{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2025,2,21]],"date-time":"2025-02-21T07:19:36Z","timestamp":1740122376555,"version":"3.37.3"},"reference-count":22,"publisher":"Springer Science and Business Media LLC","issue":"1","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2021,4,30]],"date-time":"2021-04-30T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1619740800000},"content-version":"tdm","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/www.springer.com\/tdm"},{"start":{"date-parts":[[2021,4,30]],"date-time":"2021-04-30T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1619740800000},"content-version":"vor","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/www.springer.com\/tdm"}],"funder":[{"DOI":"10.13039\/501100001809","name":"National Natural Science Foundation of China","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","award":["71701076","72031009","71871171"],"award-info":[{"award-number":["71701076","72031009","71871171"]}],"id":[{"id":"10.13039\/501100001809","id-type":"DOI","asserted-by":"publisher"}]},{"DOI":"10.13039\/100009377","name":"Education Department of Hunan Province","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","award":["17C1282"],"award-info":[{"award-number":["17C1282"]}],"id":[{"id":"10.13039\/100009377","id-type":"DOI","asserted-by":"publisher"}]}],"content-domain":{"domain":["link.springer.com"],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":["J Comb Optim"],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2022,1]]},"DOI":"10.1007\/s10878-021-00727-z","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2021,4,30]],"date-time":"2021-04-30T13:04:06Z","timestamp":1619787846000},"page":"98-115","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/springer_crossmark_policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":1,"title":["A new allocation rule for the housing market problem with ties"],"prefix":"10.1007","volume":"43","author":[{"given":"Xinsheng","family":"Xiong","sequence":"first","affiliation":[]},{"given":"Xianjia","family":"Wang","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[]},{"given":"Kun","family":"He","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[]}],"member":"297","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2021,4,30]]},"reference":[{"key":"727_CR1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"1954","DOI":"10.1257\/aer.99.5.1954","volume":"99","author":"A Abdulkadiro\u011flu","year":"2009","unstructured":"Abdulkadiro\u011flu A, Pathak PA, Roth AE (2009) Strategy-proofness versus efficiency in matching with indifferences: redesigning the NYC high school match. Amer Econ Rev 99:1954\u20131978","journal-title":"Amer Econ Rev"},{"key":"727_CR2","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"729","DOI":"10.1257\/000282803322157061","volume":"93","author":"A Abdulkadiro\u011flu","year":"2003","unstructured":"Abdulkadiro\u011flu A, S\u04e7nmez T (2003) School choice: a mechanism design approach. Am Econ Rev 93:729\u2013747","journal-title":"Am Econ Rev"},{"key":"727_CR3","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"1","DOI":"10.1016\/j.geb.2010.12.005","volume":"73","author":"J Alcalde-Unzu","year":"2011","unstructured":"Alcalde-Unzu J, Molis E (2011) Exchange of indivisible goods and indifferences: the top trading absorbing sets mechanisms. Game Econ Behav 73:1\u201316","journal-title":"Game Econ Behav"},{"key":"727_CR4","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"26","DOI":"10.1287\/inte.2014.0766","volume":"45","author":"R Anderson","year":"2015","unstructured":"Anderson R, Ashlagi I et al (2015) Kidney Exchange and the alliance for paired donation: operations research changes the way kidneys are transplanted. Interfaces 45:26\u201342","journal-title":"Interfaces"},{"key":"727_CR5","unstructured":"Aziz H, Keijzer B (2016) Housing markets with indifferences: a tale of two mechanisms. In: Proceedings of the twenty-sixth AAAI conference on artificial intelligence 2012, pp 1249\u20131255"},{"key":"727_CR6","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"309","DOI":"10.1016\/0165-1765(84)90003-X","volume":"14","author":"CG Bird","year":"1984","unstructured":"Bird CG (1984) Group incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods. Econ Lett 14:309\u2013313","journal-title":"Econ Lett"},{"key":"727_CR7","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Ding T, Schotter A (2016) Matching and chatting: an experimental study of the impact of network communication on school-matching mechanisms. Game Econ Behav","DOI":"10.1016\/j.geb.2016.02.004"},{"key":"727_CR8","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"64","DOI":"10.1016\/j.jet.2013.12.011","volume":"151","author":"L Ehlers","year":"2014","unstructured":"Ehlers L (2014) Top trading with fixed tie-breaking in markets with indivisible goods. J Econ Theory 151:64\u201387","journal-title":"J Econ Theory"},{"key":"727_CR9","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"1","DOI":"10.1145\/2377677.2377679","volume":"42","author":"A Ghodsi","year":"2012","unstructured":"Ghodsi A, Sekar V et al (2012) Multi-resource fair queueing for packet processing. Proc. SIGCOMM 42:1\u201312","journal-title":"Proc. SIGCOMM"},{"key":"727_CR10","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"333","DOI":"10.1111\/tri.12202","volume":"27","author":"K Glorie","year":"2014","unstructured":"Glorie K, Haase-Kromwijk B et al (2014) Allocation