{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2025,5,13]],"date-time":"2025-05-13T16:27:58Z","timestamp":1747153678370,"version":"3.40.5"},"reference-count":25,"publisher":"Springer Science and Business Media LLC","issue":"1","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2022,2,15]],"date-time":"2022-02-15T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1644883200000},"content-version":"tdm","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/www.springer.com\/tdm"},{"start":{"date-parts":[[2022,2,15]],"date-time":"2022-02-15T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1644883200000},"content-version":"vor","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/www.springer.com\/tdm"}],"content-domain":{"domain":["link.springer.com"],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":["Soc Choice Welf"],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2022,7]]},"DOI":"10.1007\/s00355-022-01387-6","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2022,2,15]],"date-time":"2022-02-15T13:11:16Z","timestamp":1644930676000},"page":"175-206","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/springer_crossmark_policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":1,"title":["Compromise in combinatorial vote"],"prefix":"10.1007","volume":"59","author":[{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0001-6724-2045","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Hayrullah","family":"Dindar","sequence":"first","affiliation":[]},{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0002-7305-7556","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Jean","family":"Lain\u00e9","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[]}],"member":"297","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2022,2,15]]},"reference":[{"key":"1387_CR1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","unstructured":"Aslan F, Dindar H, Lain\u00e9 J (2021) When are committees of Condorcet winners Condorcet winning committees? Rev Econ Design (2021). https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/s10058-021-00268-1","DOI":"10.1007\/s10058-021-00268-1"},{"key":"1387_CR2","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"156","DOI":"10.1016\/j.geb.2015.12.002","volume":"95","author":"S Athanasoglou","year":"2016","unstructured":"Athanasoglou S (2016) Strategyproof and efficient preference aggregation with Kemeny based criteria. Games Econom Behav 95:156\u2013167","journal-title":"Games Econom Behav"},{"key":"1387_CR3","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1007\/978-1-4020-7964-1","volume-title":"Handbook of utility theory","author":"S Barber\u00e0","year":"2004","unstructured":"Barber\u00e0 S, Bossert W, Pattanaik PK (2004) Ranking sets of objects. In: Barber\u00e0 S, Hammond PJ, Seidl C (eds) Handbook of utility theory. Springer, Boston"},{"key":"1387_CR4","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"261","DOI":"10.1016\/j.geb.2010.02.010","volume":"70","author":"JP Beno\u00eet","year":"2010","unstructured":"Beno\u00eet JP, Kornhauser LA (2010) Only dictatorship is efficient. Games Econom Behav 70:261\u2013270","journal-title":"Games Econom Behav"},{"key":"1387_CR5","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"131","DOI":"10.1080\/0022250X.1985.9989986","volume":"11","author":"T Bezembinder","year":"1985","unstructured":"Bezembinder T, van Acker P (1985) The Ostrogorski paradox and its relation to nontransitive choice. J Math Sociol 11:131\u201358","journal-title":"J Math Sociol"},{"key":"1387_CR6","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"109","DOI":"10.1016\/j.geb.2014.01.015","volume":"85","author":"W Bossert","year":"2014","unstructured":"Bossert W, Sprumont Y (2014) Strategy-proof preference aggregation: possibilities and characterizations. Games Econ Behav 85:109\u2013126","journal-title":"Games Econ Behav"},{"key":"1387_CR7","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"345","DOI":"10.1007\/BF00182575","volume":"9","author":"W