{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2025,2,21]],"date-time":"2025-02-21T07:16:15Z","timestamp":1740122175702,"version":"3.37.3"},"reference-count":44,"publisher":"Springer Science and Business Media LLC","issue":"2","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2020,6,19]],"date-time":"2020-06-19T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1592524800000},"content-version":"tdm","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/www.springer.com\/tdm"},{"start":{"date-parts":[[2020,6,19]],"date-time":"2020-06-19T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1592524800000},"content-version":"vor","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/www.springer.com\/tdm"}],"funder":[{"DOI":"10.13039\/501100003977","name":"Israel Science Foundation","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","award":["1162\/17"],"award-info":[{"award-number":["1162\/17"]}],"id":[{"id":"10.13039\/501100003977","id-type":"DOI","asserted-by":"publisher"}]}],"content-domain":{"domain":["link.springer.com"],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":["Auton Agent Multi-Agent Syst"],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2020,10]]},"DOI":"10.1007\/s10458-020-09469-4","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2020,6,19]],"date-time":"2020-06-19T09:02:49Z","timestamp":1592557369000},"update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/springer_crossmark_policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":2,"title":["Obtaining costly unverifiable valuations from a single agent"],"prefix":"10.1007","volume":"34","author":[{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0002-7497-5834","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Erel","family":"Segal-Halevi","sequence":"first","affiliation":[]},{"given":"Shani","family":"Alkoby","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[]},{"given":"David","family":"Sarne","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[]}],"member":"297","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2020,6,19]]},"reference":[{"issue":"3","key":"9469_CR1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"488","DOI":"10.2307\/1879431","volume":"84","author":"GA Akerlof","year":"1970","unstructured":"Akerlof, G. A. (1970). The market for \u201clemons\u201d: Quality uncertainty and the market mechanism. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 84(3), 488\u2013500.","journal-title":"The Quarterly Journal of Economics"},{"key":"9469_CR2","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Alkoby, S., & Sarne, D. (2015). Strategic free information disclosure for a Vickrey auction. In International workshop on agent-mediated electronic commerce and trading agents design and analysis (pp. 1\u201318). Cham: Springer.","DOI":"10.1007\/978-3-319-54229-4_1"},{"key":"9469_CR3","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Alkoby, S., & Sarne, D. (2017). The benefit in free information disclosure when selling information to people. In AAAI (pp. 985\u2013992).","DOI":"10.1609\/aaai.v31i1.10630"},{"key":"9469_CR4","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Alkoby, S., Sarne, D., & David, E. (2014). Manipulating information providers access to information in auctions. In Technologies and applications of artificial intelligence (pp. 14\u201325). Cham: Springer.","DOI":"10.1007\/978-3-319-13987-6_2"},{"key":"9469_CR5","unstructured":"Alkoby, S., Sarne, D., & Das, S. (2015). Strategic free information disclosure for search-based information platforms. In Proceedings of the 2015 international conference on autonomous agents and multiagent systems (pp. 635\u2013643)."},{"key":"9469_CR6","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Alkoby, S., Sarne, D., & Milchtaich, I. (2017). Strategic signaling and free information disclosure in auctions. In AAAI (pp. 319\u2013327).","DOI":"10.1609\/aaai.v31i1.10609"},{"key":"9469_CR7","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"17","DOI":"10.1016\/j.euroecorev.2013.03.008","volume":"62","author":"O Armantier","year":"2013","unstructured":"Armantier, O., & Treich, N. (2013). Eliciting beliefs: Proper scoring rules, incentives, stakes and hedging. European Economic Review, 62, 17\u201340.","journal-title":"European Economic Review"},{"key":"9469_CR8","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Babaioff, M., Kleinberg, R., & Paes\u00a0Leme, R. (2012). Optimal mechanisms for selling information. In Proceedings of the 13th ACM conference on electronic commerce pp. (92\u2013109). New York: ACM.","DOI":"10.1145\/2229012.2229024"},{"issue":"4","key":"9469_CR9","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"911","DOI":"10.2307\/1912769","volume":"50","author":"P Baron","year":"1982","unstructured":"Baron, P., & Myerson, R. B. (1982). Regulating