{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2025,2,21]],"date-time":"2025-02-21T07:45:13Z","timestamp":1740123913275,"version":"3.37.3"},"reference-count":29,"publisher":"Springer Science and Business Media LLC","issue":"4","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2023,2,14]],"date-time":"2023-02-14T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1676332800000},"content-version":"tdm","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/creativecommons.org\/licenses\/by\/4.0"},{"start":{"date-parts":[[2023,2,14]],"date-time":"2023-02-14T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1676332800000},"content-version":"vor","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/creativecommons.org\/licenses\/by\/4.0"}],"funder":[{"DOI":"10.13039\/501100001659","name":"Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","award":["459928802"],"award-info":[{"award-number":["459928802"]}],"id":[{"id":"10.13039\/501100001659","id-type":"DOI","asserted-by":"publisher"}]},{"DOI":"10.13039\/501100005722","name":"Ludwig-Maximilians-Universit\u00e4t M\u00fcnchen","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","id":[{"id":"10.13039\/501100005722","id-type":"DOI","asserted-by":"crossref"}]}],"content-domain":{"domain":["link.springer.com"],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":["J Philos Logic"],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2023,8]]},"abstract":"<jats:title>Abstract<\/jats:title><jats:p>In this paper we use proof-theoretic methods, specifically sequent calculi, admissibility of cut within them and the resultant subformula property, to examine a range of philosophically-motivated deontic logics. We show that for all of those logics it is a (meta)theorem that the Special Hume Thesis holds, namely that no purely normative conclusion follows non-trivially from purely descriptive premises (nor vice versa). In addition to its interest on its own, this also illustrates one way in which proof theory sheds light on philosophically substantial questions.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1007\/s10992-023-09701-y","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2023,2,17]],"date-time":"2023-02-17T06:19:59Z","timestamp":1676614799000},"page":"1149-1169","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/springer_crossmark_policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":0,"title":["Is, Ought, and Cut"],"prefix":"10.1007","volume":"52","author":[{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0002-0660-6527","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Norbert","family":"Gratzl","sequence":"first","affiliation":[],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]},{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0002-6331-4256","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Edi","family":"Pavlovi\u0107","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]}],"member":"297","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2023,2,14]]},"reference":[{"key":"9701_CR1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"53","DOI":"10.1007\/s10992-012-9253-3","volume":"43","author":"C Brown","year":"2014","unstructured":"Brown, C. (2014). Minding the Is-Ought gap. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 43, 53\u201369.","journal-title":"Journal of Philosophical Logic"},{"key":"9701_CR2","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1017\/CBO9780511621192","volume-title":"Modal logic: An introduction","author":"BF Chellas","year":"1980","unstructured":"Chellas, B. F. (1980). Modal logic: An introduction. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press."},{"key":"9701_CR3","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"625","DOI":"10.1007\/s10992-016-9413-y","volume":"46","author":"K Fine","year":"2017","unstructured":"Fine, K. (2017). Truth-maker content I. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 46, 625\u2013674.","journal-title":"Journal of Philosophical Logic"},{"key":"9701_CR4","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"675","DOI":"10.1007\/s10992-016-9419-5","volume":"46","author":"K Fine","year":"2017","unstructured":"Fine, K. (2017). Truth-maker content II. