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The generality of the result obtained allows to get an analogous result for social choice correspondences: for any given set of preference profiles satisfying suitable conditions, the net-oudegree social choice correspondence, the net-indegree social choice correspondence and the total social choice correspondence are the unique social choice correspondences on that set satisfying neutrality, consistency and cancellation. Using the notable fact that several well-known voting rules coincide with the restriction of the net-outdegree social choice correspondence to appropriate sets of preference profiles, we are able to deduce a variety of new and known characterization theorems for the Borda rule, the Partial Borda rule, the Averaged Borda rule, the Approval Voting, the Plurality rule and the anti-Plurality rule, among which Young\u2019s characterization of the Borda rule and Fishburn\u2019s characterization of the Approval Voting.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1007\/s10479-025-06593-w","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2025,5,2]],"date-time":"2025-05-02T17:32:24Z","timestamp":1746207144000},"page":"1501-1552","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/springer_crossmark_policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":1,"title":["A generalization to networks of Young\u2019s characterization of the Borda rule"],"prefix":"10.1007","volume":"349","author":[{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0002-1639-9525","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Daniela","family":"Bubboloni","sequence":"first","affiliation":[],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]},{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0003-3274-041X","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Michele","family":"Gori","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]}],"member":"297","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2025,5,2]]},"reference":[{"key":"6593_CR1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"621","DOI":"10.1007\/s00355-006-0145-8","volume":"27","author":"C Al\u00f3s-Ferrer","year":"2006","unstructured":"Al\u00f3s-Ferrer, C. 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