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This causes wasted resources and unfair allocation. To fix this, we consider a college assignment problem where students simultaneously receive their college and dorm assignments. We first introduce the so-called \u201c<jats:italic>Dorm Augmented Deferred Acceptance<\/jats:italic>\u201d (<jats:italic>DDA<\/jats:italic>) and show that it is stable and efficient. However, it is not student-optimal stable. We then introduce our next mechanism, \u201c<jats:italic>Student-Improving Dorm Augmented Deferred Acceptance<\/jats:italic>\u201d (<jats:italic>SDDA<\/jats:italic>). It is mainly built on <jats:italic>DDA<\/jats:italic>, but with some extra steps to neutralize the student-harming rejection cycles. We show that <jats:italic>SDDA<\/jats:italic> is student-optimal stable, efficient, and unanimously preferred to <jats:italic>DDA<\/jats:italic> by students. Stability and strategy-proofness are incompatible, implying that neither of these mechanisms is strategy-proof. None of these mechanisms is more manipulable than the other; hence <jats:italic>SDDA<\/jats:italic> improves the students\u2019 welfare without an extra strategic cost.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1007\/s00355-024-01510-9","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2024,2,13]],"date-time":"2024-02-13T04:30:43Z","timestamp":1707798643000},"page":"609-627","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/springer_crossmark_policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":0,"title":["Dorm augmented college assignments"],"prefix":"10.1007","volume":"62","author":[{"given":"Mustafa O\u01e7uz","family":"Afacan","sequence":"first","affiliation":[]}],"member":"297","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2024,2,13]]},"reference":[{"key":"1510_CR1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"425","DOI":"10.1257\/aeri.20190307","volume":"2","author":"A Abdulkadiro\u011flu","year":"2020","unstructured":"Abdulkadiro\u011flu A, Che Y-K, Pathak PA, Roth AE, Tercieux O (2020) Efficiency. 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