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The literature also discusses payoff-information-robust mechanisms, i.e., mechanisms that are implementable for any belief and higher-order beliefs of the agents about the payoff types of the other agents. In the present paper, I address the question of whether deterministic mechanisms that are robust in both of these dimensions exist. I consider environments where each agent holds private information about his personal payoff and about the existence and extent of his social preferences. In such environments, a mechanism is robust in both dimensions only if it is ex-post implementable, i.e., only if incentive compatibility holds for every realization of payoff signals and for every realization of social preferences. I show that ex-post implementation of deterministic mechanisms is impossible in such environments; i.e., deterministic mechanisms that are both social-preference-robust and payoff-information-robust do not exist.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1007\/s00355-020-01291-x","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2020,9,30]],"date-time":"2020-09-30T21:03:01Z","timestamp":1601499781000},"page":"467-485","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/springer_crossmark_policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":2,"title":["Ex-post implementation with social preferences"],"prefix":"10.1007","volume":"56","author":[{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0001-9921-0179","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Boaz","family":"Zik","sequence":"first","affiliation":[]}],"member":"297","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2020,9,30]]},"reference":[{"key":"1291_CR1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"186","DOI":"10.1016\/j.geb.2016.04.004","volume":"97","author":"B Bartling","year":"2016","unstructured":"Bartling B, Netzer N (2016) An externality-robust auction: theory and experimental evidence. 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