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 46, 675\u2013702.","journal-title":"Journal of Philosophical Logic"},{"issue":"2","key":"9701_CR5","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"887","DOI":"10.1007\/s11229-018-01996-8","volume":"198","author":"K Fine","year":"2021","unstructured":"Fine, K. (2021). Truthmaking and the Is\u2013Ought gap. Synthese, 198(2), 887\u2013914.","journal-title":"Synthese"},{"issue":"6","key":"9701_CR6","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"1351","DOI":"10.1007\/s10670-017-9879-1","volume":"82","author":"A Fuhrmann","year":"2017","unstructured":"Fuhrmann, A. (2017). Deontic modals: Why abandon the default approach. Erkenntnis, 82(6), 1351\u20131365.","journal-title":"Erkenntnis"},{"issue":"3","key":"9701_CR7","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"849","DOI":"10.1007\/s11229-011-9905-9","volume":"187","author":"R Hakli","year":"2012","unstructured":"Hakli, R., & Negri, S. (2012). Does the deduction theorem fail for modal logic? Synthese, 187(3), 849\u2013867.","journal-title":"Synthese"},{"issue":"3","key":"9701_CR8","first-page":"1","volume":"7","author":"JF Horty","year":"2007","unstructured":"Horty, J. F. (2007). Reasons as defaults. Philosophers\u2019 Imprint, 7(3), 1\u201328.","journal-title":"Philosophers\u2019 Imprint"},{"key":"9701_CR9","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1093\/acprof:oso\/9780199744077.001.0001","volume-title":"Reasons as defaults","author":"JF Horty","year":"2012","unstructured":"Horty, J. F. (2012). Reasons as defaults. New York: Oxford University Press."},{"issue":"6","key":"9701_CR10","first-page":"1373","volume":"6","author":"L Humberstone","year":"2019","unstructured":"Humberstone, L. (2019). Recent thought on is and ought: Connections, confluences and rediscoveries. FLAP, 6(6), 1373\u20131446.","journal-title":"FLAP"},{"key":"9701_CR11","volume-title":"Treatise on Human Nature","author":"DA Hume","year":"1978","unstructured":"Hume, D. A. (1978). Treatise on Human Nature, 2nd edn. New York: Oxford University Press.","edition":"2nd edn."},{"unstructured":"McNamara, P., & Van De Putte, F. (2021). Deontic logic. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.) The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy. Spring 2021. Stanford: Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University.","key":"9701_CR12"},{"key":"9701_CR13","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.30965\/9783957439611","volume-title":"Normenlogik - Grundlagen, Systeme, Anwendungen","author":"E Morscher","year":"2012","unstructured":"Morscher, E. (2012). Normenlogik - Grundlagen, Systeme, Anwendungen. Paderborn: Mentis Verlag."},{"issue":"4","key":"9701_CR14","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"418","DOI":"10.2307\/420956","volume":"4","author":"S Negri","year":"1998","unstructured":"Negri, S., & von Plato, J. (1998). Cut elimination in the presence of axioms. Bulletin of Symbolic Logic, 4(4), 418\u2013435.","journal-title":"Bulletin of Symbolic Logic"},{"key":"9701_CR15","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1017\/CBO9780511527340","volume-title":"Structural proof theory","author":"S Negri","year":"2001","unstructured":"Negri, S., & von Plato, J. (2001). Structural proof theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press."},{"key":"9701_CR16","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1017\/CBO9781139003513","volume-title":"Proof analysis: A contribution to Hilbert\u2019s last problem","author":"S Negri","year":"2011","unstructured":"Negri, S., & von Plato, J. (2011). Proof analysis: A contribution to Hilbert\u2019s last problem. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press."},{"doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Orlandelli, E. (2014). Proof analysis in deontic logics. In F. Cariani, D. Grossi, J. Meheus, & X. Parent (Eds.) Deontic logic and normative systems, DEON 2014, LNCS, (Vol. 8554 pp. 198\u2013216). Cham: Springer.","key":"9701_CR17","DOI":"10.1007\/978-3-319-08615-6_11"},{"doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Pigden, C. (Ed). (2010). Hume on Is and Ought. London: Palgrave Macmillan.","key":"9701_CR18","DOI":"10.1007\/978-0-230-29688-6"},{"issue":"219","key":"9701_CR19","first-page":"443","volume":"55","author":"F Poggiolesi","year":"2012","unstructured":"Poggiolesi, F. (2012). On the importance of being analytic: The paradigmatic case of the logic of proofs. Logique et Analyse, 55(219), 443\u2013461.","journal-title":"Logique et Analyse"},{"issue":"3","key":"9701_CR20","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"199","DOI":"10.1080\/00048406085200221","volume":"83","author":"A Prior","year":"1960","unstructured":"Prior, A. (1960). The autonomy of ethics. Australian Journal of Philosophy, 83(3), 199\u2013206.","journal-title":"Australian Journal of Philosophy"},{"doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Restall, G., & Russell, G. (2010). Barriers to implication. In C. Pigden (Ed.) Hume on Is and Ought (pp. 243\u2013260). London: Palgrave Macmillan.","key":"9701_CR21","DOI":"10.1007\/978-0-230-29688-6_21"},{"issue":"3","key":"9701_CR22","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"603","DOI":"10.1007\/s10992-021-09643-3","volume":"51","author":"G Russell","year":"2022","unstructured":"Russell, G. (2022). How to prove Hume\u2019s law. