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To properly understand the impact of the two capital stocks, we consider six information structures which differ in whether a firm takes into account that their competitor\u2019s strategy depends only on time or on one or both capital stocks. We find that if firms are aware that their own capital stock makes investments of the competitor more efficient, a firm would invest less. Due to this effect, information only pays off if it is taken into account by both competitors, because otherwise the less informed and therefore less cautious player invests more and has a higher capital stock and revenues in the long run.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1007\/s10957-022-02054-7","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2022,6,20]],"date-time":"2022-06-20T15:03:53Z","timestamp":1655737433000},"page":"878-895","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/springer_crossmark_policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":2,"title":["Asymmetric Information in a Capital Accumulation Differential Game with Spillover and Learning Effects"],"prefix":"10.1007","volume":"194","author":[{"given":"Gustav","family":"Feichtinger","sequence":"first","affiliation":[]},{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0002-0461-0979","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Richard F.","family":"Hartl","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[]},{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0001-5973-1981","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Peter M.","family":"Kort","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[]},{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0003-4882-5688","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Andrea","family":"Seidl","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[]},{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0002-3891-5471","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Stefan","family":"Wrzaczek","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[]}],"member":"297","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2022,6,20]]},"reference":[{"key":"2054_CR1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"79","DOI":"10.1007\/s10479-008-0320-7","volume":"164","author":"N Amrouche","year":"2008","unstructured":"Amrouche, N., Mart\u00edn-Herr\u00e1n, G., Zaccour, G.: Feedback Stackleberg equilibrium strategies when he private label competes with the national brand. 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