and matching in kidney exchange programs. Transpl Int 27:333\u2013343","journal-title":"Transpl Int"},{"key":"727_CR11","first-page":"280","volume":"15","author":"W Huh","year":"2013","unstructured":"Huh W, Liu N, Truong VA (2013) Multiresource allocation scheduling in dynamic environments. M & Som-Manuf Serv Op 15:280\u2013291","journal-title":"M & Som-Manuf Serv Op"},{"key":"727_CR12","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"1913","DOI":"10.1016\/j.jet.2012.05.017","volume":"147","author":"P Jaramillo","year":"2012","unstructured":"Jaramillo P, Manjunath V (2012) The difference indifference makes in strategy-proof allocation of objects. J Econ Theory 147:1913\u20131946","journal-title":"J Econ Theory"},{"key":"727_CR13","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"75","DOI":"10.1007\/BF01242849","volume":"23","author":"J Ma","year":"1994","unstructured":"Ma J (1994) Strategy-proofness and strict core in a market with indivisibilities. Int J Game Theory 23:75\u201383","journal-title":"Int J Game Theory"},{"key":"727_CR14","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"347","DOI":"10.1006\/game.2001.0858","volume":"38","author":"E Miyagawa","year":"2002","unstructured":"Miyagawa E (2002) Strategy-proofness and the core in house allocation problems. Games Econ Behav 38:347\u2013361","journal-title":"Games Econ Behav"},{"key":"727_CR15","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"127","DOI":"10.1016\/0165-1765(82)90003-9","volume":"9","author":"AE Roth","year":"1982","unstructured":"Roth AE (1982) Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods. Econ Lett 9:127\u2013132","journal-title":"Econ Lett"},{"key":"727_CR16","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"131","DOI":"10.1016\/0304-4068(77)90004-0","volume":"4","author":"AE Roth","year":"1977","unstructured":"Roth AE, Postlewaite A (1977) Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods. J Math Econ 4:131\u2013137","journal-title":"J Math Econ"},{"key":"727_CR17","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"828","DOI":"10.1257\/aer.97.3.828","volume":"97","author":"AE Roth","year":"2007","unstructured":"Roth AE, S\u04e7nmez T, \u00dcver MU (2007) Efficient kidney exchange: coincidence of wants in markets with compatibility-based preferences. Am Econ Rev 97:828\u2013851","journal-title":"Am Econ Rev"},{"key":"727_CR18","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Saban D, Sethuraman J (2013) House allocation with indifferences: a generalizationand a unified view. In: Proceedings of the EC\u201913. ACM, 2013, pp 803\u2013820","DOI":"10.1145\/2492002.2482574"},{"key":"727_CR19","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"23","DOI":"10.1016\/0304-4068(74)90033-0","volume":"1","author":"L Shapley","year":"1974","unstructured":"Shapley L, Scarf H (1974) On cores and indivisibility. J Math Econ 1:23\u201337","journal-title":"J Math Econ"},{"key":"727_CR20","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"323","DOI":"10.1007\/BF00183301","volume":"11","author":"LG Svensson","year":"1994","unstructured":"Svensson LG (1994) Queue allocation of indivisible goods. Soc Choice Welfare 11:323\u2013330","journal-title":"Soc Choice Welfare"},{"key":"727_CR21","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"146","DOI":"10.1137\/0201010","volume":"1","author":"R Taijan","year":"1972","unstructured":"Taijan R (1972) Depth-first search and linear graph algorithms. SIAM J Comput 1:146\u2013160","journal-title":"SIAM J Comput"},{"key":"727_CR22","first-page":"1140","volume":"44","author":"XS Xiong","year":"2014","unstructured":"Xiong XS, He K, Zhao Y (2014) Mechanism design for the house allocation problem with indifferent houses and existing tenants. Sci China Inf Sci 44:1140\u20131155","journal-title":"Sci China Inf Sci"}],"container-title":["Journal of Combinatorial Optimization"],"original-title":[],"language":"en","link":[{"URL":"https:\/\/link.springer.com\/content\/pdf\/10.1007\/s10878-021-00727-z.pdf","content-type":"application\/pdf","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"text-mining"},{"URL":"https:\/\/link.springer.com\/article\/10.1007\/s10878-021-00727-z\/fulltext.html","content-type":"text\/html","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"text-mining"},{"URL":"https:\/\/link.springer.com\/content\/pdf\/10.1007\/s10878-021-00727-z.pdf","content-type":"application\/pdf","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"similarity-checking"}],"deposited":{"date-parts":[[2022,1,29]],"date-time":"2022-01-29T08:14:59Z","timestamp":1643444099000},"score":1,"resource":{"primary":{"URL":"https:\/\/link.springer.com\/10.1007\/s10878-021-00727-z"}},"subtitle":[],"short-title":[],"issued":{"date-parts":[[2021,4,30]]},"references-count":22,"journal-issue":{"issue":"1","published-print":{"date-parts":[[2022,1]]}},"alternative-id":["727"],"URL":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/s10878-021-00727-z","relation":{},"ISSN":["1382-6905","1573-2886"],"issn-type":[{"type":"print","value":"1382-6905"},{"type":"electronic","value":"1573-2886"}],"subject":[],"published":{"date-parts":[[2021,4,30]]},"assertion":[{"value":"31 March 2021","order":1,"name":"accepted","label":"Accepted","group":{"name":"ArticleHistory","label":"Article History"}},{"value":"30 April 2021","order":2,"name":"first_online","label":"First Online","group":{"name":"ArticleHistory","label":"Article History"}}]}}