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Although agents are either selfish or honest, they do not expect other participants to be honest. However, an honest agent may exist not among participants but in their higher-order beliefs. We assume that \u201call agents are selfish\u201d never happens to be common knowledge. We show a positive result in general asymmetric information environments, demonstrating that with a minor restriction on signal correlation called information diversity, any incentive-compatible social choice function, whether ethical or nonethical, is uniquely implementable in the Bayesian Nash equilibrium.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1007\/s00355-025-01592-z","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2025,4,21]],"date-time":"2025-04-21T10:14:08Z","timestamp":1745230448000},"page":"1017-1038","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/springer_crossmark_policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":1,"title":["Honesty and epistemological implementation of social choice functions with asymmetric information"],"prefix":"10.1007","volume":"65","author":[{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0001-9763-5464","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Hitoshi","family":"Matsushima","sequence":"first","affiliation":[]}],"member":"297","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2025,4,21]]},"reference":[{"issue":"4","key":"1592_CR1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"1115","DOI":"10.3982\/ECTA14673","volume":"87","author":"J Abeler","year":"2019","unstructured":"Abeler J, Nosenzo D, Raymond C (2019) Preference for truth-telling. 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