{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2026,2,16]],"date-time":"2026-02-16T20:41:05Z","timestamp":1771274465138,"version":"3.50.1"},"reference-count":35,"publisher":"Springer Science and Business Media LLC","issue":"2","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2025,2,1]],"date-time":"2025-02-01T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1738368000000},"content-version":"tdm","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/creativecommons.org\/licenses\/by\/4.0"},{"start":{"date-parts":[[2025,2,1]],"date-time":"2025-02-01T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1738368000000},"content-version":"vor","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/creativecommons.org\/licenses\/by\/4.0"}],"funder":[{"DOI":"10.13039\/100018694","name":"HORIZON EUROPE Marie Sklodowska-Curie Actions","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","award":["890648"],"award-info":[{"award-number":["890648"]}],"id":[{"id":"10.13039\/100018694","id-type":"DOI","asserted-by":"publisher"}]},{"DOI":"10.13039\/501100006769","name":"Russian Science Foundation","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","award":["24-28-00608"],"award-info":[{"award-number":["24-28-00608"]}],"id":[{"id":"10.13039\/501100006769","id-type":"DOI","asserted-by":"publisher"}]}],"content-domain":{"domain":["link.springer.com"],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":["Soc Choice Welf"],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2025,9]]},"abstract":"<jats:title>Abstract<\/jats:title>\n          <jats:p>We study a series of reforms of school admissions mechanisms motivated, among other reasons, by fairness concerns and vulnerability to manipulation. Before the reforms and after, the mechanisms were vulnerable to preference manipulation and induced <jats:italic>blocking students<\/jats:italic>: students who miss desired schools despite having higher priority or seats left empty. We demonstrate that some of these reforms improved fairness by adopting mechanisms with fewer blocking students compared to the preexisting ones, while several others did not. We identify preexisting mechanisms where fairness consideration was more of an issue than vulnerability to manipulation and those where it is the reverse.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1007\/s00355-024-01578-3","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2025,2,1]],"date-time":"2025-02-01T10:20:21Z","timestamp":1738405221000},"page":"449-473","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/springer_crossmark_policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":1,"title":["When do reforms meet fairness concerns in school admissions?"],"prefix":"10.1007","volume":"65","author":[{"given":"Somouaoga","family":"Bonkoungou","sequence":"first","affiliation":[]},{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0002-9143-2938","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Alexander","family":"Nesterov","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[]}],"member":"297","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2025,2,1]]},"reference":[{"issue":"3","key":"1578_CR1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"729","DOI":"10.1257\/000282803322157061","volume":"93","author":"A Abdulkadiro\u011flu","year":"2003","unstructured":"Abdulkadiro\u011flu A, S\u00f6nmez T (2003) School choice: a mechanism design approach. Am Econ Rev 93(3):729\u2013747","journal-title":"Am Econ Rev"},{"issue":"5","key":"1578_CR2","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"1954","DOI":"10.1257\/aer.99.5.1954","volume":"99","author":"A Abdulkadiro\u011flu","year":"2009","unstructured":"Abdulkadiro\u011flu A, Pathak P, Roth AE (2009) Strategy-proofness versus efficiency in matching with indifferences: redesigning the NYC high school match. Am Econ Rev 99(5):1954\u20131978","journal-title":"Am Econ Rev"},{"issue":"4","key":"1578_CR3","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"425","DOI":"10.1257\/aeri.20190307","volume":"2","author":"A