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Our main result is that a single grand contest maximizes total effort. We consider three extensions. First, when the designers\u2019 objective changes to maximizing the effort submitted by the winning contestant, we find that the optimal design involves the high-type contestants being assigned to a set of pairwise contests. Second, under multiple participations (a player\u2019s effort is valid in multiple contests, as in several applications), running a contest open to all, along with a parallel contest open only to low types, increases total effort over a single grand contest. Third, tilting the playing field (a player\u2019s effort is multiplied by a tilting factor) in favor of low types increases total effort in a single grand contest, even more than what is possible with multiple participations; thus, in applications, a <jats:italic>quota<\/jats:italic> reserved for traditionally disadvantaged categories results in lower total effort than a grand contest that optimally <jats:italic>handicaps<\/jats:italic> advantaged categories.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1007\/s00355-023-01483-1","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2023,9,13]],"date-time":"2023-09-13T07:02:57Z","timestamp":1694588577000},"page":"117-152","update-policy":"http:\/\/dx.doi.org\/10.1007\/springer_crossmark_policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":1,"title":["Centralized assignment of prizes and contestants"],"prefix":"10.1007","volume":"62","author":[{"given":"Stefano","family":"Barbieri","sequence":"first","affiliation":[],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]},{"given":"Marco","family":"Serena","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]}],"member":"297","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2023,9,13]]},"reference":[{"issue":"3","key":"1483_CR1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"693","DOI":"10.1287\/opre.2016.1575","volume":"65","author":"L Ales","year":"2017","unstructured":"Ales L, Cho SH, K\u00f6rpeo\u011flu E (2017) Optimal award scheme in innovation tournaments. 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