Bossert","year":"1992","unstructured":"Bossert W, Storcken T (1992) Strategy-proofness of social welfare functions: the use of the Kemeny distance between preference orderings. Soc Choice Welfare 9:345\u2013360","journal-title":"Soc Choice Welfare"},{"key":"1387_CR8","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"211","DOI":"10.1007\/s003550050101","volume":"15","author":"S Brams","year":"1998","unstructured":"Brams S, Kilgour DM (1998) The paradox of multiple elections. Soc Choice Welfare 15:211\u2013236","journal-title":"Soc Choice Welfare"},{"key":"1387_CR9","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"287","DOI":"10.1023\/A:1011252808608","volume":"10","author":"S Brams","year":"2001","unstructured":"Brams S, Kilgour DM (2001) Fallback bargaining. Group Decis Negot 10:287\u2013316","journal-title":"Group Decis Negot"},{"issue":"1","key":"1387_CR10","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"57","DOI":"10.1146\/annurev-economics-081720-114422","volume":"13","author":"A Casella","year":"2021","unstructured":"Casella A, Mac\u00e9 A (2021) Does vote trading improve welfare? Ann Rev Econ 13(1):57\u201386","journal-title":"Ann Rev Econ"},{"key":"1387_CR11","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"525","DOI":"10.1007\/s11238-011-9286-z","volume":"72","author":"T Cuhadaroglu","year":"2012","unstructured":"Cuhadaroglu T, Lain\u00e9 J (2012) Pareto efficiency in multiple referendum. Theor Decis 72:525\u2013536","journal-title":"Theor Decis"},{"key":"1387_CR12","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"391","DOI":"10.1111\/j.1475-6765.1976.tb00542.x","volume":"4","author":"H Daudt","year":"1976","unstructured":"Daudt H, Rae D (1976) The Ostrogorski paradox: a peculiarity of compound majority decision. Eur J Polit Res 4:391\u2013398","journal-title":"Eur J Polit Res"},{"key":"1387_CR13","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"161","DOI":"10.1016\/0165-4896(87)90019-9","volume":"14","author":"R Deb","year":"1987","unstructured":"Deb R, Kelsey D (1987) On constructing a generalized Ostrogorski paradox: necessary and sufficient conditions. Math Soc Sci 14:161\u2013174","journal-title":"Math Soc Sci"},{"key":"1387_CR14","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"451","DOI":"10.1007\/BF00182855","volume":"13","author":"G Hollard","year":"1996","unstructured":"Hollard G, Le Breton M (1996) Logrolling and a McGarvey theorem for separable tournaments. Soc Choice Welfare 13:451\u2013455","journal-title":"Soc Choice Welfare"},{"key":"1387_CR15","volume-title":"Contemporary economic issues. International Economic Association Series","author":"L Hurwicz","year":"1999","unstructured":"Hurwicz L, Sertel MR (1999) Designing mechanisms, in particular for electoral systems: the majoritarian compromise. In: Sertel MR (ed) Contemporary economic issues. International Economic Association Series. Palgrave Macmillan, London"},{"key":"1387_CR16","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"171","DOI":"10.1007\/s00355-017-1079-z","volume":"50","author":"E Kamwa","year":"2018","unstructured":"Kamwa E, Merlin V (2018) Coincidence of Condorcet committees. Soc Choice Welfare 50:171\u2013189","journal-title":"Soc Choice Welfare"},{"key":"1387_CR17","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"477","DOI":"10.1007\/s003550200194","volume":"20","author":"B Kaymak","year":"2003","unstructured":"Kaymak B, Sanver MR (2003) Sets of alternatives as Condorcet winners. Soc Choice Welfare 20:477\u2013494","journal-title":"Soc Choice Welfare"},{"key":"1387_CR18","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"49","DOI":"10.1016\/j.mathsocsci.2006.03.006","volume":"52","author":"G Laffond","year":"2006","unstructured":"Laffond G, Lain\u00e9 J (2006) Single-switch preferences and the Ostrogorski paradox. Math Soc Sci 52:49\u201366","journal-title":"Math Soc Sci"},{"key":"1387_CR19","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"197","DOI":"10.1017\/CBO9781107446984.010","volume-title":"Handbook of computational social choice","author":"J Lang","year":"2016","unstructured":"Lang J, Xia L (2016) Voting on combinatorial domains. In: Brandt F, Conitzer V, Endriss U, Lang J, Procaccia AD (eds) Handbook of computational social choice. