{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2025,2,21]],"date-time":"2025-02-21T03:04:13Z","timestamp":1740107053640,"version":"3.37.3"},"reference-count":45,"publisher":"Springer Science and Business Media LLC","issue":"2","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2021,3,10]],"date-time":"2021-03-10T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1615334400000},"content-version":"tdm","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/creativecommons.org\/licenses\/by\/4.0"},{"start":{"date-parts":[[2021,3,10]],"date-time":"2021-03-10T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1615334400000},"content-version":"vor","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/creativecommons.org\/licenses\/by\/4.0"}],"content-domain":{"domain":["link.springer.com"],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":["Soc Choice Welf"],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2021,8]]},"abstract":"<jats:title>Abstract<\/jats:title><jats:p>We analyze a political competition model of redistributive policies. We provide an equilibrium existence result and a full characterization of the net transfers to the different income groups. We also derive several testable predictions about the way in which the net group transfers and the after-tax Gini coefficient vary with the main parameters of the model. In accordance with the theory, the empirical evidence from a sample of developed and developing democracies supports a highly statistically significant association between: (i) the net group transfer and the gap between the population and the group mean initial income, and (ii) the net group transfer (and resp., the Gini coefficient) and power sharing disproportionality. In addition, the data also provide some empirical evidence confirming a significant relationship between the net transfers to the poor (and resp., the Gini) and the concern of the political parties with income inequality.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1007\/s00355-021-01310-5","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2021,3,10]],"date-time":"2021-03-10T05:02:35Z","timestamp":1615352555000},"page":"197-228","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/springer_crossmark_policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":0,"title":["Redistribution, power sharing and inequality concern"],"prefix":"10.1007","volume":"57","author":[{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0003-0944-3097","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Dario","family":"Debowicz","sequence":"first","affiliation":[]},{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0002-9156-464X","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Alejandro","family":"Saporiti","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[]},{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0002-5723-2609","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Yizhi","family":"Wang","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[]}],"member":"297","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2021,3,10]]},"reference":[{"key":"1310_CR1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"913","DOI":"10.1257\/0002828054825466","volume":"95","author":"A Alesina","year":"2005","unstructured":"Alesina A, Angeletos G (2005a) Fairness and redistribution: US vs. Europe. Am Econ Rev 95:913\u2013935","journal-title":"Am Econ Rev"},{"key":"1310_CR2","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"1227","DOI":"10.1016\/j.jmoneco.2005.05.003","volume":"5","author":"A Alesina","year":"2005","unstructured":"Alesina A, Angeletos G (2005b) Redistribution, corruption and fairness. J Monet Econ 5:1227\u20131244","journal-title":"J Monet Econ"},{"key":"1310_CR3","first-page":"93","volume-title":"Handbook of social economics 1A","author":"A Alesina","year":"2010","unstructured":"Alesina A, Giuliano P (2010) Preferences for redistribution. In: Benhabib J, Bisin A, Jackson M (eds) Handbook of social economics 1A. North Holland Publisher, Amsterdam, pp 93\u2013129"},{"issue":"565","key":"1310_CR4","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"1244","DOI":"10.1111\/j.1468-0297.2012.02541.x","volume":"122","author":"A Alesina","year":"2012","unstructured":"Alesina A, Cozzi G, Mantovan N (2012) The evolution of ideology, fairness, and redistribution. Econ J 122(565):1244\u20131261","journal-title":"Econ J"},{"key":"1310_CR5","volume-title":"Social choice and individual values","author":"K Arrow","year":"1963","unstructured":"Arrow K (1963) Social choice and individual values. Wiley, New York"},{"issue":"1","key":"1310_CR6","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"103","DOI":"10.1016\/j.jdeveco.2008.01.001","volume":"88","author":"W Arulampalam","year":"2009","unstructured":"Arulampalam W, Dasgupta S, Dhillon A, Dutta B (2009) Electoral goals and center-state transfers: a theoretical model and empirical evidence from India. J Dev Econ 