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Under complete information, sequential voting has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium with a simple equilibrium strategy guaranteeing true majority results. Simultaneous voting suffers from a plethora of equilibria, often contradicting true majorities. Experimental results, however, show severe deviations from the equilibrium strategy in sequential voting with not significantly more <jats:italic>true majority results<\/jats:italic> than in simultaneous voting. Social considerations under sequential voting\u2014based on emotional reactions toward the behaviors of the previous players\u2014seem to distort subgame perfect equilibria.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1007\/s00355-021-01371-6","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2021,11,3]],"date-time":"2021-11-03T09:03:12Z","timestamp":1635930192000},"page":"711-740","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/springer_crossmark_policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":0,"title":["Voting behavior under outside pressure: promoting true majorities with sequential voting?"],"prefix":"10.1007","volume":"58","author":[{"given":"Friedel","family":"Bolle","sequence":"first","affiliation":[]},{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0001-8630-108X","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Philipp E.","family":"Otto","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[]}],"member":"297","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2021,11,3]]},"reference":[{"issue":"3","key":"1371_CR1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"324","DOI":"10.1016\/j.joep.2007.01.007","volume":"28","author":"AM Ahmed","year":"2007","unstructured":"Ahmed AM (2007) Group identity, social distance and intergroup bias. 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