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It also implies two equal treatment conditions: one is a natural weakening of <jats:italic>anonymity<\/jats:italic>, which is the most standard equal treatment condition for individuals, and the other is a natural weakening of <jats:italic>neutrality<\/jats:italic>, which is the most standard equal treatment one for alternatives. Thus, equal treatment of congruent distributions plays the role of weak equal treatment conditions both for individuals and for alternatives. As our main results, we characterize a class of social choice functions that satisfy equal treatment of congruent distributions and some mild <jats:italic>positive responsiveness<\/jats:italic> conditions, and it is shown to coincide with the class of <jats:italic>tie-breaking plurality rules<\/jats:italic>, which are selections of the well-known <jats:italic>plurality rule<\/jats:italic>.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1007\/s00355-021-01382-3","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2022,1,30]],"date-time":"2022-01-30T00:03:06Z","timestamp":1643500986000},"page":"139-173","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/springer_crossmark_policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":0,"title":["Characterization of tie-breaking plurality rules"],"prefix":"10.1007","volume":"59","author":[{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0002-1552-075X","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Hiroki","family":"Saitoh","sequence":"first","affiliation":[]}],"member":"297","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2022,1,30]]},"reference":[{"key":"1382_CR1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"173","DOI":"10.1007\/s00355-005-0048-0","volume":"25","author":"E Baharad","year":"2005","unstructured":"Baharad E, Nitzan S (2005) The inverse plurality rule-an axiomatization. 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