a monopolist with unknown costs. Econometrica, 50(4), 911\u2013930.","journal-title":"Econometrica"},{"issue":"2","key":"9469_CR10","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"140","DOI":"10.1016\/j.econlet.2009.11.006","volume":"106","author":"L Barrage","year":"2010","unstructured":"Barrage, L., & Lee, M. S. (2010). A penny for your thoughts: Inducing truth-telling in stated preference elicitation. Economics Letters, 106(2), 140\u2013142.","journal-title":"Economics Letters"},{"issue":"12","key":"9469_CR11","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"3779","DOI":"10.1257\/aer.104.12.3779","volume":"104","author":"E Ben-Porath","year":"2014","unstructured":"Ben-Porath, E., Dekel, E., & Lipman, B. L. (2014). Optimal allocation with costly verification. The American Economic Review, 104(12), 3779\u20133813.","journal-title":"The American Economic Review"},{"key":"9469_CR12","volume-title":"Contract theory","author":"P Bolton","year":"2005","unstructured":"Bolton, P., Dewatripont, M., et al. (2005). Contract theory. Cambridge: MIT."},{"issue":"2","key":"9469_CR13","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"5","DOI":"10.1145\/2594564","volume":"2","author":"Y Emek","year":"2014","unstructured":"Emek, Y., Feldman, M., Gamzu, I., PaesLeme, R., & Tennenholtz, M. (2014). Signaling schemes for revenue maximization. ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation, 2(2), 5.","journal-title":"ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation"},{"issue":"2","key":"9469_CR14","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"1","DOI":"10.2200\/S00788ED1V01Y201707AIM035","volume":"11","author":"B Faltings","year":"2017","unstructured":"Faltings, B., & Radanovic, G. (2017). Game theory for data science: Eliciting truthful information. Synthesis Lectures on Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning, 11(2), 1\u2013151.","journal-title":"Synthesis Lectures on Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning"},{"issue":"6","key":"9469_CR15","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"1715","DOI":"10.1111\/j.1468-0262.2004.00551.x","volume":"72","author":"J Glazer","year":"2004","unstructured":"Glazer, J., & Rubinstein, A. (2004). On optimal rules of persuasion. Econometrica, 72(6), 1715\u20131736.","journal-title":"Econometrica"},{"issue":"3","key":"9469_CR16","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"447","DOI":"10.2307\/2297639","volume":"53","author":"JR Green","year":"1986","unstructured":"Green, J. R., & Laffont, J. J. (1986). Partially verifiable information and mechanism design. The Review of Economic Studies, 53(3), 447\u2013456.","journal-title":"The Review of Economic Studies"},{"issue":"3","key":"9469_CR17","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"461","DOI":"10.1086\/466995","volume":"24","author":"SJ Grossman","year":"1981","unstructured":"Grossman, S. J. (1981). The informational role of warranties and private disclosure about product quality. The Journal of Law and Economics, 24(3), 461\u2013483.","journal-title":"The Journal of Law and Economics"},{"issue":"2","key":"9469_CR18","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"323","DOI":"10.1111\/j.1540-6261.1980.tb02161.x","volume":"35","author":"SJ Grossman","year":"1980","unstructured":"Grossman, S. J., & Hart, O. D. (1980). Disclosure laws and takeover bids. The Journal of Finance, 35(2), 323\u2013334.","journal-title":"The Journal of Finance"},{"issue":"5","key":"9469_CR19","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"1133","DOI":"10.1007\/s10458-016-9357-1","volume":"31","author":"C Hajaj","year":"2017","unstructured":"Hajaj, C., & Sarne, D. (2017). Selective opportunity disclosure at the service of strategic information platforms. Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, 31(5), 1133\u20131164.","journal-title":"Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems"},{"key":"9469_CR20","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Hajaj, C., Dickerson, J. P., Hassidim, A., Sandholm, T., & Sarne, D. (2015). Strategy-proof and efficient kidney exchange using a credit mechanism. In Twenty-Ninth AAAI conference on artificial intelligence.","DOI":"10.1609\/aaai.v29i1.9322"},{"issue":"3","key":"9469_CR21","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"690","DOI":"10.1257\/aer.20150913","volume":"107","author":"S Hart","year":"2017","unstructured":"Hart, S., Kremer, I., & Perry, M. (2017). Evidence games: Truth and commitment. American Economic Review, 107(3), 690\u2013713.","journal-title":"American Economic Review"},{"key":"9469_CR22","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"313","DOI":"10.1016\/j.jet.2017.09.001","volume":"172","author":"S Hart","year":"2017","unstructured":"Hart, S., & Nisan, N. (2017). Approximate