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This order of moves is the third-best outcome for a contest organiser as it leads to a contest with lower aggregate effort compared to a contest where the players move in reverse order (first\u00a0best) or simultaneously (second\u00a0best). We propose that if the contest organiser\u2014who does not know<jats:italic>ex ante<\/jats:italic>which player is the strong and which is the weak one\u2014offers a lower price (effort cost) to the player(s) who choose(s) to exert effort early, she can achieve a greater payoff by affecting the contestants\u2019 sequence of moves. We show that there exists no price that generates the first-best outcome. However, there is a price (or a range of prices) that induces both players to move early and receive it, leading to the second-best outcome. We also discuss the case where both players move early but only one receives the low price, e.g., lobbying or Instagram \u201cgiveaway\u201d contests.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1007\/s00355-023-01461-7","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2023,5,11]],"date-time":"2023-05-11T05:27:06Z","timestamp":1683782826000},"page":"511-535","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/springer_crossmark_policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":9,"title":["Manipulation of moves in sequential contests"],"prefix":"10.1007","volume":"61","author":[{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0001-6044-7259","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Konstantinos","family":"Protopappas","sequence":"first","affiliation":[]}],"member":"297","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2023,5,10]]},"reference":[{"issue":"2","key":"1461_CR1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"277","DOI":"10.1093\/jleo\/14.2.277","volume":"14","author":"D Austen-Smith","year":"1998","unstructured":"Austen-Smith D (1998) Allocating access for information and contributions. 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