88(1):103\u2013119","journal-title":"J Dev Econ"},{"issue":"2","key":"1310_CR7","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"317","DOI":"10.3368\/jhr.50.2.317","volume":"50","author":"C Cameron","year":"2015","unstructured":"Cameron C, Miller DL (2015) A practitioner\u2019s guide to cluster-robust inference. J Hum Resour 50(2):317\u2013372","journal-title":"J Hum Resour"},{"issue":"2","key":"1310_CR8","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"383","DOI":"10.1111\/j.1540-5907.2010.00495.x","volume":"55","author":"J Carey","year":"2011","unstructured":"Carey J, Hix S (2011) The electoral sweet spot: low-magnitude proportional electoral systems. Am J Polit Sci 55(2):383\u2013397","journal-title":"Am J Polit Sci"},{"key":"1310_CR9","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"83","DOI":"10.1016\/S0047-2727(00)00172-9","volume":"83","author":"G Corneo","year":"2002","unstructured":"Corneo G, Gruner PH (2002) Individual preferences for political redistribution. J Public Econ 83:83\u2013107","journal-title":"J Public Econ"},{"key":"1310_CR10","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"342","DOI":"10.1017\/CBO9780511813146.015","volume-title":"Political representation","author":"G Cox","year":"2010","unstructured":"Cox G (2010) Swing voters, core voters and distributive politics. In: Shapiro I, Stokes S, Wood E, Kirshner A (eds) Political representation. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 342\u201357"},{"key":"1310_CR11","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"370","DOI":"10.2307\/2131098","volume":"48","author":"G Cox","year":"1986","unstructured":"Cox G, McCubbins M (1986) Electoral politics as a redistributive game. J Polit 48:370\u201389","journal-title":"J Polit"},{"key":"1310_CR12","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"794","DOI":"10.1038\/nature05651","volume":"446","author":"C Dawes","year":"2007","unstructured":"Dawes C, Fowler J, Johnson T, McElreath R, Smirnov O (2007) Egalitarian motives in humans. Nature 446:794\u2013796","journal-title":"Nature"},{"issue":"17","key":"1310_CR13","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"6479","DOI":"10.1073\/pnas.1118653109","volume":"109","author":"C Dawes","year":"2012","unstructured":"Dawes C, Loewen P, Schreiber D, Simmons A, Flagan T, McElreath R, Bokemper S, Fowler J, Paulus M (2012) Neural basis of egalitarian behavior. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 109(17):6479\u20136483","journal-title":"Proc Natl Acad Sci USA"},{"issue":"6","key":"1310_CR14","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"743","DOI":"10.1016\/j.euroecorev.2010.01.001","volume":"54","author":"S Dhami","year":"2010","unstructured":"Dhami S, Nowaihi A (2010a) Redistributive policy with heterogenous social preferences of voters. Eur Econ Rev 54(6):743\u2013759","journal-title":"Eur Econ Rev"},{"issue":"5","key":"1310_CR15","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"897","DOI":"10.1111\/j.1467-9779.2010.01479.x","volume":"12","author":"S Dhami","year":"2010","unstructured":"Dhami S, Nowaihi A (2010) Existence of a Condorcet winner when voters have other-regarding preferences. J Public Econ Theory 12(5):897\u2013922","journal-title":"J Public Econ Theory"},{"key":"1310_CR16","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"856","DOI":"10.2307\/2082513","volume":"89","author":"A Dixit","year":"1995","unstructured":"Dixit A, Londregan J (1995) Redistributive politics and economic efficiency. Am Polit Sci Rev 89:856\u201366","journal-title":"Am Polit Sci Rev"},{"key":"1310_CR17","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"1132","DOI":"10.2307\/2960152","volume":"58","author":"A Dixit","year":"1996","unstructured":"Dixit A, Londregan J (1996) The determinants of success of special interests in redistributive politics. J Polit 58:1132\u201355","journal-title":"J Polit"},{"key":"1310_CR18","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"86","DOI":"10.1016\/j.geb.2013.10.004","volume":"83","author":"M Drouvelis","year":"2014","unstructured":"Drouvelis M, Saporiti A, Vriend NJ (2014) Political motivations and electoral competition: equilibrium analysis and experimental evidence. Games Econ Behav 83:86\u2013115","journal-title":"Games Econ Behav"},{"issue":"4","key":"1310_CR19","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"857","DOI":"10.1257\/0002828042002741","volume":"94","author":"D Engelmann","year":"2004","unstructured":"Engelmann D, Strobel M (2004) Inequality aversion, efficiency, and maximin preferences in simple distribution experiments. Am Econ Rev 94(4):857\u2013869","journal-title":"Am Econ Rev"},{"issue":"10","key":"1310_CR20","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"3150","DOI":"10.1257\/aer.20130954","volume":"105","author":"RC Feenstra","year":"2015","unstructured":"Feenstra RC, Inklaar R, Timmer MP (2015) The next generation of the Penn world table. Am Econ Rev 105(10):3150\u20133182","journal-title":"Am Econ Rev"},{"key":"1310_CR22","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"817","DOI":"10.1162\/003355399556151","volume":"114","author":"E Fehr","year":"1999","unstructured":"Fehr E, Schmidt K (1999) A theory of fairness, competition, and cooperation. Q J Econ 114:817\u2013868","journal-title":"Q J Econ"},{"key":"1310_CR23","unstructured":"Flamand S (2012) Heterogeneous social preferences in a model of voting on redistribution. Unpublished manuscript, Universidad Aut\u00f3noma de Barcelona, pp 1\u201326"},{"issue":"3","key":"1310_CR24","first-page":"341","volume":"40","author":"R Franzese","year":"2010","unstructured":"Franzese R (2010) The multiple effects of multiple policymakers: Veto actors bargaining in common pools. Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica 40(3):341\u201370","journal-title":"Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica"},{"issue":"2","key":"1310_CR25","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"187","DOI":"10.1016\/0165-1765(79)90115-0","volume":"3","author":"M Fuller","year":"1979","unstructured":"Fuller M (1979) The estimation of Gini coefficients from grouped data. Econ Lett 3(2):187\u2013192","journal-title":"Econ Lett"},{"issue":"5","key":"1310_CR26","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"1178","DOI":"10.1111\/jeea.12031","volume":"11","author":"P Funk","year":"2013","unstructured":"Funk P, Gathmann C (2013) How do electoral systems affect fiscal policy? Evidence from cantonal parliaments, 1890\u20132000. J Eur Econ Assoc 11(5):1178\u20131203","journal-title":"J Eur Econ Assoc"},{"issue":"4","key":"1310_CR27","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"885","DOI":"10.1016\/S0176-2680(03)00042-9","volume":"19","author":"V Galasso","year":"2003","unstructured":"Galasso V (2003) Redistribution and fairness: a note. Eur J Polit Econ 19(4):885\u2013892","journal-title":"Eur J Polit Econ"},{"issue":"1","key":"1310_CR28","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"33","DOI":"10.1016\/0261-3794(91)90004-C","volume":"10","author":"M Gallagher","year":"1991","unstructured":"Gallagher M (1991) Proportionality, disproportionality and electoral systems. Electrol Stud 10(1):33\u201351","journal-title":"Electrol Stud"},{"issue":"3","key":"1310_CR29","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"607","DOI":"10.1111\/ajps.12215","volume":"60","author":"H Herrera","year":"2016","unstructured":"Herrera H, Morelli M, Nunnari S (2016) Turnout across democracies. Am J Polit Sci 60(3):607\u2013624","journal-title":"Am J Polit Sci"},{"key":"1310_CR30","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"845","DOI":"10.1017\/S0007123412000245","volume":"43","author":"V Larcinese","year":"2013","unstructured":"Larcinese V, Snyder J, Testa C (2013) Testing models of distributive politics using exit polls to measure voters\u2019 preferences and partisanship. Br J Polit Sci 43:845\u2013875","journal-title":"Br J Polit Sci"},{"key":"1310_CR32","volume-title":"Patterns of democracy. Government forms and performance in thirty-six countries","author":"A Lijphart","year":"2012","unstructured":"Lijphart A (2012) Patterns of democracy. Government forms and performance in thirty-six countries, 2nd edn. Yale University Press, New Haven","edition":"2"},{"issue":"3","key":"1310_CR33","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"273","DOI":"10.1007\/BF00116710","volume":"52","author":"A Lindbeck","year":"1987","unstructured":"Lindbeck A, Weibull J (1987) Balanced-budget redistribution as the outcome of political competition. Public Choice 52(3):273\u2013297","journal-title":"Public Choice"},{"key":"1310_CR34","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"225","DOI":"10.1257\/aer.91.1.225","volume":"91","author":"A Lizzeri","year":"2001","unstructured":"Lizzeri A, Persico N (2001) The provision of public goods under alternative electoral incentives. Am Econ Rev 91:225\u2013245","journal-title":"Am Econ Rev"},{"issue":"3","key":"1310_CR35","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"881","DOI":"10.1111\/j.1467-9442.2012.01708.x","volume":"114","author":"R Luttens","year":"2012","unstructured":"Luttens R, Valfort M (2012) Voting for redistribution under desert-sensitive altruism. Scand J Econ 114(3):881\u2013907","journal-title":"Scand J Econ"},{"key":"1310_CR36","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1111\/ajps.12235","author":"K Matakos","year":"2015","unstructured":"Matakos K, Troumpounis O, Xefteris D (2015) Electoral rule disproportionality and platform polarization. Am J Polit Sci. https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1111\/ajps.12235","journal-title":"Am J Polit Sci"},{"key":"1310_CR37","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"914","DOI":"10.1086\/261013","volume":"89","author":"AH Meltzer","year":"1981","unstructured":"Meltzer AH, Richard SF (1981) A rational theory of the size of government. J Polit Econ 89:914\u2013927","journal-title":"J