}}]}}