Abdulkadiro\u011flu","year":"2020","unstructured":"Abdulkadiro\u011flu A, Che Y-K, Pathak P, Roth AE, Tercieux O (2020) Efficiency, justified envy, and incentives in priority-based matching. Am Econ Rev Insights 2(4):425\u201342","journal-title":"Am Econ Rev Insights"},{"key":"1578_CR4","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"317","DOI":"10.1016\/j.geb.2022.11.011","volume":"137","author":"N Ayoade","year":"2023","unstructured":"Ayoade N, P\u00e1pai S (2023) School choice with preference rank classes. Games Econ Behav 137:317\u2013341","journal-title":"Games Econ Behav"},{"issue":"1","key":"1578_CR5","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"73","DOI":"10.1006\/jeth.1998.2469","volume":"84","author":"M Balinski","year":"1999","unstructured":"Balinski M, S\u00f6nmez T (1999) A tale of two mechanisms: student placement. J Econ Theory 84(1):73\u201394","journal-title":"J Econ Theory"},{"issue":"3","key":"1578_CR6","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"881","DOI":"10.3982\/TE4137","volume":"16","author":"S Bonkoungou","year":"2021","unstructured":"Bonkoungou S, Nesterov A (2021) Comparing school choice and college admissions mechanisms by their strategic accessibility. Theor Econ 16(3):881\u2013909","journal-title":"Theor Econ"},{"issue":"3","key":"1578_CR7","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"965","DOI":"10.3982\/TE5105","volume":"18","author":"S Bonkoungou","year":"2023","unstructured":"Bonkoungou S, Nesterov A (2023) Incentives in matching markets: counting and comparing manipulating agents. Theor Econ 18(3):965\u2013991","journal-title":"Theor Econ"},{"issue":"4","key":"1578_CR8","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"1860","DOI":"10.1257\/aer.100.4.1860","volume":"100","author":"C Calsamiglia","year":"2010","unstructured":"Calsamiglia C, Haeringer G, Klijn F (2010) Constrained school choice: an experimental study. Am Econ Rev 100(4):1860\u201374","journal-title":"Am Econ Rev"},{"issue":"1","key":"1578_CR9","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"99","DOI":"10.1086\/689773","volume":"125","author":"Y Chen","year":"2017","unstructured":"Chen Y, Kesten O (2017) Chinese college admissions and school choice reforms: a theoretical analysis. J Polit Econ 125(1):99\u2013139","journal-title":"J Polit Econ"},{"issue":"2","key":"1578_CR10","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"99","DOI":"10.1257\/mic.5.2.99","volume":"5","author":"P Coles","year":"2013","unstructured":"Coles P, Kushnir A, Niederle M (2013) Preference signaling in matching markets. Am Econ J Microecon 5(2):99\u2013134","journal-title":"Am Econ J Microecon"},{"key":"1578_CR11","volume-title":"School admissions code","author":"Department for Education and Skills","year":"2007","unstructured":"Department for Education and Skills (2007) School admissions code. Her Majesty\u2019s Stationery Office, Norwich, United Kingdom"},{"issue":"4","key":"1578_CR12","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"1249","DOI":"10.3982\/TE4257","volume":"16","author":"B Do\u011fan","year":"2021","unstructured":"Do\u011fan B, Ehlers L (2021) Minimally unstable pareto improvements over deferred acceptance. Theor Econ 16(4):1249\u20131279","journal-title":"Theor Econ"},{"issue":"4","key":"1578_CR13","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"556","DOI":"10.1257\/mic.20200148","volume":"14","author":"B Do\u011fan","year":"2022","unstructured":"Do\u011fan B, Ehlers L (2022) Robust minimal instability of the top trading cycles mechanism. Am Econ J Microecon 14(4):556\u2013582","journal-title":"Am Econ J Microecon"},{"issue":"1","key":"1578_CR14","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"215","DOI":"10.1016\/j.jpubeco.2005.02.002","volume":"90","author":"H Ergin","year":"2006","unstructured":"Ergin H, S\u00f6nmez T (2006) Games of school choice under the Boston mechanism. J Public Econ 90(1):215\u2013237","journal-title":"J Public Econ"},{"issue":"3\u20134","key":"1578_CR15","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"409","DOI":"10.1007\/s00182-007-0081-6","volume":"36","author":"K