Polit Econ"},{"key":"1310_CR38","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"609","DOI":"10.1162\/003355302753650346","volume":"117","author":"G-M Milesi-Ferretti","year":"2002","unstructured":"Milesi-Ferretti G-M, Perotti R, Rostagno M (2002) Electoral systems and the composition of public spending. Q J Econ 117:609\u2013657","journal-title":"Q J Econ"},{"issue":"4","key":"1310_CR39","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"575","DOI":"10.1016\/S0261-3794(03)00056-8","volume":"23","author":"R Moser","year":"2004","unstructured":"Moser R, Scheiner E (2004) Mixed electoral systems and electoral system effects: controlled comparison and cross-national analysis. Electoral Stud 23(4):575\u2013599","journal-title":"Electoral Stud"},{"key":"1310_CR40","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"699","DOI":"10.1016\/S0014-2921(98)00131-7","volume":"43","author":"T Persson","year":"1999","unstructured":"Persson T, Tabellini G (1999) The size and scope of government: comparative politics with rational politicians. Eur Econ Rev 43:699\u2013735","journal-title":"Eur Econ Rev"},{"key":"1310_CR41","volume-title":"Political economics: explaining economic policy","author":"T Persson","year":"2000","unstructured":"Persson T, Tabellini G (2000) Political economics: explaining economic policy. MIT Press, Cambridge"},{"key":"1310_CR42","volume-title":"Elections as instruments of democracy: majoritarian and proportional visions","author":"G Powell","year":"2000","unstructured":"Powell G (2000) Elections as instruments of democracy: majoritarian and proportional visions. Yale University Press, New Haven"},{"issue":"3","key":"1310_CR43","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"705","DOI":"10.1007\/s00199-013-0772-0","volume":"55","author":"A Saporiti","year":"2014","unstructured":"Saporiti A (2014) Power sharing and electoral equilibrium. Econ Theory 55(3):705\u2013729","journal-title":"Econ Theory"},{"key":"1310_CR44","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"489","DOI":"10.2307\/1958270","volume":"80","author":"R Taagepera","year":"1986","unstructured":"Taagepera R (1986) Reformulating the cube law for proportional representation elections. Am Polit Sci Rev 80:489\u2013504","journal-title":"Am Polit Sci Rev"},{"key":"1310_CR45","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"521","DOI":"10.1017\/S0003055400262382","volume":"63","author":"H Theil","year":"1969","unstructured":"Theil H (1969) The desired political entropy. Am Polit Sci Rev 63:521\u2013525","journal-title":"Am Polit Sci Rev"},{"issue":"2","key":"1310_CR46","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"469","DOI":"10.1016\/j.euroecorev.2004.09.014","volume":"50","author":"J-R Tyran","year":"2006","unstructured":"Tyran J-R, Sausgruber R (2006) A little fairness may induce a lot of redistribution in democracy. Eur Econ Rev 50(2):469\u2013485","journal-title":"Eur Econ Rev"},{"key":"1310_CR47","unstructured":"Volkens A, Lehman P, Matthie\u00df T, Merz N, Regel S, We\u00dfels B (2015) The Manifesto Data Collection. Manifesto Project (MRG\/CMP\/MARPOR). Version 2015a. Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin f\u00fcr Sozialforschung (WZB)"}],"container-title":["Social Choice and Welfare"],"original-title":[],"language":"en","link":[{"URL":"https:\/\/link.springer.com\/content\/pdf\/10.1007\/s00355-021-01310-5.pdf","content-type":"application\/pdf","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"text-mining"},{"URL":"https:\/\/link.springer.com\/article\/10.1007\/s00355-021-01310-5\/fulltext.html","content-type":"text\/html","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"text-mining"},{"URL":"https:\/\/link.springer.com\/content\/pdf\/10.1007\/s00355-021-01310-5.pdf","content-type":"application\/pdf","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"similarity-checking"}],"deposited":{"date-parts":[[2023,10,31]],"date-time":"2023-10-31T10:44:24Z","timestamp":1698749064000},"score":1,"resource":{"primary":{"URL":"https:\/\/link.springer.com\/10.1007\/s00355-021-01310-5"}},"subtitle":[],"short-title":[],"issued":{"date-parts":[[2021,3,10]]},"references-count":45,"journal-issue":{"issue":"2","published-print":{"date-parts":[[2021,8]]}},"alternative-id":["1310"],"URL":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/s00355-021-01310-5","relation":{},"ISSN":["0176-1714","1432-217X"],"issn-type":[{"type":"print","value":"0176-1714"},{"type":"electronic","value":"1432-217X"}],"subject":[],"published":{"date-parts":[[2021,3,10]]},"assertion":[{"value":"30 December 2017","order":1,"name":"received","label":"Received","group":{"name":"ArticleHistory","label":"Article History"}},{"value":"27 January 2021","order":2,"name":"accepted","label":"Accepted","group":{"name":"ArticleHistory","label":"Article History"}},{"value":"10 March 2021","order":3,"name":"first_online","label":"First Online","group":{"name":"ArticleHistory","label":"Article History"}}]}}