{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2025,2,21]],"date-time":"2025-02-21T03:04:23Z","timestamp":1740107063819,"version":"3.37.3"},"reference-count":10,"publisher":"Springer Science and Business Media LLC","issue":"4","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2022,9,15]],"date-time":"2022-09-15T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1663200000000},"content-version":"tdm","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/creativecommons.org\/licenses\/by\/4.0"},{"start":{"date-parts":[[2022,9,15]],"date-time":"2022-09-15T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1663200000000},"content-version":"vor","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/creativecommons.org\/licenses\/by\/4.0"}],"funder":[{"DOI":"10.13039\/100006919","name":"Massachusetts Institute of Technology","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","id":[{"id":"10.13039\/100006919","id-type":"DOI","asserted-by":"crossref"}]}],"content-domain":{"domain":["link.springer.com"],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":["Soc Choice Welf"],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2023,5]]},"abstract":"<jats:title>Abstract<\/jats:title><jats:p>This paper studies single-peaked domains where the designer is uncertain about the underlying alignment according to which the domain is single-peaked. The underlying alignment is common knowledge amongst agents, but preferences are private knowledge. Thus, the state of the world has both a public and private element, with the designer uninformed of both. I first posit a relevant solution concept called implementation in mixed information equilibria, which requires Nash implementation in the public information and dominant strategy implementation in the private information given the public information. I then identify necessary and sufficient conditions for social choice rules (SCRs) to be implementable. The characterization is used to identify unanimous and anonymous implementable SCRs for different forms of designer uncertainty, which basically boils down to picking the right SCRs from the large class identified by Moulin (Public Choice 35(4):437\u2013455, 1980), and hence this result can be seen as identifying which of Moulin\u2019s SCRs are robust to designer uncertainty.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1007\/s00355-022-01431-5","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2022,9,15]],"date-time":"2022-09-15T06:05:41Z","timestamp":1663221941000},"page":"561-578","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/springer_crossmark_policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":0,"title":["Single-peaked domains with designer uncertainty"],"prefix":"10.1007","volume":"60","author":[{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0002-5498-6042","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Aroon","family":"Narayanan","sequence":"first","affiliation":[]}],"member":"297","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2022,9,15]]},"reference":[{"key":"1431_CR1","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Black D (1948) On the rationale of group decision-making. J Political Econ 56(1):23\u201334. ISSN 00223808, 1537534X. http:\/\/www.jstor.org\/stable\/1825026","DOI":"10.1086\/256633"},{"key":"1431_CR2","volume-title":"Nash equilibrium and welfare optimality","author":"E Maskin","year":"1977","unstructured":"Maskin E (1977) Nash equilibrium and welfare optimality. Mimeo, New York"},{"key":"1431_CR3","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Moore J, Repullo R (1990) Nash implementation: a full characterization. Econometrica 58(5):1083\u20131099. ISSN 00129682, 14680262. http:\/\/www.jstor.org\/stable\/2938301","DOI":"10.2307\/2938301"},{"key":"1431_CR4","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","unstructured":"Moulin H (1980) On strategy-proofness and single peakedness. Public Choice 35(4):437\u2013455. ISSN 1573-7101. https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/BF00128122","DOI":"10.1007\/BF00128122"},{"key":"1431_CR5","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","unstructured":"Nicol\u00f2 A, Barber\u00e0 S (2021) Information disclosure with many alternatives. Soc Choice Welf. ISSN 0176-1714. https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/s00355-021-01341-y","DOI":"10.1007\/s00355-021-01341-y"},{"key":"1431_CR6","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","unstructured":"N\u00fa\u00f1ez M, Pimienta C, Xefteris D (2021) On the implementation of the median. J Math Econ 102595. ISSN 0304-4068. https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1016\/j.jmateco.2021.102595","DOI":"10.1016\/j.jmateco.2021.102595"},{"issue":"2","key":"1431_CR7","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"436","DOI":"10.1111\/j.1540-5907.2010.00502.x","volume":"55","author":"EM Penn","year":"2011","unstructured":"Penn EM, Patty JW, Gailmard S (2011) Manipulation and single-peakedness: a general result. Am J Political Sci 55(2):436\u2013449. https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1111\/j.1540-5907.2010.00502.x","journal-title":"Am J Political Sci"},{"key":"1431_CR8","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","unstructured":"Reffgen A (2015) Strategy-proof social choice on multiple and multi-dimensional single-peaked domains. J Econ Theory 157:349 \u2013 383. ISSN 0022-0531. https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1016\/j.jet.2014.12.010","DOI":"10.1016\/j.jet.2014.12.010"},{"issue":"3","key":"1431_CR9","first-page":"203","volume":"2","author":"T Saijo","year":"2007","unstructured":"Saijo T, Sjostrom T, Yamato T (2007) Secure implementation. Theor Econ 2(3):203\u2013229","journal-title":"Theor Econ"},{"key":"1431_CR10","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Sprumont Y (1995) Strategyproof collective choice in economic and political environments. Can J Econ 28(1):68\u2013107. https:\/\/EconPapers.repec.org\/RePEc:cje:issued:v:28:y:1995:i:1:p:68-107","DOI":"10.2307\/136023"}],"container-title":["Social Choice and Welfare"],"original-title":[],"language":"en","link":[{"URL":"https:\/\/link.springer.com\/content\/pdf\/10.1007\/s00355-022-01431-5.pdf","content-type":"application\/pdf","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"text-mining"},{"URL":"https:\/\/link.springer.com\/article\/10.1007\/s00355-022-01431-5\/fulltext.html","content-type":"text\/html","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"text-mining"},{"URL":"https:\/\/link.springer.com\/content\/pdf\/10.1007\/s00355-022-01431-5.pdf","content-type":"application\/pdf","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"similarity-checking"}],"deposited":{"date-parts":[[2023,5,5]],"date-time":"2023-05-05T12:02:28Z","timestamp":1683288148000},"score":1,"resource":{"primary":{"URL":"https:\/\/link.springer.com\/10.1007\/s00355-022-01431-5"}},"subtitle":[],"short-title":[],"issued":{"date-parts":[[2022,9,15]]},"references-count":10,"journal-issue":{"issue":"4","published-print":{"date-parts":[[2023,5]]}},"alternative-id":["1431"],"URL":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/s00355-022-01431-5","relation":{},"ISSN":["0176-1714","1432-217X"],"issn-type":[{"type":"print","value":"0176-1714"},{"type":"electronic","value":"1432-217X"}],"subject":[],"published":{"date-parts":[[2022,9,15]]},"assertion":[{"value":"26 August 2021","order":1,"name":"received","label":"Received","group":{"name":"ArticleHistory","label":"Article History"}},{"value":"19 August 2022","order":2,"name":"accepted","label":"Accepted","group":{"name":"ArticleHistory","label":"Article History"}},{"value":"15 September 2022","order":3,"name":"first_online","label":"First Online","group":{"name":"ArticleHistory","label":"Article History"}}]}}