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We describe two non-deterministic group decision methods that meet these criteria, one based on automatic bargaining over lotteries, the other on conditional commitments to approve compromise options. Using theoretical analysis, agent-based simulations and a behavioral experiment, we show that these methods prevent majorities from consistently suppressing minorities, which can happen in deterministic methods, and keeps proponents of the status quo from blocking decisions, as in other consensus-based approaches. Our simulations show that these methods achieve aggregate welfare comparable to common voting methods, while employing chance judiciously, and that the welfare costs of fairness and consensus are small compared to the inequality costs of majoritarianism. In an incentivized experiment with naive participants, we find that a sizable fraction of participants prefers to use a non-deterministic voting method over Plurality Voting to allocate monetary resources. However, this depends critically on their position within the group. Those in the majority show a strong preference for majoritarian voting methods.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1007\/s00355-024-01524-3","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2024,5,4]],"date-time":"2024-05-04T06:01:26Z","timestamp":1714802486000},"page":"345-371","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/springer_crossmark_policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":2,"title":["Fair group decisions via non-deterministic proportional consensus"],"prefix":"10.1007","volume":"64","author":[{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0002-0442-8077","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Jobst","family":"Heitzig","sequence":"first","affiliation":[]},{"given":"Forest W.","family":"Simmons","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[]},{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0001-5533-5885","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Sara M.","family":"Constantino","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[]}],"member":"297","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2024,5,4]]},"reference":[{"key":"1524_CR1","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Abramowitz B, Elkind E, Grossi D et\u00a0al (2021) Democratic forking: choosing sides with social choice. 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