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 51(3), 603\u2013632.","journal-title":"Journal of Philosophical Logic"},{"key":"9701_CR23","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1007\/978-94-017-3375-5","volume-title":"The is-ought problem: An investigation in philosophical logic, vol. 1 of Trends in Logic","author":"G Schurz","year":"1997","unstructured":"Schurz, G. (1997). The is-ought problem: An investigation in philosophical logic, vol. 1 of Trends in Logic. Dordrecht: Springer."},{"doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Schurz, G. (2010). Non-trivial versions of Hume\u2019s Is-Ought thesis. In Hume on Is and Ought (pp. 198\u2013216). London: Palgrave Macmillan.","key":"9701_CR24","DOI":"10.1007\/978-0-230-29688-6_18"},{"key":"9701_CR25","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"193","DOI":"10.5840\/jphil2015112412","volume":"4","author":"DJ Singer","year":"2015","unstructured":"Singer, D. J. (2015). Mind the Is-Ought gap. Journal of Philosophy, 4, 193\u2013210.","journal-title":"Journal of Philosophy"},{"doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Smullyan, R. M. (1986). Logicians who reason about themselves. In J. Halpern (Ed.) Theoretical aspects of reasoning about knowledge, (pp. 341\u2013352). Los Altos: Morgan Kaufmann.","key":"9701_CR26","DOI":"10.1016\/B978-0-934613-04-0.50028-4"},{"key":"9701_CR27","volume-title":"Forever Undecided A Puzzle Guide to G\u00f6del","author":"RM Smullyan","year":"1987","unstructured":"Smullyan, R. M. (1987). Forever Undecided A Puzzle Guide to G\u00f6del. New York: Alfred A. Knopf Inc."},{"doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Troelstra, A., & Schwichtenberg, H. (2000). Basic Proof Theory. In Cambridge tracts in theoretical computer science. 2nd edn. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.","key":"9701_CR28","DOI":"10.1017\/CBO9781139168717"},{"doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Williamson, T. (2002). Knowledge and its Limits. Oxford University Press on Demand.","key":"9701_CR29","DOI":"10.1093\/019925656X.001.0001"}],"container-title":["Journal of Philosophical Logic"],"original-title":[],"language":"en","link":[{"URL":"https:\/\/link.springer.com\/content\/pdf\/10.1007\/s10992-023-09701-y.pdf","content-type":"application\/pdf","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"text-mining"},{"URL":"https:\/\/link.springer.com\/article\/10.1007\/s10992-023-09701-y\/fulltext.html","content-type":"text\/html","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"text-mining"},{"URL":"https:\/\/link.springer.com\/content\/pdf\/10.1007\/s10992-023-09701-y.pdf","content-type":"application\/pdf","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"similarity-checking"}],"deposited":{"date-parts":[[2023,7,18]],"date-time":"2023-07-18T14:07:47Z","timestamp":1689689267000},"score":1,"resource":{"primary":{"URL":"https:\/\/link.springer.com\/10.1007\/s10992-023-09701-y"}},"subtitle":[],"short-title":[],"issued":{"date-parts":[[2023,2,14]]},"references-count":29,"journal-issue":{"issue":"4","published-print":{"date-parts":[[2023,8]]}},"alternative-id":["9701"],"URL":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/s10992-023-09701-y","relation":{},"ISSN":["0022-3611","1573-0433"],"issn-type":[{"type":"print","value":"0022-3611"},{"type":"electronic","value":"1573-0433"}],"subject":[],"published":{"date-parts":[[2023,2,14]]},"assertion":[{"value":"26 November 2021","order":1,"name":"received","label":"Received","group":{"name":"ArticleHistory","label":"Article History"}},{"value":"14 January 2023","order":2,"name":"accepted","label":"Accepted","group":{"name":"ArticleHistory","label":"Article History"}},{"value":"14 February 2023","order":3,"name":"first_online","label":"First Online","group":{"name":"ArticleHistory","label":"Article History"}},{"order":1,"name":"Ethics","group":{"name":"EthicsHeading","label":"Declarations"}},{"value":"All authors certify that they have no affiliations with or involvement in any organization or entity with any financial interest or non-financial interest in the subject matter or materials discussed in this manuscript.","order":2,"name":"Ethics","group":{"name":"EthicsHeading","label":"<!--Emphasis Type='Bold' removed-->Conflict of Interests"}}]}}