revenue maximization with multiple items. Journal of Economic Theory, 172, 313\u2013347.","journal-title":"Journal of Economic Theory"},{"issue":"2","key":"9469_CR23","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"315","DOI":"10.1007\/BF01212920","volume":"3","author":"DB Hausch","year":"1993","unstructured":"Hausch, D. B., & Li, L. (1993). A common value auction model with endogenous entry and information acquisition. Economic Theory, 3(2), 315\u2013334.","journal-title":"Economic Theory"},{"issue":"2","key":"9469_CR24","first-page":"234","volume":"83","author":"K Hendricks","year":"1993","unstructured":"Hendricks, K., Porter, R. H., & Tan, G. (1993). Optimal selling strategies for oil and gas leases with an informed buyer. The American Economic Review, 83(2), 234\u2013239.","journal-title":"The American Economic Review"},{"key":"9469_CR25","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"1415","DOI":"10.2307\/2951754","volume":"62","author":"K Hendricks","year":"1994","unstructured":"Hendricks, K., Porter, R. H., & Wilson, C. A. (1994). Auctions for oil and gas leases with an informed bidder and a random reservation price. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 62, 1415\u20131444.","journal-title":"Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society"},{"issue":"3","key":"9469_CR26","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"984","DOI":"10.1093\/restud\/rdt006","volume":"80","author":"T Hossain","year":"2013","unstructured":"Hossain, T., & Okui, R. (2013). The binarized scoring rule. Review of Economic Studies, 80(3), 984\u20131001.","journal-title":"Review of Economic Studies"},{"issue":"5","key":"9469_CR27","first-page":"894","volume":"76","author":"JH Kagel","year":"1986","unstructured":"Kagel, J. H., & Levin, D. (1986). The winner\u2019s curse and public information in common value auctions. The American Economic Review, 76(5), 894\u2013920.","journal-title":"The American Economic Review"},{"issue":"1","key":"9469_CR28","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"2:1","DOI":"10.1145\/3296670","volume":"7","author":"Y Kong","year":"2019","unstructured":"Kong, Y., & Schoenebeck, G. (2019). An information theoretic framework for designing information elicitation mechanisms that reward truth-telling. ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation, 7(1), 2:1\u20132:33.","journal-title":"ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation"},{"issue":"1","key":"9469_CR29","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"153","DOI":"10.1016\/j.jet.2006.12.007","volume":"137","author":"AM Manelli","year":"2007","unstructured":"Manelli, A. M., & Vincent, D. R. (2007). Multidimensional mechanism design: Revenue maximization and the multiple-good monopoly. Journal of Economic Theory, 137(1), 153\u2013185.","journal-title":"Journal of Economic Theory"},{"issue":"4","key":"9469_CR30","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"854","DOI":"10.1086\/250032","volume":"106","author":"B Moldovanu","year":"1998","unstructured":"Moldovanu, B., & Tietzel, M. (1998). Goethe\u2019s second-price auction. Journal of Political Economy, 106(4), 854\u2013859.","journal-title":"Journal of Political Economy"},{"issue":"6","key":"9469_CR31","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"1629","DOI":"10.1111\/1468-0262.00259","volume":"69","author":"G Moscarini","year":"2001","unstructured":"Moscarini, G., & Smith, L. (2001). The optimal level of experimentation. Econometrica, 69(6), 1629\u20131644.","journal-title":"Econometrica"},{"issue":"4","key":"9469_CR32","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"1461","DOI":"10.1111\/j.1467-937X.2009.00557.x","volume":"76","author":"T Offerman","year":"2009","unstructured":"Offerman, T., Sonnemans, J., Van de Kuilen, G., & Wakker, P. P. (2009). A truth serum for non-Bayesians: Correcting proper scoring rules for risk attitudes. The Review of Economic Studies, 76(4), 1461\u20131489.","journal-title":"The Review of Economic Studies"},{"issue":"1","key":"9469_CR33","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"135","DOI":"10.1111\/1468-0262.00096","volume":"68","author":"N Persico","year":"2000","unstructured":"Persico, N. (2000). Information acquisition in auctions. Econometrica, 68(1), 135\u2013148.","journal-title":"Econometrica"},{"issue":"1","key":"9469_CR34","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"1","DOI":"10.2307\/2951695","volume":"63","author":"RH Porter","year":"1995","unstructured":"Porter, R. H. (1995). The role of information in us offshore oil and gas lease auction. Econometrica, 63(1), 1\u201327.","journal-title":"Econometrica"},{"issue":"5695","key":"9469_CR35","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"462","DOI":"10.1126\/science.1102081","volume":"306","author":"D