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In line with the literature on Interactive Democracy, our model allows the voters to actively determine the degree to which the system is direct versus representative. However, unlike Liquid Democracy, Flexible Representative Democracy uses strictly non-transitive delegations, making delegation cycles impossible, and maintains a fixed set of accountable, elected representatives. We present Flexible Representative Democracy and analyze it using a computational approach with issues that are binary and symmetric. We compare the outcomes of various voting systems using Direct Democracy with majority voting as an ideal baseline. First, we demonstrate the shortcomings of Representative Democracy in our model. We provide NP-Hardness results for electing an ideal set of representatives, discuss pathologies, and demonstrate empirically that common multi-winner election rules for selecting representatives do not perform well in expectation. To analyze the effects of adding delegation to representative voting systems, we begin by providing theoretical results on how issue-specific delegations determine outcomes. Finally, we provide empirical results comparing the outcomes of various voting systems: Representative Democracy, Proxy Voting, and FRD with issue-specific delegations. Our results show that variants of Proxy Voting yield no discernible benefit over unweighted representatives and reveal the potential for Flexible Representative Democracy to improve outcomes as voter participation increases.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1007\/s00355-024-01543-0","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2024,9,9]],"date-time":"2024-09-09T15:03:19Z","timestamp":1725894199000},"page":"263-308","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/springer_crossmark_policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":2,"title":["Flexible representative democracy"],"prefix":"10.1007","volume":"64","author":[{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0001-7870-775X","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Ben","family":"Abramowitz","sequence":"first","affiliation":[]},{"given":"Nicholas","family":"Mattei","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[]}],"member":"297","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2024,9,9]]},"reference":[{"key":"1543_CR1","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Abramowitz B, Mattei N (2019) Flexible representative democracy: an introduction with binary issues. 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