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 197\u2013221"},{"key":"1387_CR20","unstructured":"Meir R (2017) Iterative voting. In: Endriss U (ed) Trends in computational social choice, chapter 4. AI Access, pp 69\u201386"},{"issue":"2","key":"1387_CR21","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"421","DOI":"10.1007\/s00355-020-01293-9","volume":"56","author":"M N\u00fa\u00f1ez","year":"2021","unstructured":"N\u00fa\u00f1ez M, Sanver MR (2021) On the subgame perfect implementability of voting rules. Soc Choice Welfare 56(2):421\u2013441","journal-title":"Soc Choice Welfare"},{"key":"1387_CR22","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"211","DOI":"10.1007\/s00355-006-0101-7","volume":"27","author":"I \u00d6zkal-Sanver","year":"2006","unstructured":"\u00d6zkal-Sanver I, Sanver MR (2006) Ensuring Pareto optimality by referendum voting. Soc Choice Welfare 27:211\u2013219","journal-title":"Soc Choice Welfare"},{"key":"1387_CR23","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"615","DOI":"10.1007\/s003550050164","volume":"16","author":"MR Sertel","year":"1999","unstructured":"Sertel MR, Yilmaz B (1999) The majoritarian compromise is majoritarian optimal and subgame perfect implementable. Soc Choice Welfare 16:615\u2013627","journal-title":"Soc Choice Welfare"},{"key":"1387_CR24","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"159","DOI":"10.1007\/s003550050137","volume":"16","author":"L Vidu","year":"1999","unstructured":"Vidu L (1999) An extension of a theorem on the aggregation of separable preferences. Soc Choice Welfare 16:159\u2013167","journal-title":"Soc Choice Welfare"},{"key":"1387_CR25","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"373","DOI":"10.1007\/s001990100205","volume":"20","author":"L Vidu","year":"2002","unstructured":"Vidu L (2002) Majority cycles in a multidimensional setting. Econ Theor 20:373\u2013386","journal-title":"Econ Theor"}],"container-title":["Social Choice and Welfare"],"original-title":[],"language":"en","link":[{"URL":"https:\/\/link.springer.com\/content\/pdf\/10.1007\/s00355-022-01387-6.pdf","content-type":"application\/pdf","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"text-mining"},{"URL":"https:\/\/link.springer.com\/article\/10.1007\/s00355-022-01387-6\/fulltext.html","content-type":"text\/html","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"text-mining"},{"URL":"https:\/\/link.springer.com\/content\/pdf\/10.1007\/s00355-022-01387-6.pdf","content-type":"application\/pdf","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"similarity-checking"}],"deposited":{"date-parts":[[2022,7,22]],"date-time":"2022-07-22T13:04:18Z","timestamp":1658495058000},"score":1,"resource":{"primary":{"URL":"https:\/\/link.springer.com\/10.1007\/s00355-022-01387-6"}},"subtitle":[],"short-title":[],"issued":{"date-parts":[[2022,2,15]]},"references-count":25,"journal-issue":{"issue":"1","published-print":{"date-parts":[[2022,7]]}},"alternative-id":["1387"],"URL":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/s00355-022-01387-6","relation":{},"ISSN":["0176-1714","1432-217X"],"issn-type":[{"type":"print","value":"0176-1714"},{"type":"electronic","value":"1432-217X"}],"subject":[],"published":{"date-parts":[[2022,2,15]]},"assertion":[{"value":"13 September 2021","order":1,"name":"received","label":"Received","group":{"name":"ArticleHistory","label":"Article History"}},{"value":"11 January 2022","order":2,"name":"accepted","label":"Accepted","group":{"name":"ArticleHistory","label":"Article History"}},{"value":"15 February 2022","order":3,"name":"first_online","label":"First Online","group":{"name":"ArticleHistory","label":"Article History"}}]}}