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We show that when the candidate-specific uncertainty is sufficiently large, policy convergence becomes optimal. We also show that when these two types of uncertainty co-exist, only purely office-motivated parties result in policy convergence, in other words, any level of policy motivation of parties results in some policy divergence, making policy motivation undesirable when candidate-specific uncertainty is sufficiently large.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1007\/s00355-025-01595-w","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2025,4,15]],"date-time":"2025-04-15T10:56:15Z","timestamp":1744714575000},"page":"959-982","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/springer_crossmark_policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":0,"title":["How does political uncertainty affect the optimal degree of policy divergence?"],"prefix":"10.1007","volume":"65","author":[{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0003-3027-5999","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"R. 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