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We introduce a necessary condition relating to the jurors\u2019 enemies for implementing the deserving winner, called minimal impartiality. The mechanisms proposed in the literature to implement the deserving winner via backward induction fail when jurors have enemies, even though minimal impartiality is satisfied. We propose a simple sequential mechanism that successfully implements the deserving winner via backward induction, whether the jurors have enemies or not, as long as minimal impartiality is satisfied.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1007\/s00355-025-01600-2","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2025,4,14]],"date-time":"2025-04-14T12:09:21Z","timestamp":1744632561000},"page":"927-957","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/springer_crossmark_policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":1,"title":["Eliciting the deserving winner in the presence of enemies"],"prefix":"10.1007","volume":"65","author":[{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0001-7269-6981","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Pablo","family":"Amor\u00f3s","sequence":"first","affiliation":[]}],"member":"297","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2025,4,14]]},"reference":[{"key":"1600_CR1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"508","DOI":"10.1016\/j.geb.2014.07.003","volume":"87","author":"T Adachi","year":"2014","unstructured":"Adachi T (2014) A natural mechanism for eliciting rankings when jurors have favorites. 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