Prelec","year":"2004","unstructured":"Prelec, D. (2004). A Bayesian truth serum for subjective data. Science, 306(5695), 462\u2013466.","journal-title":"Science"},{"issue":"4","key":"9469_CR36","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"48:1","DOI":"10.1145\/2856102","volume":"7","author":"G Radanovic","year":"2016","unstructured":"Radanovic, G., Faltings, B., & Jurca, R. (2016). Incentives for effort in crowdsourcing using the peer truth serum. ACM Transactions on Intelligent Systems and Technology, 7(4), 48:1\u201348:28.","journal-title":"ACM Transactions on Intelligent Systems and Technology"},{"key":"9469_CR37","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"24","DOI":"10.1016\/j.artint.2014.05.008","volume":"215","author":"D Sarne","year":"2014","unstructured":"Sarne, D., Alkoby, S., & David, E. (2014). On the choice of obtaining and disclosing the common value in auctions. Artificial Intelligence, 215, 24\u201354.","journal-title":"Artificial Intelligence"},{"key":"9469_CR38","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Segal-Halevi, E., Alkoby, S., Sharbaf, T., & Sarne, D. (2019). Obtaining costly unverifiable valuations from a single agent. In AAMAS (pp. 1216\u20131224).","DOI":"10.1007\/s10458-020-09469-4"},{"issue":"1","key":"9469_CR39","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"8","DOI":"10.1111\/j.1540-6261.1961.tb02789.x","volume":"16","author":"W Vickrey","year":"1961","unstructured":"Vickrey, W. (1961). Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed tenders. The Journal of Finance, 16(1), 8\u201337.","journal-title":"The Journal of Finance"},{"key":"9469_CR40","unstructured":"Waggoner, B., & Chen, Y. (2013). Information elicitation sans verification. In Proceedings of the 3rd workshop on social computing and user generated content (SC13)."},{"issue":"3","key":"9469_CR41","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"289","DOI":"10.1509\/jmr.09.0039","volume":"50","author":"R Weaver","year":"2013","unstructured":"Weaver, R., & Prelec, D. (2013). Creating truth-telling incentives with the Bayesian truth serum. Journal of Marketing Research, 50(3), 289\u2013302.","journal-title":"Journal of Marketing Research"},{"issue":"3","key":"9469_CR42","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"641","DOI":"10.2307\/1910412","volume":"47","author":"ML Weitzman","year":"1979","unstructured":"Weitzman, M. L. (1979). Optimal search for the best alternative. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 47(3), 641\u2013654.","journal-title":"Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society"},{"issue":"4","key":"9469_CR43","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"543","DOI":"10.1007\/s00285-009-0274-7","volume":"60","author":"DD Wiegmann","year":"2010","unstructured":"Wiegmann, D. D., Weinersmith, K. L., & Seubert, S. M. (2010). Multi-attribute mate choice decisions and uncertainty in the decision process: A generalized sequential search strategy. Journal of Mathematical Biology, 60(4), 543\u2013572.","journal-title":"Journal of Mathematical Biology"},{"key":"9469_CR44","unstructured":"Witkowski, J., & Parkes, D. C. (2012). A robust Bayesian truth serum for small populations. In AAAI."}],"container-title":["Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems"],"original-title":[],"language":"en","link":[{"URL":"https:\/\/link.springer.com\/content\/pdf\/10.1007\/s10458-020-09469-4.pdf","content-type":"application\/pdf","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"text-mining"},{"URL":"https:\/\/link.springer.com\/article\/10.1007\/s10458-020-09469-4\/fulltext.html","content-type":"text\/html","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"text-mining"},{"URL":"https:\/\/link.springer.com\/content\/pdf\/10.1007\/s10458-020-09469-4.pdf","content-type":"application\/pdf","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"similarity-checking"}],"deposited":{"date-parts":[[2022,10,29]],"date-time":"2022-10-29T12:23:22Z","timestamp":1667046202000},"score":1,"resource":{"primary":{"URL":"https:\/\/link.springer.com\/10.1007\/s10458-020-09469-4"}},"subtitle":[],"short-title":[],"issued":{"date-parts":[[2020,6,19]]},"references-count":44,"journal-issue":{"issue":"2","published-print":{"date-parts":[[2020,10]]}},"alternative-id":["9469"],"URL":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/s10458-020-09469-4","relation":{},"ISSN":["1387-2532","1573-7454"],"issn-type":[{"type":"print","value":"1387-2532"},{"type":"electronic","value":"1573-7454"}],"subject":[],"published":{"date-parts":[[2020,6,19]]},"assertion":[{"value":"19 June 2020","order":1,"name":"first_online","label":"First Online","group":{"name":"ArticleHistory","label":"Article History"}}],"article-number":"46"}}