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We investigate<jats:sc>Stable Roommates<\/jats:sc>with complete (i.e., every agent can be matched with any other agent) or incomplete preferences, with ties (i.e., two agents are considered of equal value to some agent) or without ties. It is known that in general allowing ties makes the problem NP-complete. We provide algorithms for<jats:sc>Stable Roommates<\/jats:sc>that are, compared to those in the literature, more efficient when the input preferences are complete and have some structural property, such as being narcissistic, single-peaked, and single-crossing. However, when the preferences are incomplete and have ties, we show that being single-peaked and single-crossing does not reduce the computational complexity\u2014<jats:sc>Stable Roommates<\/jats:sc>remains NP-complete.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1007\/s10458-020-09470-x","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2020,9,11]],"date-time":"2020-09-11T07:03:07Z","timestamp":1599807787000},"update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/springer_crossmark_policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":11,"title":["Stable roommates with narcissistic, single-peaked, and single-crossing preferences"],"prefix":"10.1007","volume":"34","author":[{"given":"Robert","family":"Bredereck","sequence":"first","affiliation":[]},{"given":"Jiehua","family":"Chen","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[]},{"given":"Ugo Paavo","family":"Finnendahl","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[]},{"given":"Rolf","family":"Niedermeier","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[]}],"member":"297","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2020,9,11]]},"reference":[{"key":"9470_CR1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"1","DOI":"10.1016\/j.tcs.2018.03.015","volume":"723","author":"D Adil","year":"2018","unstructured":"Adil, D., Gupta, S., Roy, S., Saurabh, S., & Zehavi, M. 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