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The structure of the game features an instantaneous payoff which is at least cubic, and state equations linear in states and controls. The model can be used to illustrate games in the field of industrial organization and management, involving advertising campaigns under product differentiation and either quantity or price competition.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1007\/s10100-025-00965-0","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2025,3,16]],"date-time":"2025-03-16T12:37:46Z","timestamp":1742128666000},"page":"375-389","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/springer_crossmark_policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":0,"title":["On a class of state-redundant differential games"],"prefix":"10.1007","volume":"33","author":[{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0001-6353-4753","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Luca","family":"Lambertini","sequence":"first","affiliation":[]},{"given":"Arsen","family":"Palestini","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[]}],"member":"297","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2025,3,16]]},"reference":[{"key":"965_CR1","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","DOI":"10.7551\/mitpress\/2450.001.0001","volume-title":"Discrete choice theory of product differentiation","author":"S Anderson","year":"1992","unstructured":"Anderson S, de Palma A, Thisse J-F (1992) Discrete choice theory of product differentiation. 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