Eriksson","year":"2008","unstructured":"Eriksson K, H\u00e4ggstr\u00f6m O (2008) Instability of matchings in decentralized markets with various preference structures. Int J Game Theory 36(3\u20134):409\u2013420","journal-title":"Int J Game Theory"},{"issue":"1","key":"1578_CR16","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"9","DOI":"10.1080\/00029890.1962.11989827","volume":"69","author":"D Gale","year":"1962","unstructured":"Gale D, Shapley LS (1962) College admissions and the stability of marriage. Am Math Mon 69(1):9\u201315","journal-title":"Am Math Mon"},{"issue":"5","key":"1578_CR17","first-page":"1921","volume":"144","author":"G Haeringer","year":"2009","unstructured":"Haeringer G, Klijn F (2009) Constrained school choice. J Econ Theory 144(5):1921\u20131947","journal-title":"Constrained school choice. J Econ Theory"},{"key":"1578_CR18","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Imamura K, Tomoeda K (2022) Measuring manipulability of matching mechanisms. Available at SSRN 4000419","DOI":"10.2139\/ssrn.4000419"},{"issue":"3","key":"1578_CR19","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"1297","DOI":"10.1162\/qjec.2010.125.3.1297","volume":"125","author":"O Kesten","year":"2010","unstructured":"Kesten O (2010) School choice with consent. Q J Econ 125(3):1297\u20131348","journal-title":"Q J Econ"},{"issue":"2","key":"1578_CR20","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"633","DOI":"10.3982\/ECTA7443","volume":"78","author":"F Kojima","year":"2010","unstructured":"Kojima F, Manea M (2010) Axioms for deferred acceptance. Econometrica 78(2):633\u2013653","journal-title":"Econometrica"},{"key":"1578_CR21","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Kwon H, Shorrer RI (2020) Justified-envy minimal mechanisms in school choice. Available at SSRN 3495266","DOI":"10.2139\/ssrn.3495266"},{"issue":"3","key":"1578_CR22","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"295","DOI":"10.1007\/BF01934199","volume":"10","author":"DG McVitie","year":"1970","unstructured":"McVitie DG, Wilson LB (1970) Stable marriage assignment for unequal sets. BIT Numer Math 10(3):295\u2013309","journal-title":"BIT Numer Math"},{"issue":"3","key":"1578_CR23","first-page":"899","volume":"6","author":"H Nie","year":"2007","unstructured":"Nie H (2007) A game-theoretical analysis of China\u2019s college admission mechanism. China Econ Q Beijing 6(3):899","journal-title":"China Econ Q Beijing"},{"issue":"2","key":"1578_CR24","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"199","DOI":"10.1257\/mic.1.2.199","volume":"1","author":"M Niederle","year":"2009","unstructured":"Niederle M, Roth AE (2009) Market culture: how rules governing exploding offers affect market performance. Am Econ J Microecon 1(2):199\u2013219","journal-title":"Am Econ J Microecon"},{"issue":"1","key":"1578_CR25","first-page":"99","volume":"98","author":"P Pathak","year":"2008","unstructured":"Pathak P, S\u00f6nmez T (2008) Levelling the playing field: strategic and sophisticated players in the Boston mechanism. Am Econ Rev 98(1):99\u2013123","journal-title":"Am Econ Rev"},{"issue":"1","key":"1578_CR26","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"80","DOI":"10.1257\/aer.103.1.80","volume":"103","author":"P Pathak","year":"2013","unstructured":"Pathak P, S\u00f6nmez T (2013) School admissions reform in Chicago and England: comparing mechanisms by their vulnerability to manipulation. Am Econ Rev 103(1):80\u2013106","journal-title":"Am Econ Rev"},{"key":"1578_CR27","first-page":"137","volume":"3","author":"A Romero-Medina","year":"1998","unstructured":"Romero-Medina A (1998) Implementation of stable solutions in a restricted matching market. Rev Econ Des 3:137\u2013147","journal-title":"Rev Econ Des"},{"key":"1578_CR28","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Romm A, Roth AE, Shorrer RI (2020) Stability vs. no justified envy. No Justified Envy (March 6, 2020)","DOI":"10.2139\/ssrn.3550122"},{"issue":"4","key":"1578_CR29","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"617","DOI":"10.1287\/moor.7.4.617","volume":"7","author":"AE