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We show how the characterization of serial dictatorship mechanisms with reservation prices for homogeneous indivisible objects (Klaus and Nichifor 2020, Theorem\u00a01) can be adapted to the allocation of heterogeneous indivisible objects by adding <jats:italic>neutrality<\/jats:italic>: mechanism <jats:inline-formula><jats:alternatives><jats:tex-math>$$\\varphi $$<\/jats:tex-math><mml:math xmlns:mml=\"http:\/\/www.w3.org\/1998\/Math\/MathML\">\n                  <mml:mi>\u03c6<\/mml:mi>\n                <\/mml:math><\/jats:alternatives><\/jats:inline-formula> satisfies <jats:italic>minimal tradability<\/jats:italic>, <jats:italic>individual rationality<\/jats:italic>, <jats:italic>strategy-proofness<\/jats:italic>, <jats:italic>consistency<\/jats:italic>, <jats:italic>independence of unallocated objects<\/jats:italic>, <jats:italic>neutrality<\/jats:italic>, and <jats:italic>non wasteful tie-breaking<\/jats:italic> if and only if there exists a reservation price vector <jats:italic>r<\/jats:italic> and a priority ordering <jats:inline-formula><jats:alternatives><jats:tex-math>$$\\succ $$<\/jats:tex-math><mml:math xmlns:mml=\"http:\/\/www.w3.org\/1998\/Math\/MathML\">\n                  <mml:mo>\u227b<\/mml:mo>\n                <\/mml:math><\/jats:alternatives><\/jats:inline-formula> such that <jats:inline-formula><jats:alternatives><jats:tex-math>$$\\varphi $$<\/jats:tex-math><mml:math xmlns:mml=\"http:\/\/www.w3.org\/1998\/Math\/MathML\">\n                  <mml:mi>\u03c6<\/mml:mi>\n                <\/mml:math><\/jats:alternatives><\/jats:inline-formula> is a <jats:italic>serial dictatorship mechanism with reservation prices<\/jats:italic> based on <jats:italic>r<\/jats:italic> and <jats:inline-formula><jats:alternatives><jats:tex-math>$$\\succ $$<\/jats:tex-math><mml:math xmlns:mml=\"http:\/\/www.w3.org\/1998\/Math\/MathML\">\n                  <mml:mo>\u227b<\/mml:mo>\n                <\/mml:math><\/jats:alternatives><\/jats:inline-formula>.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1007\/s00355-020-01303-w","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2021,2,14]],"date-time":"2021-02-14T13:43:58Z","timestamp":1613310238000},"page":"145-162","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/springer_crossmark_policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":3,"title":["Serial dictatorship mechanisms with reservation prices: heterogeneous objects"],"prefix":"10.1007","volume":"57","author":[{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0001-9140-4729","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Bettina","family":"Klaus","sequence":"first","affiliation":[]},{"given":"Alexandru","family":"Nichifor","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[]}],"member":"297","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2021,2,13]]},"reference":[{"key":"1303_CR1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"127","DOI":"10.1016\/j.geb.2016.12.002","volume":"102","author":"M Dold","year":"2017","unstructured":"Dold M, Khadjavi M (2017) Jumping the queue: an experiment on procedural preferences. 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