{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2026,1,13]],"date-time":"2026-01-13T06:00:11Z","timestamp":1768284011930,"version":"3.49.0"},"reference-count":13,"publisher":"Springer Science and Business Media LLC","issue":"1","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2024,3,11]],"date-time":"2024-03-11T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1710115200000},"content-version":"tdm","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/creativecommons.org\/licenses\/by\/4.0"},{"start":{"date-parts":[[2024,3,11]],"date-time":"2024-03-11T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1710115200000},"content-version":"vor","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/creativecommons.org\/licenses\/by\/4.0"}],"content-domain":{"domain":["link.springer.com"],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":["Ann Oper Res"],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2026,1]]},"abstract":"<jats:title>Abstract<\/jats:title>\n                  <jats:p>This paper analyzes bankruptcy problems from a strategic perspective using the parameterized TAL family of bankruptcy rules. We construct a strategic game where every player selects a parameter, and the rule from the TAL family that corresponds to the mean of the chosen parameters is used to divide the estate. We prove the existence of Nash equilibria for this strategic game. In particular, we provide the set of all Nash equilibria for two players, and for more players, we prove existence by constructing a Nash equilibrium of a particular form based on the notion of a pivotal player.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1007\/s10479-024-05906-9","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2024,3,11]],"date-time":"2024-03-11T10:12:20Z","timestamp":1710151940000},"page":"85-104","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/springer_crossmark_policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":1,"title":["A strategic approach to bankruptcy problems based on the TAL family of rules"],"prefix":"10.1007","volume":"356","author":[{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0002-8146-0636","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Dirck","family":"Bouwhuis","sequence":"first","affiliation":[],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]},{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0002-2710-1827","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Peter","family":"Borm","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]},{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0002-4976-025X","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Ruud","family":"Hendrickx","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]}],"member":"297","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2024,3,11]]},"reference":[{"issue":"2","key":"5906_CR1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"195","DOI":"10.1016\/0022-0531(85)90102-4","volume":"36","author":"RJ Aumann","year":"1985","unstructured":"Aumann, R. 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International Journal of Economic Theory, 18(1), 92\u2013102.","journal-title":"International Journal of Economic Theory"},{"key":"5906_CR9","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"231","DOI":"10.1007\/s00355-006-0121-3","volume":"27","author":"JD Moreno-Ternero","year":"2006","unstructured":"Moreno-Ternero, J. D., & Villar, A. (2006). The TAL-family of rules for bankruptcy problems. Social Choice and Welfare, 27, 231\u2013249.","journal-title":"Social Choice and Welfare"},{"issue":"2","key":"5906_CR10","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"286","DOI":"10.2307\/1969529","volume":"54","author":"J Nash","year":"1951","unstructured":"Nash, J. (1951). Non-cooperative games. Annals of Mathematics, 54(2), 286\u2013295.","journal-title":"Annals of Mathematics"},{"issue":"4","key":"5906_CR11","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"345","DOI":"10.1016\/0165-4896(82)90029-4","volume":"2","author":"B O\u2019Neill","year":"1982","unstructured":"O\u2019Neill, B. (1982). A problem of rights arbitration from the Talmud. Mathematical Social Sciences, 2(4), 345\u2013371.","journal-title":"Mathematical Social Sciences"},{"issue":"1","key":"5906_CR12","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"35","DOI":"10.1007\/s13209-020-00221-5","volume":"12","author":"R Serrano","year":"2021","unstructured":"Serrano, R. (2021). Sixty-seven years of the Nash program: Time for retirement? SERIEs, 12(1), 35\u201348.","journal-title":"SERIEs"},{"key":"5906_CR13","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Thomson, W. (2019). How to divide when there isn\u2019t enough: From Aristotle, the Talmud, and Maimonides to the axiomatics of resource allocation. Econometric Society Monographs. 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