Roth","year":"1982","unstructured":"Roth AE (1982) The economics of matching: stability and incentives. Math Oper Res 7(4):617\u2013628","journal-title":"Math Oper Res"},{"issue":"2","key":"1578_CR30","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"277","DOI":"10.1016\/0022-0531(85)90106-1","volume":"36","author":"AE Roth","year":"1985","unstructured":"Roth AE (1985) The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem. J Econ Theory 36(2):277\u2013288","journal-title":"J Econ Theory"},{"key":"1578_CR31","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"425","DOI":"10.2307\/1913160","volume":"54","author":"AE Roth","year":"1986","unstructured":"Roth AE (1986) On the allocation of residents to rural hospitals: a general property of two-sided matching markets. Econometr J Econometr Soc 54:425\u2013427","journal-title":"Econometr J Econometr Soc"},{"issue":"2","key":"1578_CR32","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"284","DOI":"10.1086\/262074","volume":"105","author":"AE Roth","year":"1997","unstructured":"Roth AE, Xing X (1997) Turnaround time and bottlenecks in market clearing: decentralized matching in the market for clinical psychologists. J Polit Econ 105(2):284\u2013329","journal-title":"J Polit Econ"},{"issue":"1","key":"1578_CR33","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"23","DOI":"10.1016\/0304-4068(74)90033-0","volume":"1","author":"L Shapley","year":"1974","unstructured":"Shapley L, Scarf H (1974) On cores and indivisibility. J Math Econ 1(1):23\u201337","journal-title":"J Math Econ"},{"issue":"2","key":"1578_CR34","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"533","DOI":"10.1007\/s00199-020-01255-3","volume":"71","author":"Q Tang","year":"2021","unstructured":"Tang Q, Zhang Y (2021) Weak stability and pareto efficiency in school choice. Econ Theor 71(2):533\u2013552","journal-title":"Econ Theor"},{"key":"1578_CR35","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"1","DOI":"10.1016\/j.geb.2020.05.007","volume":"123","author":"B Wu","year":"2020","unstructured":"Wu B, Zhong X (2020) Matching inequality and strategic behavior under the Boston mechanism: evidence from China\u2019s college admissions. Games Econom Behav 123:1\u201321","journal-title":"Games Econom Behav"}],"container-title":["Social Choice and Welfare"],"original-title":[],"language":"en","link":[{"URL":"https:\/\/link.springer.com\/content\/pdf\/10.1007\/s00355-024-01578-3.pdf","content-type":"application\/pdf","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"text-mining"},{"URL":"https:\/\/link.springer.com\/article\/10.1007\/s00355-024-01578-3\/fulltext.html","content-type":"text\/html","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"text-mining"},{"URL":"https:\/\/link.springer.com\/content\/pdf\/10.1007\/s00355-024-01578-3.pdf","content-type":"application\/pdf","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"similarity-checking"}],"deposited":{"date-parts":[[2025,9,26]],"date-time":"2025-09-26T07:35:31Z","timestamp":1758872131000},"score":1,"resource":{"primary":{"URL":"https:\/\/link.springer.com\/10.1007\/s00355-024-01578-3"}},"subtitle":[],"short-title":[],"issued":{"date-parts":[[2025,2,1]]},"references-count":35,"journal-issue":{"issue":"2","published-print":{"date-parts":[[2025,9]]}},"alternative-id":["1578"],"URL":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/s00355-024-01578-3","relation":{},"ISSN":["0176-1714","1432-217X"],"issn-type":[{"value":"0176-1714","type":"print"},{"value":"1432-217X","type":"electronic"}],"subject":[],"published":{"date-parts":[[2025,2,1]]},"assertion":[{"value":"13 August 2023","order":1,"name":"received","label":"Received","group":{"name":"ArticleHistory","label":"Article History"}},{"value":"8 November 2024","order":2,"name":"accepted","label":"Accepted","group":{"name":"ArticleHistory","label":"Article History"}},{"value":"1 February 2025","order":3,"name":"first_online","label":"First Online","group":{"name":"ArticleHistory","label":"Article History"}}]}}